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Abstract
Aristotle’s virtue theory is considered the main depository of prominent pro-
business/market and anti-business/market approaches to business and economic ethics. 
However, Aristotle’s ethical and economic thought is not clearly in favor or against 
business and other market institutions. Hence, most writers assume what they should 
prove independently. The former tend to overlook his anti-business claims as these 
appear mostly in his writings about the art of wealth acquisition (chrematistics or 
χρηματιστική; Politics I.8-11). The latter make a superficial reading of Aristotle’s 
writings on chrematistics, commercial justice and economics and downplay the pro-
business implications of these writings. My thesis is a study of Aristotle’s account of 
chrematistics in relation to his ethical, political and economic thinking because, 
currently, there is no book-length reconstruction and interpretation of it. My 
exegetical task is to reconstruct and interpret his writings in chrematistics and my 
critical task is to answer whether he was a friend or foe of business and other market 
institutions. While I examine all modes of chrematistics, my main research question is 
concerned with the ethical status of business.
In the first chapter I present how the question about chrematistics arises in the Politics, 
and how it relates to Aristotle’s concerns in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. 
In the second chapter I present Aristotle’s quasi-historical and ethical account of 
chrematistics as these appear in Pol. I.8-11. In the third chapter I examine further in 
the Politics why Aristotle censures the lower occupations, including commerce, and I 
argue that his critique is not ideological as most scholars contend; his objections rest 
on his perfectionist view of constitutions and citizenship. In the fourth chapter I 
present and examine Aristotle’s theory of just price as this appears in NE V.5. I argue 
that the market price of a product is just when the utility of exchangers is equally 
satisfied and approximates the ‘natural’ price of the product. In the fifth chapter I 
examine the reading that business is an unjust way of wealth-acquisition. I argue that 
Aristotle mainly objects to business qua the principle of unlimited wealth-acquisition 
and to parasitic forms of business. Instead he seems to approve of business that closes 
gaps in self-sufficiency and generates profit within the bounds of the natural prices of 
goods. The sixth chapter examines the reading that the institutions of commercial 
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economies are inimical to virtue and necessitate greed and injustice. I suggest that, for 
Aristotle, money and business are neutral devices; greed and acquisitiveness are 
natural propensities that arise independently from the institutions of money and 
business. However, Aristotle is wary of the mercantile life and commercial economies, 




My engagement with Aristotle’s theory of business started life in the wake of the 
Global Recession (2008-2010) and the fiscal crisis of my home country, Greece, 
which affected me financially and led me to interrupt my PhD study for three years. 
Before the interruption, my doctoral research aimed at developing an Aristotelian 
approach to the ethical responsibilities of businesses, especially of the large 
corporations of the financial sector. During the interruption I realized that most virtue-
theoretic research in economic and business ethics is not informed by Aristotle’s 
philosophy of business and economic thought. Virtue-ethicists usually take it for 
granted that Aristotelian virtue theory is indispensable in business although Aristotle 
himself questioned the very possibility of virtuous business. Hence, their project 
somehow assumes what it should prove independently. 
I decided to write my thesis on Aristotle’s philosophy of business since there is no 
book-length treatment of the subject that informs current research in virtue-theoretic 
business ethics. The only book that examines Aristotle’s philosophy of business is 
Meikle’s ‘Aristotle’s Economic Thought’ although only in part. However, his book 
differs from mine in subject matter which seeks to contribute a close reading of 
Aristotle’s work on business. My choice of topic started from discontent with both 
Meikle’s Marxian reading and the disregard of Aristotelian business ethicists of 
Aristotle’s critique of business. In addition, I found in Aristotle a corrective to the 
alarming consequences of the ethics of neo-classical economics and policy-making. 
Mainstream economists, governments and policy-makers usually prioritize economic 
efficiency over social, political, ethical, and environmental concerns. They believe 
that the self-interested pursuit of profit-maximization is the ‘invisible hand’—the 
driving force behind self-regulating markets—that maximizes efficiency, preference-
satisfaction, and secures freedom and distributive justice. However, the recent 
financial crash disproved the dogma of unfettered markets. Governments were forced 
to use massive bail-outs in order to restore the banking sector at the expense of tax-
payers, although the financial crisis resulted from the excessive and unregulated 
profit-seeking of both the depository and the shadow banking system. Evidently, the 
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current system of governance lacks substantive ethical orientation and, most 
importantly, there is no inbuilt ethical limit on market operation. 
As a student of Aristotle’s philosophy, I was surprised to see that his main worry with 
the primitive market economy of his time is so current: wealth-acquisition should not 
be detached from ethical and political ends. In my view, his inquiry in chrematistics is 
chiefly an attempt to arrange economic and ethical ends properly, and to place a limit 
on market operation because he realized that there is no natural limit in profit-seeking. 
The ‘economic’ and the ‘ethical’ are two separate spheres and, unfortunately, 
societies have failed to place wealth-acquisition under higher ethical and political 
ends. 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the teaching, inspiration and 
support of numerous people. First, I am grateful to the whole staff and postgraduate 
community at Edinburgh who over the years have, knowingly or otherwise, taught me 
philosophy in both formal and informal ways (e.g. in seminars and conversation). I 
am unable to name each one of them but Dr. Christos Kyriakou and Owen Kelly are 
due special thanks. Second, I owe a great deal to my teachers during my MSc study. I 
was lucky enough to have been taught by such philosophers as Huw Price, Richard 
Holton, Rae Langton, Peter Kail and Mike Ridge (my MSc thesis supervisor). Third, I 
am greatly indebted to my supervisor Dory Scaltsas not only for his exquisite 
supervision and teaching, but also for his kindness, patience and moral support during 
a difficult time for me. Dory has taught me a great deal about ancient and 
contemporary philosophy since my MSc study when I joined his seminar in Ancient 
Philosophy with other budding philosophers. He is not only an erudite professor but 
also an exceptionally skillful ‘interlocutor’ who offers a most exquisite kind of 
philosophical training through rigorous and exhaustive argument analysis. Dory 
guided me skillfully through the exegetical and philosophical puzzles of Aristotle’s 
texts and encouraged me to grapple with them confidently and methodically. He 
helped me attain clarity and avoid lots of inconsistencies and mistakes during the 
writing of my thesis. Dory taught me that classical philosophy should have to be 
neither a prison nor a museum. I’m most grateful to him for showing me how to avoid 
a pure antiquarianism and how to use classical philosophy in order to fertilize 
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contemporary thought. Last, but not least, I have to thank my family—my parents 
Giorgos and Eleni, and my sister Katerina. Without their love, their patience and 
invaluable support I wouldn’t have been able to write this thesis. 
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Aristotle’s ethical and political writings have been the main repository of ideas of the 
virtue-ethical paradigm in business and economic ethics since the early 1990’s.1 
Nowadays there is a profusion of Aristotelian answers to perennial ethical questions at 
the intersection of economics, ethics and politics regarding the operation of the 
market system and business. Does business profit derive from unjust exchanges? Is 
the profit-motive antithetical to moral virtue? Does the market solution to societies’ 
economizing problem help us realize core ethical and political aims like justice, 
freedom, happiness, solidarity?2
 
On the one hand, Aristotelian business ethicists hold that his virtue theory is integral 
in the field: the moral virtues are indispensable in ethical business practice since the 
business enterprise is a form of Aristotelian community aiming at happiness.3 They 
also assume that Aristotle’s ethics is compatible with capitalist economies. On the 
other hand, Aristotle’s critique of business has fueled a long-standing suspicion of the 
profit-motive. This hostility runs from the Antiquity through the Medieval schoolmen 
to modern philosophy (e.g. Rousseau and Marx).4 Today, Aristotle is often cited in 
critiques of the market system as well in contemporary anti-market strands in ethics 
which hold that business ethics is an oxymoron.5 
It is puzzling that friends and foes of the market system both claim Aristotle as their 
precursor because Aristotle could not have been both a friend and a foe of business. 
Unfortunately, most writers in business ethics ignore Aristotle’s account of wealth-
1 See Capaldi (2013).
2 According to economists, the ‘economizing’ problem is as follows:”The ends are various. The time 
and the means for achieving these ends are limited and capable of alternative application. At the same 
time the ends have different importance”; Robbins (1932:12). Economizing is possible because agents 
can put resources into alternative uses and rank their preferences. Over the course of history, there have 
emerged three major types of economies as solutions to the economizing problem: economies run by 
tradition, by command, and by markets; see Heilbronner (2012:6-11).  
3 Solomon (1992).
4 Rousseau (1997 [1750]); Marx (1995 [1867]).
5 The prominent Aristotelian critic of the market system is MacIntyre (1984). For market and anti-
market approaches to business ethics see Capaldi (2013). For pro-market approaches see Solomon 
(1992), van Staveren (2001), Kay (2003), Crespo (2014), Miller (1990) and (2017). Except for 
MacIntyre (1984) and Meikle (1995), for more recent anti-market approaches to business and 
economic ethics see the volume Bielskis & Knight (2015). 
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acquisition (χρηματιστική; chrematistics)6 and commercial justice. It should be said in 
fairness to Aristotelian business ethicists that Aristotle actually held mixed views 
about business, or so I argue. Hence, his account of chrematistics appears complex 
and filled with contradictions. On the one hand, he held that foreign trade is necessary 
for the survival of cities. Also, he argued that landless citizens could become traders. 
On the other, hand, he was wary of the mercantile life because he argued that it is 
inimical to virtue. He also censured commerce as a perversion of the natural end of 
exchange, i.e. self-sufficiency. In addition, he appears to think that commercial profit 
is gain at the expense of others.
With a few notable exceptions, most commentaries of Aristotle’s chrematistics tend to 
be brief, dismissive or ignore the political and economic dimensions of his account. 7 
In my view, there is no convincing account of Aristotle’s contradictory claims about 
business. Some commentators argue that his negative claims about business are just 
evidence of his aristocratic bias against merchants. Others take his negative claims at 
face value and think that Aristotle offers a straightforward rejection of business and 
commercial economies. While his account of chrematistics is not conclusive and parts 
of it pertain to the economy of his time (e.g. his account of wage labor), his theory of 
business and commercial justice can fertilize current research in business and 
economic ethics. Most notably, Aristotle highlights the need for an economy of self-
sufficiency which places a limit on wealth-acquisition and market economies.
In effect, the aim of my dissertation is to contribute the first comprehensive treatment 
of Aristotle on chrematistics. My interest in Aristotle’s account is both exegetical and 
critical. The exegetical task aims at clarifying what he has said and, partly, what he 
should say about business, especially in light of his economic thought and his theory 
of commercial justice in NE V.5. My critical task is to see what contemporary 
philosophy of business and economic ethics can learn from Aristotle. The main 
question I examine is whether he was a friend or foe of business and, more broadly, of 
commercial economies because this has important implications for the philosophy of 
6 Variably translated as, for example, ‘the art of getting wealth’ (see Jowett (1885)), or the ‘skill of 
acquiring goods’ (see Saunders (2002)).
7 Meikle (1996).
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business. If Aristotle’s account, and/or his ethical and political theory, imply that 
business is an inherently unethical practice, then it is difficult to see how there could 
be an Aristotelian defense of business or a virtue-theoretic analysis of business 
practices. On the other hand, if his account implies that business is not inherently 
unjust, then an Aristotelian critique of market economies would be a non-starter. 
My dissertation consists of the reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of chrematistics 
as this appears in Pol. I.8-11, the presentation and critical discussion of the 
interpretations offered so far. Contrary to most commentators, I argue that Aristotle 
was neither a friend nor a foe of business. Rather, he was after an ethical limit on 
wealth-acquisition and commercial exchange because he realized that these are not 
limited by nature. For Aristotle, wealth should be limited by the material self-
sufficiency required for survival and the good life.8 In addition, I argue that, in 
principle, business can be compatible with Aristotle’s virtue-theoretic standards, viz. 
if it aims at self-sufficiency. However, Aristotle thought that the mercantile life is not 
suitable for the virtuous person and he favored agrarian economies because 
commercial economies facilitate the acquisitive tendencies of individuals. On the 
other hand, he was aware that commerce arises out of necessary exchange and is 
unavoidable since it serves pragmatic purposes—it is useful for the survival of cities 
and households. 
Aristotle’s inquiry in chrematistics starts in Pol. I.3 as part of his inquiry into the 
nature of the art of household-management (οἰκονομική; Pol. 1253b11-14).9 The main 
bulk of his theory appears in Pol. I.8-11 and unfolds from his problematic of the 
relationship between the two arts, economics and chrematistics. For Aristotle, the art 
of chrematistics is not identical with the art of household-management but a part of, 
and auxiliary (ὑπηρετική; hupêretikê) to, it. The two arts differ in terms of function 
8 My interpretation places Aristotle squarely in the current debate about the moral limits of markets. 
The central issue in the debate is whether there is something morally wrong with a society in which 
non-economic goods are commodified; see Sandel (2012). It is also the question about which things 
should / should not be for sale and the derivative question about the limits of profit-making. 
9 Οἰκονομική here is not the same field with the modern discipline of economics, i.e. “the science 
which studies how individuals and societies make economic choices under conditions of scarcity”; 
McConnell (2009:2).
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(Pol. 1256a10-13): the art of chrematistics aims at supplying the property required for 
the exercise of household-management. Hence, chrematistics, says Aristotle, should 
be subsumed under, and limited by, household-management. His interest in 
chrematistics and economics was not primarily analytic but ethical: it starts at the very 
beginning of the Politics with the question ‘How we can live well as a community?’. 
In particular, the purpose of the Politics, as he states it in the concluding passage of 
the Nicomachean Ethics (1181b17-24), is to find out the economic and constitutional 
arrangements most conducive to human flourishing (εὐδαιμονία; i.e. flourishing or 
happiness). That is why his inquiry in chrematistics is inextricably linked to his 
discussion of household-management and politics. The economic arrangements of a 
city should not undermine the natural end of human happiness, civic friendship and 
reciprocal justice.  
My plan for answering whether Aristotle was a friend or foe of business follows the 
order of Aristotle’s exposition of chrematistics (Pol. I.3 & I.8-11) and commercial 
justice (NE V.5). His first question is concerned with the relationship between 
chrematistics and household-management. This is the key to the second problem: the 
distinction between natural and unnatural chrematistics. On the basis of his answers to 
these two questions Aristotle describes the economic responsibilities of the 
householder and the ethical forms of wealth-acquisition, that is, the natural and the 
unnatural modes of chrematistics. His third question is whether commercial profit is 
an inherently unjust gain and, hence, whether a commercial economy necessitates 
injustice and greed. 
Let me now provide a preview of my dissertation. The first chapter is the backdrop of 
the theory of chrematistics. In particular, it puts forth the main questions about 
chrematistics, it explains the origin of these questions in the Ethics and the Politics, 
and describes Aristotle’s method. In addition, this chapter presents the psychological 
elements of his economic thinking.10 Aristotle’s naturalistic analysis of economic 
10 For Aristotle, “economics is chiefly concerned with the ordering of human purpose and function 
within the two dominant economic units of his day—the household and the state”; Gordon (2005:400). 
Aristotle develops an economics of the household—not an economics of markets—which is chiefly 
concerned with the efficient administration of the household, including the efficient distribution of 
resources. 
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behavior is normative since it is based on his normative moral psychology:11 the 
standards of virtue and happiness prescribe the ethical scope of the economic arts and 
the extent to which wealth is necessary for happiness. Aristotle’s starting question 
about chrematistics is (1) the relationship between chrematistics and household-
management in the teleological order of practical and productive arts. His inquiry in 
chrematistics starts as a quasi-historical reconstruction of the development of socio-
political and economic arrangements. As we shall see in chapter 2, this inquiry is an 
attempt to delimit the natural from the unnatural modes of acquisition—namely, 
question (2)—and culminates in an ethical critique of unnatural chrematistics (Pol. 
I.10). In particular, Aristotle seeks to analyze the forms of chrematistics that are 
suitable for the good person / citizen, the good city and the good life. In effect, I 
explicate Aristotle’s system of arts and show how this system is structured with 
politics in topmost position and the two economic arts subsumed under it. Second, I 
sketch Aristotle’s view of human nature and moral psychology because his answer to 
question (2) is based on standards of his ethical and political theory—viz. virtue, 
happiness, citizenship. I give special attention to his views of human reason, 
happiness, pleasure and desire as these are implicated in economic behavior. Third, I 
discuss the place of wealth in Aristotle’s hierarchy of goods and propose that, for 
Aristotle, wealth is both an instrument required for virtuous activity and leisure, and a 
constituent of happiness provided that the user of wealth is a good person. 
In the second chapter, I reconstruct Aristotle’s writings about chrematistics in Pol. I.3 
& I.8-11. I show how he analyzes the tasks associated with household rule, including 
the acquisition of wealth, on the basis of the natural limit of self-sufficiency. This 
analysis delimits the ethical scope of chrematistics in accord with the highest human 
end (i.e. happiness) and carves out the space of the natural economy where some 
modes of acquisition are ethical and promote human flourishing, whereas others, like 
commerce and money-lending, are unsuitable for the good person and citizen. 
According to Aristotle’s answer to question (1), chrematistics is the art of supplying 
wealth; household-management is the art of using wealth efficiently. In regards to 
11 In Aristotle’s ethical theory there seems to be no gap between facts about human nature and norms 
about how humans should live. The natural end of flourishing or happiness prescribes the conditions 
that fulfill this end. 
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question (2), Aristotle separates natural from unnatural chrematistics by using a 
standard (Natural Standard, hereafter) that comes in three forms: first, the source of 
wealth must be natural; second, chrematistics must aim at true wealth (the wealth 
required for the good life); third, wealth from exchange must be based on the use 
value of the good exchanged. Hence, only natural chrematistics is part of household-
management: the householder should know how to manage the tasks of natural 
chrematistics. Also, natural chrematistics may be an auxiliary to household-
management: the acquisition of wealth should be delegated to others and supervised 
by the householder—e.g. the householder should not necessarily be a farmer but 
should know how to manage production. However, some commercial modes of 
chrematistics are not clearly natural or unnatural—e.g. mining for trade. Also, in other 
parts of the Politics, Aristotle does not use the Natural Standard in his categorization 
of the lower occupations. While in Pol. I.8 he classifies farming in natural 
chrematistics, in Pol. VII.9 he delegates it to non-citizens because he considers it as an 
obstacle to the leisure required for political participation. Also, in Pol. III.5 he argues 
that workers and craftsmen should not be citizens; this raises the social categorization 
problem of the industrial class of the βάναυσοι (the banausic class). Since his 
objections to the lower occupations are not based on his natural standard, as in Pol. 
1.9-11, most scholars argue that his objections rest on class prejudice. I examine 
further this problem in chapter three in light of his accounts of citizenship and the best 
state because it appears that his objections to these occupations are informed by his 
perfectionist political theory. In regards to question (3), Aristotle offers no discussion 
of justice in market exchange in Pol. I.8-11 except for a quick remark in Pol. 1258a40: 
commercial gain derives at the expense of others (ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν). For most 
commentators here Aristotle claims that market exchanges are zero-sum and profit 
can only be had unjustly. I examine this reading in chapters four and five in the light 
of NE V.5. Also, for some commentators, Pol. I.9 raises the further question whether, 
for Aristotle, a commercial economy makes people greedy. His analysis points out 
that commerce and money facilitate the tendency to pursue unlimited wealth. Does 
this tendency arise from the market institutions or independently from them? This 
requires a clarification of economic virtues and vices. 
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In chapter 3, I reconstruct and examine Aristotle’s critique of the banausic 
occupations because his discussion of hired labor and the crafts in Pol. I.11 is very 
brief and incomplete. Most importantly, his objections to hired labor, commerce and 
the crafts appear to be no longer based on his Natural Standard. Rather, his critique of 
these occupations is part of his answer to the problem of the social categorization of 
the industrial class in the ideal city-state. Aristotle contends that the industrial class 
should not participate in office. For most scholars, his objections are ideological 
rather than philosophical.12 My aim in this chapter is to illuminate further which 
modes of acquisition Aristotle thinks suitable for the good person and the citizen of 
ideal and non-ideal regimes.13 In effect, first, I present and explain the inconsistencies 
between Aristotle’s discussions of Pol. I.8-11 and Pol. IV, VII and VIII—for example, 
his different approach to farming in Pol. I.8 and VII.9. Second, I examine the reading 
which holds that Aristotle’s objections to the lower occupations are ideological and I 
reject it. In brief, I argue that his objections are based on his ethical perfectionism and 
on his empirical observation that the lower occupations damage the moral character of 
individuals. I also argue that the ideological-bias reading overlooks that in Aristotle’s 
ideal regime the industrial and mercantile classes should consist of a non-Hellenic 
population who are not citizens. The ideal city-state seems to be his blueprint for 
Hellenic colonies where Greek citizens should be devoted to political activity. Also, 
the ethical status of occupations varies with the constitutional arrangement at hand. 
For example, while Aristotle’s ideal regime is an aristocracy, his best practicable state 
is the polity—the mixed constitution with a large middle-class pursuing various 
occupations, including perhaps the lower ones. If Aristotle’s rejection of the lower 
occupations was ideological, he would have contended that aristocracy is also the best 
practicable regime. Perhaps, he exaggerates the effects of these occupations on the 
moral character of agents because of empirical error. Or he might have used it for 
rhetorical purposes—he warns that the mercantile and the menial life are unsuitable 
for the free person and inimical to the life of virtue and political activity.
12 For example, see Newman (1887:138); Barker (1906:376); Ross (2005:255); Schumpeter (1954a:60).
13 By ‘ideal’ state Aristotle refers to the best conceivable regime “if there were no external obstacles” 
(Pol. 1288b23). This is not the same with the best practicable city-state of Pol. V which combines the 
unqualifiedly ideal regime and “the best [regime] in the circumstances” (Pol. 1288b25).
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Aristotle’s analysis of the ethical status of business in Pol. I.9-10 is incomplete 
because we lack an account of its justice. In the Politics he only makes a quick remark 
about justice and business: “…commerce is a mode by which men gain from one 
another” (Pol. 1258a38-b2). In the fourth chapter I present and examine Aristotle’s 
solution to the problem of justice in exchange, as he analyzes it in NE V.5: how is 
justice in exchange achieved? For most commentators, this passage implies that one 
can gain only by selling in excess of the just price. According to Aristotle, an 
exchange is just when exchangers transfer the amount of value they receive in accord 
with proportionate equality. His formula of proportionate equality ‘as builder is to 
shoemaker, so many shoes to a house’ (NE 1133a22-23) has generated an astounding 
amount of interpretations. Is proportionate equality, equality of utilities or equality of 
labor? This question brings us to Aristotle’s economic thinking. If prices are fixed 
independently from the need of exchangers, by some quantitative factor, like labor or 
cost-of-production, then the just price is proportionate equality of that factor. Hence, 
business profit can be had only in excess of the just price. On the other hand, if prices 
are formed by the subjective preferences and needs of exchangers, then the just price 
is fixed by equality of utility; hence, in principle, business profit can be had fairly as 
long as the price satisfies both exchangers. In the first section of chapter 4, I present 
Aristotle’s theory of justice and explain how commercial justice differs from 
corrective and distributive justice. In section 4.2, I present Aristotle’s analysis of 
commercial justice as this appears in NE V.5. In particular, I explain how his analysis 
raises the problem of commensurability and how he tackles with it.14 In section 4.3, I 
present the utility and labor theories of economic value and I explain why I find the 
readings of Aristotle based on these theories unsatisfactory. In effect, I propose an 
alternative interpretation of his formula that is in line with his thinking about 
economic value. For Aristotle, prices are formed by the needs of exchangers but the 
just price must take into account the value of each exchanger’s work in a non-
subjective way so that they are compensated properly. I introduce here Adam Smith’s 
notion of ‘natural’ or ‘long-term’ market price: the value of one’s work is the natural 
price of one’s product which is non-subjective utility. Like Smith’s natural price, 
14 Aristotle sought the standard which brings incomparable goods, such as houses and beds, etc., in 
proportionate equality. In other words, the problem of commercial justice raises the problem of 
commensurability.
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Aristotle’s just price derives from undistorted competition: the seller and the buyer 
bargain on the basis of equal need as if they formed a bi-lateral monopoly. As a result, 
each exchanger receives and transfers an equal amount of utility. The natural price is 
a guide to the just price: the builder and the shoemaker must receive as many shoes 
and houses as the natural price of their products commands.
The aim of the fifth chapter is to present and discuss Aristotle’s ethical critique of 
business profit. For most commentators, Aristotle maintains that trade is a zero-sum 
economic practice. Hence, one’s business profit can only be had at another’s loss. 
Their reading is based on Pol. 1258a38-b2. However, this interpretation overlooks 
that Aristotle’s just price allows the possibility of business profit as long as the market 
price is within the bounds of the natural price. They also overlook the pro-business 
evidence in Aristotle’s writings. In Pol. I.9 and I.11 Aristotle approves certain 
profitable business practices, such as the trade of household surpluses, foreign trade 
(ἐμπορία; empôria), manufacture for trade, commercial agriculture, and trade based 
on mining (μεταλευτική) and logging (ὑλοτομία). I argue that the standard 
interpretation is not the correct rendering of Aristotle’s critique of business profit and 
I propose an alternative way to understand the Pol. 1258a38-b2 passage. In section 
5.1, I present the standard reading and argue that it presupposes an objectivist view 
about economic value. In section 5.2, I critically discuss the standard interpretation. I 
explain that this reading faces three difficulties. It must square the Pol. 1258a38-b2 
passage with, first, Aristotle’s non-objectivist conception of economic value, second, 
the zero-sum assumption, and third, the pro-business evidence. In section 5.3, I 
propose a way to square this passage with these three conditions. I argue that this 
passage is not an all-out rejection of commercial profit but refers to the kinds of 
business that create profit from the exchange itself (καπηλική). Such profit violates 
the Natural Standard and the just price: the seller gains more use value he/she offers. 
My interpretation helps explain why Aristotle does not reject all forms of business; he 
rejects only the parasitic ones. I argue that, however, his main objection to business is 
that it pursues unlimited wealth and, hence, that there is no natural limit in profit-
making from market exchanges, like the limit of self-sufficiency, as this is expressed 
by the natural price of goods. This raises the question whether the organizing and 
ethical principles of commercial economies— especially, the principles of self-
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interest and profit-maximization which mobilize economic activity in market 
economies—foster selfishness and greed. Although Aristotle’s psychological account 
of chrematistics in Pol. 1257b21-1258a14 suggests that it is up to agents whether they 
pursue fair or unfair gain from commerce, some commentators argue that commerce 
and money are not neutral devices; they necessitate greed and injustice. This is the 
subject of the sixth chapter of my dissertation.
In chapter 6, I examine whether Aristotle held that greed and injustice arise as a result 
of the institutions of money and business, or whether these serve to satisfy the desire 
for excessive acquisition. The key question is whether business necessitates greed and 
commercial injustice. In the Pol. 1257b21-1258a14 Aristotle says that those attached 
to the life of physical gratification misuse the mechanism of exchange in order to 
maximize their wealth. However, he is also aware that there is no natural limit on 
prices and on the desire for unlimited wealth. Business and money create the belief 
that wealth-acquisition is about unlimited wealth. Hence, business, for Aristotle, is not 
as neutral as some commentators argue. In section 6.1, I present the two competing 
interpretations, what I call the structuralist and the agential readings. According to 
the structuralist reading, money and business necessitate greedy behavior and create 
the desire for unlimited wealth. On the other hand, the agential reading holds that 
acquisitive tendencies do not originate from the institutions of commercial economies 
independently but are somehow inborn in the agent. In addition, the agential reading 
stresses that it is up to agents to manage their characters and desires. In section 6.2, I 
explain how particular injustice differs from the other vice of acquisition, illiberality 
in taking, and how it arises. I argue that the greedy person is selfish (φίλαυτος); 
selfishness leads to particular injustice but not to illiberality necessarily. Aristotle’s 
psychology implies that economic structures do not necessitate but rather reinforce 
greed because they operate on the basis of material self-interest and profit-
maximizing behavior. In section 6.3, I argue that the agential reading cannot explain 
away why the mercantile life is unfavorable to virtue. Aristotle insists on that the 
mercantile life harms moral character, most likely, through habituation: the more 
opportunistic and parasitic a trader’s practice, the more accustomed to injustice one 
becomes. In my view, Aristotle either errs about the effects of the mercantile life on 
moral character or he exaggerates these effects for rhetorical purposes. A third 
21
possibility is that he was biased against the mercantile class but I dismiss this 
possibility in chapter 3.3. 
As a final note, I should stress the following caveat. Aristotle’s account of 
commercial chrematistics pertains to commerce in a predominantly agrarian and 
household-based economy which aimed at self-sufficiency. The ideal of this 
economic model is the efficient management of the household and the city.15 On the 
other hand, modern economies are market economies whose aim is the allocative and 
productive efficiency of interconnected, self-regulating markets which aim at 
maximizing utility.16 There is a lasting but inconclusive debate about the nature of the 
ancient economy—whether it was a primitive non-market economy or a small-scale 
version of a modern market economy—which we need to take into account in order to 
avoid the risk of anachronism by false comparisons between ancient and 
contemporary economies. In particular, we need to identify carefully the economic 
practices and principles that are the subject of Aristotle’s critique of business because 
some of his economic concepts are quite different from ours. Hence, we should 
extrapolate his critique to contemporary economies only to the extent that it overlaps 
with the organizing principles of market economies and the concepts of modern 
economics. For example, Aristotle’s conception of profit (κέρδος) is not ethically 
neutral, like the contemporary concept of ‘accounting profit’, but has the pejorative 
sense of ‘unfair gain’. Also, in modern market economies, profit-maximization and 
the maximization of wealth serve to attain the ends of efficiency and preference 
satisfaction. In modern economics, the more a society maximizes its economy’s 
efficiency the more successfully it deals with the problem of scarcity: it maximizes 
preference satisfaction at minimum cost and with minimum waste. Efficiency in 
modern economics is the efficiency of self-regulating markets in maximizing utility, 
where this is construed as preference satisfaction from the consumption of goods and 
services. In the modern solution, the ‘invisible hand’ is the driving force of market 
economies where self-interested buyers and sellers compete in order to maximize 
their utilities and profits. An axiom of modern economics is that competitive markets 
15 Xenophon’s Oeconomicus “is a systematic treatment of the organization and administration of the 
agricultural estate, emphasizing human capital and organizational efficiency”; Lowry (1987:13).
16 Utility is construed as preference satisfaction from the consumption of goods and services.
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maximize efficiency. There is an equilibrium price at which the quantity supplied 
equals the quantity demanded; it is the price that maximizes the utility of consumers 
and businesses. We need to take into account that, for modern economists, 
opportunities for profit arise as a result of consumer demand or need. 
While modern economists have purged the idea of profit-maximization and wealth-
maximization in the name of efficiency and social welfare, we do know if Aristotle 
would concur to this ideal. Markets at his time were not interconnected and the role of 
business operation in producing allocative efficiency escaped him. In addition, his 
critique of business is not concerned with the business enterprise of modern capitalist 
economies as such. Also, his theory of just price does not deal with the ethics of the 
price-mechanism of self-regulating markets where prices result from the interplay of 
aggregate supply and demand. Rather, Aristotle’s theory is concerned with the ethics 
of price formation in barter and local trade which was often opportunistic and preyed 
on the needs of customers. Also, he does not discuss financial markets and productive 
lending. Hence, apart from the exegetical difficulties that could arise by using modern 
economic concepts in interpreting Aristotle’s critique of business, modern business 
ethicists and economists should also watch out for false comparisons. Although 
Aristotle offered useful discussion of such concepts as the just price and economic 
value, as it appears, we cannot extrapolate Aristotle’s work on chrematistics to each 
and every organizing principle and practice of market economies. 
We also need to take into account that he approached economic phenomena as a 
moral and political philosopher who realized that the emerging commercial economy 
of his time raised the problem of a limit on acquisition and profit-making. In contrast 
to the modern solution to the economizing problem, which emphasizes the pursuit of 
ever-increasing wealth, Aristotle argues that human flourishing does not require 
unlimited wealth. Rather, economic activity should be limited by the requirements of 
happiness; unlimited wealth serves no purpose and is an irrational end. In addition, 
while modern economics is neutral about the rational evaluation of our preferences, 
ancient economic thinking emphasizes the evaluation of our ends and their proper 
ordering. Accordingly, Aristotle’s response to the economizing problem is that we 
need to re-adjust and manage our preferences regarding the acquisition and use of 
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wealth. Wealth-acquisition should be an intermediate end that serves politics which 
aims at the flourishing of society as a whole. This core idea of Aristotle’s theory of 
chrematistics sets apart modern from ancient economic thinking and could be an 
invaluable lesson for contemporary theorists.
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CHAPTER 1
Chrematistics, Aristotelian Principles and Method
Overview
This chapter is the conceptual backdrop of Aristotle’s inquiry in chrematistics. In 
particular, I introduce Aristotle’s main questions about chrematistics: first, how 
chrematistics is related to household-management; second, how natural chrematistics 
differs from unnatural chrematistics; third, which modes of chrematistics are 
compatible with his virtue-theoretic standards, i.e. happiness, virtue and justice. Then, 
I outline the main concepts and principles of Aristotle’s ethical, psychological and 
political theory that inform his answer to these questions. 
In section 1.1, I discuss how the questions about chrematistics arise from his Ethics 
and Politics. In section 1.2, I outline the main questions, methodology and principles 
of Aristotle’s ethical and political theory as these underlie his work on chrematistics. 
In section 1.3, I present the main moral-psychological concepts involved in Aristotle’s 
theory of chrematistics. I explicate the relationship between happiness and virtue, and 
between happiness and pleasure as these are implicated in economic behavior. In 
section 1.4, I outline Aristotle’s political naturalism. In particular, I present his quasi-
historical account of political and economic arrangements—the household and the 
city—in order to explicate the political origin of his questions about chrematistics. 
This section is also the background of section 1.5 because it provides structure to 
Aristotle’s teleological system of practical arts and informs his answer to question (1), 
including how chrematistics ought to be related to politics. Also, section 1.5, 
examines the relationship between wealth and happiness—question (1.a). 
1.1 The Questions about Chrematistics 
In this section I address the main questions about chrematistics and then explain how 
they arise from Aristotle’s background inquiry in happiness, citizenship and the best 
city. 
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1.1.1 The Master Question
Aristotle’s inquiry in chrematistics starts at Pol. I.3 as part of his inquiry into the art of 
household-management: 
But there is also a part which some believe to be identical to household 
management (i.e. οἰκονομική), and others believe to be its largest part. We 
shall have to study its nature too. I am speaking of what is called wealth 
acquisition (i.e. χρηματιστική). (Pol. 1253b11-14).
Here we learn that the received view17 about wealth leaves it unclear whether 
chrematistics is identical with the art of household-management or whether it is an 
auxiliary to it (ὑπηρετική; hupêretikê). In NE 1094a9 Aristotle appears to subscribe to 
this view. He says that wealth is the end of household-management. However, in Pol. 
I.3 he casts doubt on this popular opinion and sets out to examine the relationship 
between chrematistics and household-management because he thinks that they might 
not be identical after all. In effect, Aristotle asks the following question: 
The Master Question 
Is the art of wealth-acquisition identical with the art of household-
management?
This is the key question because his other questions about chrematistics unfold from it. 
Very briefly, Aristotle replies that they are not identical arts because they have 
different aims or functions (Pol. 1256a10-13). So, the Master Question becomes: 
1. What are the aims of the two economic arts? And how are the two arts related 
to one another? For example, is chrematistics a part or auxiliary to household-
management?
The main body of Aristotle’s theory of chrematistics unfolds from this problematic. In 
Pol. I.8-11, question (1) becomes:
2. When is chrematistics a proper part of household-management and, hence, 
natural? When chrematistics is not part of household-management and hence, 
unnatural? 
Aristotle’s theory of chrematistics subdivides into the following ethical problems: 
17 The source of this opinion is not clear; see e.g. Newman (1887:127); cf. Saunders (2002:84) cites Pol. 
1257b24-31 and Xenophon’s Oeconomicus Ill.15.
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(1.a) Which tasks of natural chrematistics are proper for the householder and the 
statesman and to what extent should householders pursue wealth?
(2.a) Which modes of chrematistics are suitable for the good city and the good 
person / citizen?
(2.b)  Does greed arise as a result of the practice of business and more broadly, the 
institutions of money and market exchange? Or is business a neutral device that 
serves to satisfy the natural predisposition of agents for excessive acquisition?
As we shall see in chapter 2, the key to questions (1) and (2) and their components is 
the following: the end of household-management prescribes the tasks of the 
householder and the proper scope of wealth, and it delimits the natural from the 
unnatural forms of chrematistics. Aristotle’s answer to (1.a) and (2.a) is also informed 
by his views about citizenship and the best constitution. Also, question (2.a) requires 
his theory of commercial justice. If, for Aristotle, commercial profit can be had only 
unjustly, then commerce is not an ethical mode of acquisition and, more broadly, a 
commercial economy is inimical to justice—this is the problem (2.b). Hence, there is 
the further question about commercial justice which is the key to answering questions 
(2.a) and (2.b):
(3) When is a commercial exchange just? 
 
In other words, we need to know when a price is just and then examine how Aristotle 
defines business profit. If prices that include business profit exceed the just price 
systematically, then it appears that business is not an ethical mode of chrematistics. 
As a start, let us see why Aristotle feels bound to ask the Master Question and its 
components and, then, how the answer to it is related to the main questions, 
methodology and principles of his Ethics and Politics. We need to understand the 
backdrop in which this question arises because his inquiry in chrematistics is not self-
standing. The Master Question is an intermediate step in a long analysis that starts at 
the very beginning of Politics as this takes up the Ethics’ question about the human 
good to the collective level, namely, how we can live well as a community. So, let us 
remind ourselves briefly the general purpose of the Ethics and the Politics. 
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The Ethics is an inquiry into the human good and how individuals should best live. To 
understand the Master Question, we also need to remind ourselves of the purpose of 
the Politics as he states it in the concluding passage of the Nicomachean Ethics 
(1181b17-24): “to see with a comprehensive view which constitution is best, and how 
each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use, if it is to be at its best.” 
The Politics is an inquiry into the good of the political community. More specifically, 
it inquires in what the best constitution is. A constitution is the kind of organization or 
ordering of a society’s population (Pol. 1274b36). By ‘ordering’ Aristotle, refers to a 
certain way of arranging and distributing power in an association of persons. His 
thinking about constitutions rests on the Platonic idea that “the existence and well-
being of any system requires the presence of a ruling element” and “some individual 
or group should rule or govern over the other members of the community”.18 In short, 
then, a constitution specifies the ruling element, i.e. “the ruling class and those with 
authority over others”.19 The various types of constitution—aristocracy, monarchy, 
polity, democracy, oligarchy and tyranny—that Aristotle discusses in Pol. III.7 are 
actually different forms of rule. In the Politics Aristotle asks: 
What is the difference between ruling a household and ruling a city or ruling 
over slaves?20 
This is a question about rulership which Aristotle inherits from Plato and tackles 
with in order to respond to question (1.a). In the Statesman (258e-259c) Plato holds 
that the art of rulership applies the same to all forms of association; the forms of rule 
differ only in terms of the number of subjects ruled. Aristotle disagrees with Plato. He 
argues that it would be a mistake to rule the city as if it were, for example, a 
household; “those who suppose that the roles of a statesman, of a king, of a 
household-manager, and of a master of slaves are the same, put the matter badly” (Pol. 
1252a7-16). Very briefly, Aristotle thinks that each association requires a distinct 
kind of rule that must be in line with the ends of the association at hand. He takes up 
18Miller (1995:20) and (2011) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/supplement2.html cites 
Plato’s Phaedo 79e-80a. Aristotle posits this principle in Pol. 1254a28-36 but the whole of Politics 




the question about rulership further in Pol. I.2-3 where he explicates the teleology of 
the household and the economic duties of the householder. 
With this brief background in mind, let me preview Aristotle’s responses to the 
Master Question and its components. In regards to (1), he argues that chrematistics is 
concerned with the acquisition of wealth while household-management is concerned 
with the management and use of wealth (Pol. 1256a10-12). The householders’ duty 
regarding wealth-acquisition—question (1.a)—depends on which tasks the 
householder could delegate to others in order to secure leisure; the tasks which require 
the householder’s engagement are part of household-management, whereas the tasks 
that can be delegated are auxiliary to it.21 In addition, Aristotle reasons that 
household-management requires a supply of goods limited by the natural end of self-
sufficiency (Pol. 1256b28-30). This is a crucial step in answering questions (1.a) and 
(2): natural self-sufficiency delimits the scope of wealth required for household-
management. It is also the standard that separates natural from unnatural chrematistics 
(Pol. 1257b19-20).
Aristotle’s answer to (1.a) and (2.a) is also informed by his standards of happiness, 
virtue, citizenship and the ideal constitution. For example, aristocracies and polities 
require that the rationality and moral character of citizens be of a high standard in 
order to be able to share in the aim of the best city, i.e. happiness (e.g. Pol. 1284a1-3). 
For Aristotle, people of the industrial class lack the deliberative and ethical abilities 
required for citizens of aristocracies.22 Hence, question (2.a) is entangled with the 
Citizenship Question:
Who should be citizens of the best city? Should members of the industrial 
class be citizens? (Pol. III.5)  
Does Aristotle think that artisans, workers and traders could not partake in political 
and judicial decision-making in the best city?23 And if he thinks that the members of 
the industrial class should not be citizens, what should be their socio-political status? 
21 Saunders (2002:84)
22 See Plato in Republic IV. Aristotle deals with this question in Pol. III.1-5 and VII.8-9. 
23 Pol. 1275a8. A citizen is anyone capable of partaking in judicial and political decision-making.
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Hence, the question about citizenship and social categorization informs the question 
(2.a) about the occupations—viz. modes of chrematistics—that are compatible with 
virtue and citizenship. 
The question about commercial justice, i.e. question (3), is a key question and I 
discuss it in connection to NE V.5. The problem is whether, for Aristotle, commercial 
profit is an unjust economic practice and, thereby, a commercial economy—viz. an 
economy mobilized by the principle of profit-maximization—is an inherently unjust 
economic system that fosters greed. Hence, Aristotle’s answer to question (3) informs 
his answer to question (2.a)—whether business is suitable for the virtuous person—
and (2.b)—whether business brings about greed and injustice. 
I showed how the Master Question is entangled with teleology, happiness, virtue, 
rulership, citizenship and the ideal constitution. I turn now to present these concepts 
in more detail. These are the founding blocks of Aristotle’s analysis of wealth-
acquisition
1.2 Aristotle’s Principles and Method
In this section, I sketch briefly the recurring concepts, principles and method that 
underlie Aristotle’s analysis of chrematistics.
The Principle of Teleology  
Since Aristotle’s analysis of chrematistics is teleological and happiness is the final 
end of both the individual and the city, let me start with his Principle of Teleology. 
According to this principle, everything in nature has a purpose, a final cause or end 
(Phys. 194a28–9; 199b15–18). Aristotle identifies the end of a thing or organism with 
its characteristic function (EE 1219a8). For Aristotle, we can know the nature of 
something if we know its characteristic function. For example, we can define the pen 
as that which is made for writing and the eye as the organ for seeing. As regards 
natural organisms, an organism’s nature is an internal principle of organization that 
explains its generation, growth and behavior (Phys. 192b32–3). For example, acorns 
grow into oak trees due to their own in-built principle of growth. This principle 
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underlies the naturalness of a tree’s existence and development, as opposed to 
artifacts, whose existence depends on social factors. Humans, too, have a 
characteristic function in line with their internal organization or structure which 
determines how they function and how they differ from non-human animals: unlike 
other animals, humans are rational and political beings (NE 1098a7–17; Pol. I253a2-
8). Different organisms have different ways of flourishing and they flourish as long as 
they perform their characteristic function well (NE 1098a17-18). Aristotle’s 
teleological principle has fundamental importance for his ethical thought: the ultimate 
human end or ‘good’ is happiness (NE 1095a17-18) and whatever realizes this natural 
end—i.e. whatever enables the optimum exercise of the distinctive capacities of 
humans is good. In contrast, whatever stands in the way to the realization of this end 
is bad. As we shall see in chapter two, Aristotle assesses the ethical import of 
chrematistics in teleological terms: does the end of chrematistics really serve the chief 
end of human beings and societies? Also, his critique of commerce and money-
lending rests on whether they distort the teleology of chrematistics; he thinks that 
these modes of money-making are unnatural because they pervert the natural ends of 
exchange and money (Pol. 1257a28-30 and 1257a38-40; as perversion of its nature 
see Pol. I.10).
The Good and Function24 
According to Aristotle, the ultimate ‘good’ has three properties (NE 1097a15-b6): first, 
it is complete (τέλειον; teleion), i.e. it is not chosen for the sake of anything else; 
second, it is self-sufficient (αὔταρκες; autarkes), i.e. it lacks in nothing and does not 
depend on other goods; third, it is most choice-worthy (μή συναριθμούμενον), i.e. it 
is not counted as one good among others, but as the most desirable of all goods. But 
since this is very general, what is the human good? Aristotle offers a functional 
account of the human good via his famous function argument (NE 1097b25-
1098a18; especially 1098a16-18). His answer is that happiness is the ultimate good. 
The key premise is that a thing’s ‘goodness’ depends on exercising its defining 
function well—that is, happiness is the excellent exercise of the human function. 
Hence, we can know the human good if we know the human function (NE 1097b25-
24 Scaltsas (1993) and (1996). 
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1098a18). The human function is the property or capacity in accord with which 
humans do things in a way characteristic of their nature, viz. a capacity that 
distinguishes humans from non-human animals. In NE 1098a16-17 Aristotle defines 
the human function as activity of the soul in accordance with reason and in Pol. I.2 he 
identifies the human function with political activity—i.e. humans are also political 
beings or animals. 
The Rule of Reason Principle 
Aristotle agrees with Plato that reason must be the ruling element of a political 
community.25 He uses this principle to explain who should rule and what form of rule 
is proper for different kinds of relations or association (Pol. I.13; III.6; III.11). The 
form of rule varies with the degree of rationality of those subject to the rule 
(see Pol. I.13 and III.6). For Aristotle, rule over children, women and slaves is not the 
same with political rule, viz. rule over citizens, because he thought that the 
deliberative capacity of children and women is underdeveloped or insufficient 
respectively. On the other hand, citizens must rule and be ruled politically, that is, rule 
over free and equal persons, because their rationality is in place. The bearing of this 
principle on our examination of chrematistics is very important. Aristotle argues that 
constitutions vary with the capacity or degree of rationality of a city’s citizens. For 
example, aristocratic constitutions and polities require that the rationality and moral 
character of citizens be of a high standard in order to share in political and judicial 
decisions. Hence, Aristotle’s answer to question (2.a) depends on the constitution 
under examination.26 Aristotle’s relaxes his strictures on citizenship in his analysis of 
the best practicable constitution, whereas the industrial class people should not be 
citizens of the ideal city. 
The Principle of Perfection27
25 Republic 441e.
26 The question is whether the members of the industrial and mercantile classes could be citizens and 
whether citizens should practice these professions.
27 The term ‘Principle of Perfection’ is coined by Miller (1995:18-19). It is the normative ideal “that 
one ought to strive for perfection” but, in a more general way, it is the idea that human perfection 
consists in excellent human functioning. As an explicit statement of the principle, Miller cites Pol. 
1333a29–30: “What is most choice-worthy for each individual is always the highest it is possible for 
him to attain”. 
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Aristotle’s principle of teleology is also the link between his perfectionist ethical and 
political theory. Since happiness is a matter of realizing the political and rational 
nature of human beings, then happiness is a matter of perfecting human nature. 
Aristotle’s perfectionism has objective basis, in the sense that the human good is 
independent from what human beings may happen to desire; it is rooted in human 
nature which flourishes under certain forms of activity and social conditions. So, 
Aristotle’s theory of good differs from subjectivist theories of the ‘good’ as well as 
from Plato’s objectivist but non-naturalist theory of the ‘good’.28 His perfectionism 
links the individual and the city because human flourishing depends on the city. Apart 
from moral education and the laws, the city provides the full range of goods required 
for the exercise of the human function. Part of this process is political participation: 
by sharing in political and judicial decision-making, humans exercise their rational 
and political nature and, hence, they perfect themselves. Hence, Aristotle’s 
perfectionism forges a link between his ethics and politics: the way a city is 
constituted—its political institutions and laws—shapes the character of citizens; a city 
either promotes or hinders the exercise of the human function. In this respect, 
Aristotle’s perfectionism underlies his ethical assessment of the economic 
arrangements and occupations most conducive to the development of human nature. 
1.3 Aristotle’s Moral Psychology 
In this section I present the main concepts of his virtue-theoretic moral psychology, 
virtue and happiness, as these are involved in his answer to the Master Question in 
subsequent chapters. Virtue and happiness delimit how much wealth one ought to 
pursue and determine the distinction between natural / unnatural or ethical / unethical 
modes of chrematistics. Happiness is also the principle of organization of the various 
practical arts, including the two economic arts. In addition, the Citizenship Question is 
virtue-theoretic since the ethical status of the lower occupations depends on the 
prospect of those who practice these occupations for virtue and happiness. Section 1.3 
explains how human nature prescribes happiness as the chief end and why happiness 
requires intellectual and moral virtue. Also, it explains how pleasure and desire are 
28 The ‘good’ is one of the transcendent Forms of Platonic metaphysics.
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related to happiness. As I show, Aristotle’s economic thinking is partly based on his 
virtue-theoretic psychology. 
1.3.1 Happiness & Virtue 
According to Aristotle, happiness is the highest good and the ultimate aim of all 
human beings; it is the ultimate aim of all acts and arts (NE 1094a1-2 and 1098a18-
22). He argues that happiness does not consist in pleasure, wealth or honor (NE 
1095b15-1096a10). So, what does happiness consist in? According to Aristotle, 
happiness is “rational activity of the soul in accordance with the best and most 
complete virtue” (NE 1098a16-17). Let me present the steps that lead to this definition. 
First, Aristotle argues that every action aims at some good and that no one disputes 
that this good is happiness, i.e. living and doing well (NE 1095a15-20). Second, 
happiness is the chief good because it meets the criteria of the chief good: it is 
complete, self-sufficient and most choice-worthy (NE 1097a27-b22). Third, he 
develops his function argument:29
1. A thing’s goodness depends on doing its function well.
2. The function of an F is the same in kind as the function of an excellent F. 
3. Humans have a function.
4. The function of humans is a certain kind of life, an activity or actions of the 
soul involving reason. 
5. So, the function of the excellent human being is to do the activities and actions 
that involve reason well.
6. The chief human good is happiness, i.e. living and doing well. 
7. Each action is completed well when in accordance with the appropriate virtue. 
8. So, happiness, i.e. living and doing well, is rational activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue, or in accordance with the best and most complete 
virtue.
The function argument shows what is distinctive about humans and links happiness 
with intellectual and moral virtue. For Aristotle, the defining human function is 
‘rationality’ or activity of the soul in accordance with reason (NE 1098a16-17)—in 
Pol. 1253a2 and NE 1097b11 he adds that humans are also political beings.30 While 
the rationally conducted life distinguishes humans from non-human animals, living 
29 The argument is located at NE 1097b25-1098a17. This reconstruction is by Paula Gottlieb (Project 
Archelogos: http://www.archelogos.com/project/archie-frameset.jsp?xmlfile=eni7.xml) and Gottlieb 
(2009:66-68).  
30 Human beings are also economic animals (EE 1242a22).
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well presupposes the good exercise of this capacity in a way that the rational and non-
rational parts of the soul are coordinated properly. This activity presupposes the 
intellectual and ethical virtues or excellences. The main function of practical reason is 
the discovery of the good action.31 Aristotle suggests that the intellectual virtue 
regarding practical life is practical wisdom (φρόνησις); this is the ability to discern 
the good.32 A practical judgment of what the good is in the circumstances is actually a 
choice (προαίρεσις), a combination of rational and non-rational states.33 These 
judgments are also motivational states: they move the agent to act well. 
The role of moral virtue is to provide one’s deliberations with the proper affective 
direction and to dispose the agent to act well—they offer the desiderative element 
which is essential for action. According to Aristotle, moral virtue is neither a capacity 
to be affected by passions nor a passion itself (NE 1105b19-1106a10). His definition 
of moral virtue is as follows (NE 1106b36-1107a4): (a) “ethical virtue is a reasoned 
disposition concerned with choice (ἕξις προαιρετική) that lies in a mean between 
vices”; (NE 1107a1-3). (b) “the mean is determined by a principle (λόγος; logos) by 
31 Excellent practical reason or practical wisdom is “a true and reasoned state or capacity to act with 
regard to the things that are good or bad for man”; NE 1140b4-6.
32 For Aristotle, the discovery of the good involves deliberation informed by ethical dispositions, 
experience and factual knowledge. There is controversy whether deliberation is over means only or 
over both means and ends. While the cognitivist reading is more received, the non-cognitivist 
reading—i.e. the specification of ends is not the outcome of deliberation over ends but is the work of 
affective states—has been explored by several commentators and continues to be engaging; see Irwin 
(1975) and (2007:158-177). Some notable proponents of this reading are Fortenbaugh (1964) and Moss 
(2011) who think that, for Aristotle, ethical virtue makes the end right and that deliberation is about 
means only, not about ends—that is, some affective state determines ends (NE 1144a7-9; 1112b11-12). 
For Aristotle, deliberation is a particular form of reasoning, one in which one works out that this x is 
for the sake of y. But the rational work involved in forming a conception of the good is to recognize for 
oneself that certain things are good, and then making comparative judgments about how different 
goods fit into an overall picture of the good (e.g. x is better than y, etc.). Aristotle’s account of 
habituation reinforces this reading: we are trained to desire certain ends; later these become the starting 
points of ethical deliberation. Moreover, he says that deliberation is not necessary for choice (NE 
1117a17-22; a courageous act may be done in an instant, without deliberation). This reading of 
Aristotle is non-cognitivist: how we see and what we aim at is related to how we feel and what we 
desire, which is the province of passions. But when Aristotle says that we do not deliberate about ends 
he may also mean that we do not deliberate about happiness, the final end. Perhaps, he thinks that it is 
in our nature to desire happiness non-deliberatively (NE 1097b22). Also, if happiness consists of plural 
goods, we may have to deliberate about ends qua constituents of happiness in order to discover what 
qualifies as an adequate specification of the constituents of happiness. Several commentators, for 
example Wiggins (1980:228), argue that deliberation is about components of the good; see also Sorabji 
(1980:201-219) and Irwin (1975:567-578). It is also possible that, for Aristotle, we do not deliberate 
about such constituents of happiness (e.g. the virtues) since these are intrinsic goods. 
33 The paradigm contrary position is Hume’s who thinks that ethical judgment is essentially 
desiderative. 
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which the practically wise person (φρόνιμος; phronimos) would choose the right 
action” (NE 1107a3-4). In other words, ethical virtue is a reasoned disposition 
because it disposes agents to act well by choice or decision (προαίρεσις). The virtuous 
person is disposed to choose the mean between extremes. For example, with regard to 
fear, the mean between the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness is courage. 
Cowards tend to be overly fearful, whereas foolhardy persons tend to be overly 
fearless. The courageous person feels fear for the right reason, to the proper extent 
and acts accordingly. In sum, the ethical virtues provide the appropriate affective and 
actional responses in accordance with rational prescriptions and co-determine correct 
ends along with reason. Practical wisdom and moral virtue constitute happiness and 
ensure that rational activity is not mere cleverness.34 
1.3.2 Happiness, Pleasure and Desire 
For Aristotle pleasure (ἡδονή) is “necessarily a good” (NE 1153b4) but neither the 
chief good (NE 1095b19-22) nor the only good (NE X.3). Definitely, happiness 
involves pleasure (NE 1153b15) but is not identical with pleasure (NE 1095b14-
1096a11). Pleasure is a by-product of unhindered activity of a natural state, like 
happiness (NE 1153a7–17); it accompanies activities because we feel pleasure by 
doing pleasant activities. Aristotle says that pleasure perfects our activities: “pleasures 
intensify the activities, and what intensifies a thing is proper to it” (NE 1175a35). And 
since life itself is an activity, and the good life is activity—the exercise of our 
essential capacities—, pleasure is indispensable to the good life. In a general way, all 
instances of pleasure may be good but they are not all worth choosing (NE X.5). For 
Aristotle, only the pleasures enjoyed by the person whose body and soul is in good 
condition (in a natural state) are really good. Also, some pleasures are bad 
unqualifiedly (NE 1152a26-33): “…those which are admittedly disgraceful plainly 
should not be said to be pleasures, except to a perverted taste” (NE 1176a22-23). 
There is also the problem of choosing between rival pleasures: “Since activities differ 
with respect to goodness and badness, some being worth choosing, others worth 
avoiding, and others neither, the same is true of pleasures as well” (NE 1175b24–6). 
The standard for making comparisons between competing pleasures is virtuous 
34 That mere cleverness differs from practical wisdom see NE 1144a24-b1.
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activity (NE X.4): a pleasure's goodness depends on the goodness of its associated 
activity. In other words, a pleasure is good when the activity that generates this 
pleasure is good and a pleasure is bad when the activity that generates it is bad. For 
example, one’s sadistic pleasure from torturing animals is not good.
For Aristotle, the virtuous person desires the right things; it is a mark of virtue when 
someone desires and takes pleasure in the right things (NE 1104b13-16). There are 
three types of desire in his psychology; desires differ by definition and capacity (DA 
433b3–5).35 The first type is sensual desire. This operates on the pleasure principle: it 
is desire for bodily gratification and for the avoidance of bodily pain. The second type 
is rational desire: this is desire for the good. The third kind is emotion and falls in-
between sensual and rational desire (NE 1111b12–13). Aristotle divides sensual 
desires in two classes (NE 1118b8–22; 1147b24–31): first, natural sensual desires 
which are common to all humans, such as the desire for food and water, second, 
sensual desires which are peculiar to the individual person, such as the desire for 
peanut-butter (“…different things are pleasant to different kinds of people…”; NE 
1118b13). Conflicting motivations arise when different types of desire conflict, e.g. 
the peculiar desire for junk food may conflict with the rational desire for a healthy 
diet. Virtuous action involves desiring the right objects, to the right extent and using 
the right means to achieve them—see for example the temperate person (NE 1146a12) 
and the self-restrained person who acts on rational desire (NE 1145a17). There are 
two ways to understand the division between natural sensual desires and peculiar 
sensual desires. The first is the familiar one between wants and needs. Natural sensual 
desires are akin to the idea of ‘needs’ because they are over things necessary for 
survival and the avoidance of pain.36 In a second, corollary, sense, these desires are 
not subject to choice or volitional control (NE 1147b24-28).37 It is useful to invoke 
here the economic principle of Diminishing Utility. In general, the objects of natural 
35 My discussion of ‘desire’ is based on Modrak (2009:318-321).
36 Aristotle defines the ‘necessary’ as follows: “(a) That without which, as a concomitant condition, life 
is impossible; e.g. respiration and food are necessary for an animal, because it cannot exist without 
them. (b) The conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which one cannot get 
rid or keep free of evil—e.g., drinking medicine is necessary to escape from ill-health, and sailing to 
Aegina is necessary to recover one's money” (Met. 1015a20-24).
37 The ‘necessary’ says Aristotle is contrary to choice (Met. 1015a26). In a general way, we do not 
choose to be hungry or thirsty. 
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and peculiar desires seem to be subject to the Principle of Diminishing Utility: the 
more we use a good, the more its utility diminishes.38 Aristotle does not clarify 
whether there is a difference between peculiar and natural desires in terms of natural 
satiation.39 However, it seems that there is no natural point of satiation to the objects 
of peculiar desires, like the desire for unlimited wealth. Such desires are insatiable 
and limitless: 
…[H]uman greed is an insatiable thing. Thus two obols is enough at first, but 
once that has become traditional, they go on always asking for more, until they 
go beyond all limit. For there is no natural limit to desires, and satisfying them 
is what the many spend their lives trying to do. (Pol. 1267a40-b4)
In contrast, the desire for food is naturally satiated as a matter of human physiology.40 
As we shall see in chapter two, Aristotle’s psychological account of unnatural 
chrematistics points out that most individuals confuse the good life with the life of 
physical gratification. Since peculiar desires are unlimited in number and insatiable, 
excessive wealth is the main means to satisfy them.
We need to highlight here important differences between the psychology underlying 
Aristotle’s economic thinking and the psychology of classical and neoclassical 
economic theory. As we shall see in chapter two, Aristotle’s theory of pleasure and 
desire features in his psychological analysis of unnatural chrematistics as the kind of 
acquisition that aims at unlimited wealth (Pol. I.9). While the good life requires an 
adequate supply of wealth, natural chrematistics may stray to the unnatural kind of 
chrematistics which seeks excessive, unnecessary wealth. In addition, his analysis of 
desire has important implications for his solution to the economizing problem.41 By 
maximizing the productive or allocative efficiency of an economy, a society does not 
necessarily close off the gap between unlimited desires and scarcity. Nor will profit-
maximizing behavior and excessive acquisition help solve the asymmetry between 
38 The idea that utility diminishes with consumption can be found in his discussion of consumption for 
use (Pol. I.9) and Pol. 1323b6-10: “External goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all 
things useful are useful for a purpose, and where there is too much of them they must either do harm, 
or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors”. The diminishing utility of certain goods is the natural 
limit on desire. For discussion of such a limit see Lowry (1974).   
39 Desires for necessities, like food and water, are satiated naturally although temporarily.
40 In NE 1118b15-19 Aristotle says that natural desires aim at the replenishment of a deficiency and 
that there is a natural amount required for the replenishment of such a deficiency.
41 This is the problem of how to satisfy unlimited desires with limited resources.
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one’s desires and disposable income. Furthermore, Aristotle distinguishes between 
pleasure and happiness, whereas in modern economic theory, pleasure and happiness 
are identical; they are cashed out in terms of utility or preference satisfaction.42 
Moreover, Aristotle recognizes an evaluative or desiderative aspect in human 
rationality—humans deliberate over ends and means—, whereas in modern economic 
theory, rationality is over means only, or instrumental, and preferences are rational as 
long as they are transitive, not when they conform to standards of evaluative 
rationality, viz. practical wisdom or phronesis.43 Also, his solution to the problem of 
equality of resources presupposes that desires are under the volitional control of 
agents (Pol. 1267a1-10). He argues that equalizing the properties of citizens will not 
solve the problem of greed (Pol. II.7). For Aristotle, a society can tackle with greed 
when agents educate and manage their desires effectively; that would be impossible if 
agents had no volitional control. As we shall see in chapter six, his analysis of desire 
and pleasure features in his explanation of greed and injustice in wealth-acquisition 
(NE V.1-2). 
1.4 Aristotle’s Political Naturalism
This section provides the concepts and principles of Aristotle’s political naturalism, 
viz. the idea that the city and political rulership are natural.44 This might mean that 
they arise out of natural propensities or that they grow out of an internal principle. In 
particular, Aristotle‘s naturalistic doctrine consists of three elements: first, his natural 
genealogy of communities and economic arrangements; second, his view of humans 
as political beings by nature; third, his argument for the teleological priority of the 
city which provides the principle of organization of the practical arts. This sketch will 
inform Aristotle’s answers to question (1) and (2a). For Aristotle, individuals and 
42 In neo-classical economic theory, human welfare is identified with utility, i.e. preference satisfaction 
from the consumption of goods and services. See O’Neill (1998:38-53); Hausman (2006:118-133). 
43 The paradigm contrary position is Hume’s who thinks that ethical judgment is essentially 
desiderative. Aristotle argues that thought cannot motivate action without the mediation of passion 
(“Thought by itself sets nothing in motion; thought that sets in motion is for the sake of something and 
practical”; 1139a37-b1. See also DA 433a6-8 and 433a17-19). He also claims that passions can be 
responsive to reason (NE 1113a22-33; DA 433a9-26) which has its own impulses through wish, i.e. the 
desire for the good arising from reason’s effort to discover the good (DA 433a22-5); see Cooper 
(1999:241-49) for commentary on rational desires. On that score, reason has the power to determine 
ends. Hence, beliefs can guide passions or oppose them and determine ends. About the rationality of 
preferences in terms of transitivity see Hausman (2006:46).
44 Miller (1995:27-30).
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states need economic resources in order to survive and flourish (Pol. 1253b23-26). 
The natural economy which Aristotle describes in Pol. I.8 arises from the political 
nature of humans and their ends of survival and happiness. Also, the teleological 
priority of the city warrants the supremacy of politics over the economic arts.45 Lastly, 
Aristotle’s political economy of occupations for the ideal city is based on his 
argument for the teleological priority.46 I examine this idea in chapter 3.
1.4.1 The City: Origin and Purpose 
At the start of the Politics Aristotle argues that an association inclusive of all 
associations aims at the highest end:
Clearly, then, while every community aims at some good, the community that
has the most authority of all and encompasses all the others aims  highest, that 
is to say, at the good that has the most authority of all. This community is the 
one called a city-state, the community that is political. (Pol. 1252a3-7)
According to Aristotle, each association has an end; the city is the sovereign 
association because it embraces the ends of all smaller associations, the family and the 
village. Also, the city aims at the highest of all ends, i.e. happiness (NE 1097a15-b20). 
However, at this stage, his conclusion rather names what the city aims at. Aristotle 
further substantiates why this is so in the course of his famous argument for the 
naturalness of the city: the city arises naturally from smaller associations for the sake 
of the good life. Aristotle’s proof works from parts to whole. He seeks the final end of 
the city by first laying out the ends of smaller association based on two assumptions:47 
(a) everything and every activity in nature aims at some end or goal (Teleological 
Assumption); (b) the function or final aim of the parts of something contributes to the 
function of this thing as a whole; understanding the whole involves understanding the 
parts (Methodological Assumption).
45 See also NE I.2.
46 By Aristotle’s ‘political economy’ I refer to his thinking about the interchange of political 
governance, ethics and economics. On the one hand, economic arrangements—the patterns of 
production, distribution and consumption—shape the ethical life and character of individuals. On the 
other hand, the ethical dispositions and nature of individuals shape economic arrangements.
47 Saunders (1992:53-54).
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Aristotle starts his proof with a quasi-historical reconstruction of the formative 
process of the city (Pol. I.2). The first or elementary associations are the pairs of 
husband-wife and master-slave; these are brought together for the sake of procreation 
and preservation, respectively. The pairs of husband-wife and master-slave give rise 
to the second form of association, the household, which aims at the satisfaction of 
daily needs. The third association is the village which is an association of households 
that aims at the satisfaction of extra-daily needs. The formative process culminates in 
the formation of the city-state: 
A complete community constituted out of several villages, once it reaches the 
limit of total self-sufficiency, practically speaking, is a city-state. It comes to 
be for the sake of living, but it remains in existence for the sake of living well. 
That is why every city-state exists by nature, since the first communities do. 
For the city-state is their end, and nature is an end; for we say that each thing's 
nature—for example, that of a human being, a horse, or a household—is the 
character it has when its coming-into-being has been completed. Moreover 
that for the sake of which something exists, that is to say, its end, is best, and 
self-sufficiency is both end and best. (Pol. 1252b27-1253a1)
Here is a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument: (a) the smaller associations exist for 
the sake of living (from: Teleological Assumption); (b) the smaller associations lack 
in self-sufficiency; (c) the city-state is formed from smaller associations for the sake 
of complete self-sufficiency [from: (a); (b)]; (d) hence, the city-state is the natural end 
or nature of smaller associations [from (c) and the Teleological Assumption, viz. the 
end of a thing is its nature]; (e) self-sufficiency is both a goal and best (nature is an 
end and an end is best); (f) hence, the city-state exists by nature for the sake of the 
good life.
I have already explained premises (a), (b), and (c). However, premises (d) and (e) 
need further explaining. Aristotle’s claim about ‘nature as an end’ refers to his 
familiar teleological principle that a thing’s nature is the thing’s final end.48 In 
particular, the nature of a thing x is what x is when x’s generation has reached 
completion, i.e. when x has reached its goal.49 Obviously, Aristotle refers to the city-
state as being the nature of smaller associations—hence, the end of these 
48 Phys. 194a28–9; 199b15–18.
49 Complete generation is nature; the goal is nature; Simpson (1998:21-22).
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associations—on account of their inhabitants’ impulse towards self-sufficiency. In 
particular, he argues that the city is the final stage of a process in which smaller 
associations propagate towards higher and more complex forms of association. The 
city is the goal and terminus of this process. The principle of growth of the smaller 
associations is the natural impulse of humans towards self-sufficiency where this 
includes the desire for living and the desire for living well.50 
As regards premise (e), self-sufficiency is analytically connected to the final end of 
happiness (NE 1097a27- b22). According to Aristotle’s formal analysis, the final good 
is self-sufficient, i.e. it lacks in nothing and does not depend on other goods. Self-
sufficiency is, formally speaking, ‘end’ and ‘best’ because the lack of self-sufficiency 
is a constraint on human flourishing, not vice versa.51 In other words, Aristotle seems 
to reason that when a thing x reaches the limit of self-sufficiency, x can exist for the 
sake of the final good; the city reaches this limit; hence, the city can exist for the sake 
of the final good.52 This step completes Aristotle’s proof. He has analyzed the parts of 
the city in order to explicate its nature—its final cause or end—as a whole: the city 
exists for the sake of the good life because it is the natural end of the smaller 
associations that are themselves natural. 
Aristotle forwards further his political naturalism.53 First, he argues for his famous 
claim that ‘man is a political being’54 and then he defends the teleological priority of 
the city. The priority argument further substantiates his claim that the city should not 
be governed like a household and, hence, that the city is the proper object of political 
expertise (politikê technê). This argument is the mainstay of Aristotle’s teleological 
hierarchy of practical arts. 
50 I follow Simpson (1998:21-22): if there were only the desire for living, and not also the desire for 
living well, humans would not be moved to form an association that serves this end.  
51 Shields (2007:360).
52 Miller (2011) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/index.html#return1-supplement1
53 For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s political naturalism see Miller (1995:27-30).
54 Pol. 1253a2. In NE 1097b11 Aristotle states (without argument) the same point: “man is by nature a 
civic being.” 
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1.3.2 The Priority of the City
Aristotle claims that his proof for the naturalness of the city further implies that man 
is a political animal by nature (Pol. 1253a2; NE 1097b11). In a general way, this 
means that humans are fit55 by nature for life in a city because they have both the 
impulse and the capacity for such a life—it is not contrary to their nature. In addition, 
humans are political animals because they, and their associations, naturally need the 
city due to their functional insufficiency which is a constraint on the realization of 
their natural ends.56 His argument is as follows: humans are by nature members of the 
first, smaller associations; the natural end of these associations is the city; hence, the 
end of associations and humans must be the same, i.e. the city. 57 Aristotle qualifies 
further his claim about the political nature of humans by claiming that humans are 
political beings also because, unlike other animals’ associations, they “alone have 
perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc.”, (Pol. 1253a15-17) which they can 
communicate through speech. 
Then Aristotle argues that the city is prior to individuals and smaller associations 
because the defining function and flourishing of humans depend on the political 
community (Pol. 1253a18-28). He reasons that the city, as a self-sufficient association, 
provides the full range of goods required for a flourishing life, including the moral 
habituation, education and the laws for the development and exercise of the virtues. 
As Aristotle contends, humans would be the worst kind of animal “when divorced 
from law and justice” (Pol. 1253a34). Here is Aristotle’s argument for the priority of 
the city:
The city-state is also prior in nature to the household and to each of us 
individually, since the whole is necessarily prior to the part. For if the whole 
body is dead, there will no longer be a foot or a hand, except homonymously, 
as one might speak of a stone "hand" (for a dead hand will be like that); but 
everything is defined by its task and by its capacity; so that in such condition 
they should not be said to be the same things but homonymous ones. Hence 
that the city-state is natural and prior in nature to the individual is clear. For if 
55 See Saunders (2002:69) translates ‘πολιτικόν’ as ‘fit for a state’ in the sense that humans are born 
with the capacity (δύναμις) for communal life. 
56 Aristotle’s argument for the naturalness of the city is in contrast to the Protagorean and the 
Hobbesian view that the state is an artifice (e.g. a contractual construction or the result of agreement); 
if the city arises naturally and is prior to the individual, then it cannot be an artifice. 
57 The reconstruction of the argument is based on Simpson (1998:22).
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an individual is not self-sufficient when separated, he will be like all other 
parts in relation to the whole. Anyone who cannot form a community with 
others, or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a 
city-state—he is either a beast or a god. (Pol. 1253a19-29)
This is an argument by analogy: any human being apart from a city is like a foot or a 
hand apart from the body. When a part P (e.g. a human, a body organ, etc.) is 
separated from a whole W (a city, a body, etc.), then P is no longer a P; it is P by 
homonymy (viz. it is P in name, not in nature).58 To prove his point, Aristotle stresses 
a crucial difference between part and whole: a hand exists for as long as a body exists, 
whereas a body can exist even without a hand because it is more self-sufficient.
There is consensus that in the above argument Aristotle is not arguing for priority in 
the temporal sense because the city is posterior to smaller associations in generation.59 
For most commentators, the priority that Aristotle has in mind here is metaphysical: 
being political animals, humans depend on the city for the exercise of the function 
that realizes human happiness.60 This further suggests a teleological ordering of 
ends.61 Since the city aims at the most inclusive end, the particular ends of individuals 
are posterior to the end of the city.62 This argument helps Aristotle prioritize political 
expertise over the economic arts. He seeks to show that the city (not, for instance, the 
household) is the most authoritative end and the proper object of political expertise. 
But if the city’s end is prior to the ends of individuals, are the life pursuits of 
individuals less important or subservient to the city’s end, where this should be 
understood as a collective end? The answer depends on the form of functional 
determination that Aristotle has in mind. 
58 For Aristotle, parts are not prior to the whole as a matter of their functional dependence on the 
whole: a part P depends on a whole W for its defining function (a thing’s nature is defined by its 
function). In other words, body parts are essentially what they are as functioning parts of a body.
59 A part P is P in virtue of its being a functioning part of a whole W such that when W perishes or P is 
severed from W, P loses its defining function; see Miller (1995:45-56); Roberts (2009:30-41); Shields 
(2007:353-363). Aristotle’s account of the emergence of the city points out that in the first place 
individuals form households and then villages; hence, these associations precede the city in generation. 
60 Happiness is fulfillment of nature and fulfillment of nature comes by the exercise of the human 
function, i.e. activity of the soul in accordance with reason. Aristotle adds the function of ‘life in the 
city’ as a condition of a flourishing life.
61 For Shields (2007:353-363) Aristotle suggests a teleological form of priority based on his functional 
determination principle: things with a nature are defined by their function. (see also above section 1.2 
that everything is defined by its function and capacity).
62 Simpson (1998:14) suggests that since the city aims at happiness and happiness is the end of all 
individual pursuits, then the end of the city is the end of all individual pursuits. 
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The first possibility is that determination is ‘existential’: humans exist in virtue of 
their being parts of a city, in the way that a hand exists in virtue of its being an organ 
of the body. Most possibly, this is not what Aristotle had in mind because individuals 
can exist apart from a city as hermits. The second possibility is that determination is 
‘definitional’: humans are humans in virtue of their being functioning parts of a city, 
as a hand is a hand by virtue of its being a functioning organ of the body.63 On that 
score, individuals are defined by their functions (or roles) as contributing parts to the 
city’s end—as limbs are for locomotion, lungs are for breathing, eyes are for vision, 
etc. However, in this form of dependence, individuals’ various life pursuits are 
defined exclusively by their function in the organic whole; their ends seem to be 
pursued for the sake of the city’s function.64 
The passage also suggests a third, weaker form of dependence, the ‘perfective’ sense 
hereafter: humans are not subservient instruments of the city’s function since the end 
of the city is inclusive of their natural ends (procreation, preservation, safety, the good 
life)—the city exists for the sake of these ends. While humans can exist and be 
humans apart from the city, they depend on the city for the exercise of the function in 
virtue of which they can progress to full existence and happiness.65 Unfortunately, 
Aristotle’s analogy of citizens to human organs obscures the fact that parts of a whole 
are not always subservient to the function of a whole. For example, different kinds of 
plants and flowers may exist as constituent parts of a garden. However, a flower’s 
natural end is not to serve the garden’s end. Rather, it has an inbuilt end (i.e. a 
principle of growth and flourishing) that is better fulfilled by being part of a garden 
63 Miller (1995:46-47) distinguishes between priority in ‘separateness’ and priority in ‘completeness’.
64 Aristotle would want to avoid this connection because the human good should be, in principle, 
independent from how a community happens to specify the content of the human good. What if a city 
ranks wealth over virtue? For Aristotle, the human good is objectively given by human nature, i.e. the 
human function. In addition, the definitional dependence reading has raised the worry that it might 
imply a totalitarian reading of Aristotle.
65 The background of this reading is Aristotle’s hylomorphism: something has a nature when it is 
complete, not possible (or when its form is present). The nature of humans is what it is when humans 
have developed fully (perfected or complete; τέλειον), and full development results from the excellent 
exercise of their defining function, i.e. virtuous activity of the rational and non-rational capabilities (NE 
1098a16-17). When something reaches completion, it is faring well. Newman (1887: 32) says that for 
Aristotle existence is complete existence, and “without the State a man is a mere bundle of capacities 
for good or evil without the faculty”. This form of priority is possible if functional determination has a 
weaker sense.
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taken care by a gardener. Likewise, the city is prior because it enables the fulfillment 
of the natural end of its parts, i.e. their flourishing; any individual could ever hardly 
enable the fulfillment of the city’s end on his/her own. 
It is not clear which sense of dependence has more weight for Aristotle. All in all, the 
idea of the city as an organic unity is suggestive of a complex interdependence 
between individuals, associations and the city. However, as we shall see in Pol. III.1-2, 
for Aristotle, political life is fit for free humans (viz. citizens); this implies the ability 
for reasoned self-guidance and the capacity to rule and be ruled. This, certainly, 
discredits the definitional reading which implies subservience. But the crucial 
difference between the definitional and the perfective senses of priority is the 
difference between serving an end (definitional) and sharing in an end (perfective). 
The perfective sense fits more naturally with Aristotle’s closing remarks in Pol. I.2: 
“man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development” (Pol. 
1253a34). For Aristotle, life in a city perfects or completes humans because they 
progress towards full development only as citizens of a city. A life apart from the city 
is impoverished, even damaged (corrupted), in the way a foot is damaged when 
severed from the body. Hence, the perfective sense of priority is more in line with 
Aristotle’s commitment to the idea that the city exists for the sake of the good life. 
The city is teleologically prior in the sense that its end is ethical: without the city and 
its institutions, without moral habituation and education, without friendship, and 
without the laws, humans cannot exercise the capabilities required for the good life 
(εὐδαιμονία). 
Let us take stock. Aristotle’s political naturalism suggests that political and economic 
arrangements arise naturally for the sake of the good life. The city is prior to 
individuals in the sense that they need the city in order to exercise the human function 
well. The teleological priority of the city places political expertise on top of all 
practical arts; hence, the arts should serve the end of the city since politics is the art 
concerned with the sovereign end.66 These concepts are central in his answers to the 
66 This is very important because it fleshes a crucial difference between Aristotle’s and modern 
economic thinking. In the pre-capitalist economies of Aristotle’s time, economic interests were 
subordinate to political concerns while social organization was based on non-economic factors, such as 
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Master Question (1)—the place of the two economic arts in the hierarchy of practical 
and productive arts and the economic duties of the householder—and to questions 
(1.a) and (2.a)—the nature of humans is perfected by sharing in the aim of the city 
through citizenship and political participation; a life devoted to money-making is not 
proper for the free person / citizen but a barrier to the ethical development of 
individuals.
Let us see now in more detail the structure of Aristotle’s hierarchy of arts and the 
relationship between wealth and happiness—whether wealth is among the 
constituents of happiness or whether it is just an instrument of happiness. This is a key 
step in Aristotle’s answer to question (1.a)—the extent to which householders and 
citizens should pursue wealth.67
1.5 Happiness, the Arts and Wealth
The teleological priority argument suggests that political expertise is the most 
authoritative of all arts. But how are the various arts structured under political 
expertise and happiness? Aristotle’s answer to this question is the basis of his answer 
to the Master Question (1) in chapter two. 
1.5.1 The Threefold Division of Arts
Aristotle classifies all human knowledge into three divisions: theoretical knowledge, 
practical knowledge, and productive knowledge.68 The principle of division is the end 
that each division aims at. The purpose of theoretical knowledge is to inquire about 
truth for its own sake and pertains to things that are invariable and eternal. Its fields of 
study include logic and metaphysics, natural science (physics, biology, etc.), and 
mathematics. Practical knowledge aims at correct or excellent action—viz. it is 
knowledge about how to live and act well. Such matters are not immutable and, hence, 
are up to agents to change. Ethics and politics are the characteristically practical fields 
social status, community bonds and reciprocity. In Polanyi’s (1957) terms, the economies of Aristotle’s 
time were ‘socially embedded’. The mechanism of market exchange was not extensive and co-existed 
with gift exchange.
67 This is a problem discussed in length by Cooper (1985/2004) and Roche (2014). 
68 “The end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action” Met.  
993b21-22; see also Met. 1025b20-21; 1025b19ff. Also, NE 1095a6 and NE 1103b27-28.
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of expertise in that they both deal with the question of how to act in ways that 
promote happiness. Their main difference is that ethics deals with this question at the 
level of the individual agent, whereas politics deals with the same question at the 
communal level, viz. how to live well together as a group. However, ethics and 
politics are interrelated: they both aim at correct action. The third division is 
productive knowledge: how to create and produce things required for survival and 
happiness. Fields like agriculture, building, carpentry, rhetoric, etc., belong to the 
productive division. The productive arts are individuated by their products. For 
example, the art of shipbuilding produces ships which are definitive of this art.   
As regards ethics and politics, Aristotle argues that they are practical in the further 
sense that merely contemplating about the central question of ethics and politics in the 
abstract is of no use. Individuals and societies need to act on this knowledge in order 
to become good and live well (NE 1103b25). In addition, unlike theoretical 
knowledge, the answers to ethical and political questions (e.g. the question of justice) 
lack in precision and certainty (NE 1094b14) because practical matters are not fixed 
and unchanging as the principles of mathematics. Hence, ethical and political 
decisions do not admit precise answers that hold for everyone at all times. Instead of 
consulting a rulebook of correct action, the good person will choose to do the right 
thing in the circumstances for the right reasons. 
1.5.2 The Hierarchy of Arts
In NE 1094a1-b12, Aristotle ranks political expertise over all practical and productive 
arts, e.g. generalship, household-management (οἰκονομική; oikonomikê), rhetoric, etc. 
The logic of Aristotle’s hierarchy of practical and productive arts is as follows.69 An 
art A falls under another art B (e.g. military action falls under strategy or bridle-
making falls under the art of horse-riding) because A is needed / desired for the sake 
of B; hence A is subordinated under B. For example, the art of bridle-making aims at 
producing equipment (bridles) for aiding horse-riding which in turn aims at victorious 
69 In NE 1094a9-16 Aristotle argues that “But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-
making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this 
and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of 
these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of 
the former that the latter are pursued.”
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military action which is the aim of strategy. Aristotle reasons that since each art is 
pursued or desired for the sake of a higher end, there must be an art whose end is 
desired on account of nothing else but itself—otherwise the process would go on 
infinitely. It follows that all arts are subordinated under an ultimate end or good. 
Aristotle’s proof concludes: 
And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the 
sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should 
learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most 
highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, 
rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it 
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of 
this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the 
human good. (NE 1094a27-b7)
We should note here that political expertise is most authoritative because it includes 
all human ends and the disciplines that pursue these ends; its authority is not arbitrary. 
The teleological priority argument of the Politics supplies an unstated premise in 
Aristotle’s reasoning above. It shows that the city (not, for instance, the household)70 
is the proper object of the art concerned with the chief good because the city aims by 
nature at the most complete good. It follows that this art is politics and all other arts 
are subordinate to it. 
Aristotle does not explain whether chrematistics and household-management belong 
to the practical or the productive arts. Given his distinction between practical and 
productive arts it follows that chrematistics is a productive art, whereas household-
management is a practical one.71 Also, Aristotle does not rank the ends of the various 
arts and does not explain how the various arts aid happiness. The priority argument 
suggests that the end of the city is inclusive of all ends but offers no method to rank 
them. This structure parallels Aristotle’s statement of a three-fold division of goods 
70 Simpson (1998:14).
71 Newman (1887:126) and Miller (1995:6-11) argue that household-management is practical, whereas 
chrematistics is productive. For a full discussion why household-management is a practical art see 
Crespo (2013:39). Crespo argues that chrematistics produces wealth, whereas household-management 
is concerned with the use of wealth to serve living and the good life. While both involve action, their 
difference is that action in productive arts is transitive (poiesis), whereas action in practical arts is 
immanent (praxis).
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which recapitulates his formal account of the chief good in the first half of NE I.7 
(1096a22-1097b22): 
(a) The chief good or happiness (NE 1099b26).
(b) Goods that are necessary constituents of happiness (τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν 
ἀναγκαῖον; NE 1099b27).
(c) Goods that contribute to happiness as useful instruments (συνεργά καί 
χρήσιμα; NE 1099b27-28). 
As regards (a), the chief good is pursued only on account of itself and not because of 
something else. There are two main ways to understand the structure of the chief good 
and the other goods in Aristotelian exegesis: the final end is either a single dominant 
good which explains why anything else is pursued, or it is an inclusive end made up 
by several intrinsic goods.72 The main bulk of the Nicomachean Ethics, especially NE 
I, states that the good life is a life of virtuous activity based on practical reason; it is 
both the ethical and the civic life. In this best practical life Aristotle adds various 
external goods as both constituents of happiness and instruments of virtuous activity. 
In a general way, a life that lacks in any of these components is less complete and 
blessed. Second, in both the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says that 
the end of the city is the most complete end; this end is more godlike: 
…[T]he good of the city is a greater and more complete thing both to attain 
and to preserve…to do it for a nation or for cities is finer and more godlike. 
(NE 1094b7-11) 
However, in NE X.7-8, Aristotle appears to say that happiness is a single, dominant 
good: the life of contemplation (NE 1177a12-19).73 This is a godlike life based on the 
activity of theoretical reason. It is possible that Aristotle did not see a contradiction in 
his conflicting claims and thought that ‘dominant’ and ‘inclusive’ are not 
contradictories. 
The two readings appear contradictory in the following sense. If happiness is a 
dominant end—the direct cause / reason of all activities—, then the other goods are 
72 Ackrill (1980) is in favor of inclusivism. Kraut (1991) is in favor of the dominant view. 
73 See Kraut (1991) chapter 4 for a full defense of exclusivism.
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only pursued for the sake of happiness; hence, the other goods cannot be intrinsic 
constituents of an inclusive end. However, Aristotle could also have in mind that 
happiness is both dominant and inclusive in the following sense. Happiness might be 
a dominant end in a non-causal sense:74 we would not need to cite happiness in order 
to explain why agents want to be just or love their friends; agents are not just or love 
their friends because they want to be happy.75 Nonetheless, happiness is also a 
dominant end in the sense that it explains what all intrinsic goods constitute and 
contribute to, viz. a happy life.
As regards the conflict between NE I and NE X, whether the best life is the practical 
or the contemplative life, it is possible that Aristotle considered virtue and 
contemplation (theoria) as individually necessary and jointly sufficient constituents of 
happiness. Since the good practical life and the good contemplative life require 
wisdom, then the best life requires the perfection of both theoretical and practical 
reason.76 
Also, since the good life is partly practical, as NE I suggests, and requires external 
goods (NE 1099a31-b6), we need to understand the place of wealth in this life. For 
example, is it a useful instrument—something sought because of higher ends, like 
virtue (NE 1096a6-7; 1097a25-27)? Or is it also a constituent of happiness (Rhet. I)? 
The purpose of this discussion is to find out the scope of wealth-acquisition since 
Aristotle does not discuss its scope in the Ethics and Politics.
1.5.3 Happiness and Wealth
74 I use ‘causal’ here in a loose sense to denote the idea of a ‘determining’ or ‘motivating’ reason. 
Strictly speaking, there is a received distinction between reasons and causes, i.e. humans act for reasons. 
A reason is ‘determining’ in the sense that it can be cited in the explanation of action; alternatively we 
can call it a ‘motivating’ reason as well as a ‘normative’ reason. Happiness, for Aristotle, is a final end 
which is not cause in the sense of efficient cause.
75 A utilitarian view of welfare, especially hedonism, holds that the ultimate end is the maximization of 
happiness, i.e. pleasure, and the minimization of pain. This is a monistic view of motivation.
76 We can conceive of this combination as follows: successful practical life requires theoretical 
expertise while the contemplative life requires the aid of practical expertise that actualizes human 
function and secures the material conditions necessary for the leisured life of θεωρία (theoria). Cooper 
(1999:235) also argues that while Aristotle seems to favor the contemplative life, because it is godlike, 
the virtues of practical reason are expressions of the perfection of reason; their kinship makes the 
practical virtues instances of the divine form of happiness in practical life.
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According to Aristotle, “wealth is not the good we are looking for, since it is useful, 
and for the sake of something else” (NE 1096a6-7); happiness, most certainly, 
requires the goods of fortune or external goods (τά ἐκτός ἀγαθά), including wealth 
(NE 1099a31-b6). However, it is not clear in what sense they are necessary 
components of happiness. Some commentators doubt that external goods make an 
intrinsic contribution to happiness in the sense of (b) above.77 They hold that 
happiness is virtuous activity exclusively and that external goods are only instruments 
that contribute to happiness indirectly by enabling the exercise of such virtues as 
generosity, magnificence and magnanimity.78 Let us call this the ‘exclusivist’ or Stoic 
reading:79 if virtuous activity is necessary and sufficient for happiness, then it is the 
exclusive constituent of happiness—it excludes the other components, like wealth.80 
The rival interpretation holds that external goods constitute happiness along with the 
virtues and other goods of the soul. On that score, virtue is necessary but not 
sufficient for happiness.81 Let us call this the ‘inclusivist’ reading since external goods, 
like wealth, make both direct contribution to happiness—by enhancing agents’ 
happiness in their own right—and indirect contribution to happiness—by aiding 
virtuous activity.
There is evidence for both readings. The exclusivist reading is directly based on NE 
1098a16-20. It is also based on the idea that external goods are not constituents of 
happiness “([happiness] falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods” 
(NE 1098b12-20).82 On the other hand, the inclusivist reading is based on NE 
1099a31-b6 where Aristotle says that the lack of external goods diminishes the quality 
of one’s life (“takes the lustre from happiness”; NE 1099b2) and on NE 1101a14-16 
where he says that the happy person is both virtuous and “sufficiently equipped with 
external goods”. Also, his definition of happiness in the Rhetoric (1360b14-31) 
suggests that happiness does not consist in the exercise of virtue alone; happiness 
77 See Kraut (1991) and Cooper (2004).
78 The Stoics denied that external goods are really ever goods.
79 The life of virtue is sufficient for happiness; see Roche (2014:37).
80 Virtuous activity is happiness in the sense that its lack decreases the welfare of agents.
81 Ackrill (1980); Irwin (1985/2007); Nussbaum (1986); Annas (1993); and Broadie and Rowe (2002). 
82 See also Pol. 1323b15-17: “Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the 
body are desirable at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul.” Here 
Aristotle seems to say that, as such, external goods are desired as instruments productive of virtue and 
desirable only for the sake of psychic goods.
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consists in prosperity combined with virtue and pleasure: 
We may define happiness as prosperity combined with excellence; or as 
independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; 
or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of 
guarding one’s property and body and making use of them. That happiness is 
one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees. From this definition 
of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: good birth, plenty of 
friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old 
age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, 
athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and excellence. A man 
cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and 
these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have. (Goods of 
the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honor 
are external.) (1360b14-31)
Here Aristotle holds that happiness includes the complete range of intellectual and 
moral virtues along with the various external goods, pleasure, etc. which appear to be 
constituents of happiness. By having any of the above goods, one is better-off; 
presumably the lack of pleasure, freedom and external goods diminishes the quality of 
one’s life without making one less virtuous necessarily. 
About riches Aristotle says that they are instruments of noble activity (NE 1099b1-2); 
he does not clarify whether by ‘external goods’ in NE 1101a14-16 he refers to wealth. 
Possibly, wealth belongs to the class of goods which are instruments (συνεργὰ καὶ 
χρήσιμα), not constituents (τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον) of happiness:
…[H]appiness has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. 
Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions [i.e. 
constituents] of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as 
instruments [συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα]. (NE 1099b26-28)
Yet, in the Rhetoric (1362a13-25) Aristotle seems to suggest that certain forms of 
wealth are not only instruments but also make a direct contribution to happiness (they 
are conditions or constituents of happiness): 
The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the 
ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of 
numerous and beautiful implements, livestock, and slaves. All these kinds of 
property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds 
are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide 
enjoyment. (1362a13-17)
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Wealth, Aristotle says, consists of things that have utility; they are productive of other 
goods or income. Also, wealth consists of things that offer pleasure and beauty. 
However, while it might appear that wealth, like beautiful estates, directly contributes 
to the good life, we should not ignore that Aristotle does not rank them on an equal 
footing with the goods of the soul which have intrinsic value and constitute happiness 
directly. Also, wealth Aristotle says, primarily consists in use rather than in 
ownership:
Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is 
really the activity—that is, the use—of property that constitutes wealth. (Rhet. 
1362a24-25)
In other words, what makes wealth a member of the class of goods, is the use of it. 
And, presumably, not any use of wealth makes it such a good—see the prodigal 
person; wealth should be a good when it is used well. Hence, for instance, one must 
be liberal (NE 1104a4-8) and temperate in using wealth in order to attain happiness. 
Also, the possession of wealth may be harmful after some point (Pol. 1323b5). If this 
is what Aristotle has in mind, the mere possession of goods does not constitute 
happiness; one must be good in order to use external goods well. In other words, 
wealth is a constituent of happiness only if it is used well.83 However, as passages like 
Pol. 1323b15-17, NE 1096a6-7 and 1099b1-2 suggest, wealth, for Aristotle, has no 
intrinsic value. He most possibly thought that wealth is both an instrument and a 
constituent of happiness but not an intrinsic constituent, like the internal goods. In 
sum, I suggest that, for Aristotle, (a) wealth enables the exercise of virtue, and (b) the 
use of wealth by a good person contributes to one’s well-being in its own right 
although it is not an intrinsic good. Hence, whether wealth is a constituent of 
happiness depends on the use one puts it into and on the goodness of the user. Yet, 
there is no evidence that wealth, for Aristotle, is an intrinsic good.84 
83 For this proviso see Roche (2014) who furnishes evidence like NE 1124a26–31 in favor of the 
reading that wealth is a good—a constituent of happiness—when it is used well.
84 Roche (2014) does not clarify whether wealth has intrinsic value when it is used well. I think that 
would be a mistake; if it were intrinsically good, it would not be sought for the sake of other things (it 
would have some of the properties of the good); for instance, contrast wealth with intrinsic goods like 
knowledge which is sought after for what they are.
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1.6 Conclusion and Summary
This chapter introduced Aristotle’s problematic from which his inquiry about 
chrematistics arises. I put forth the questions about chrematistics against the backdrop 
of Aristotle’s main concerns, principles and concepts of his Ethics and Politics. Also, 
I provided the conceptual groundwork of his inquiry in chrematistics—i.e. the main 
concepts of his moral psychology and ethical and political theory—without which we 
cannot work out his answers to the main questions about chrematistics. In the next 
chapter I present Aristotle’s writings on chrematistics as these appear in Pol. I.8-11. 
Aristotle analyzes the tasks associated with household rule, including the acquisition 
of wealth, as prescribed by the natural limit of the household economy: material self-
sufficiency. This analysis will delimit the ethical scope of chrematistics in accord with 
the higher, natural end of human happiness, and will carve out the space of the natural 
economy where some modes of acquisition are ethical, whereas others, like commerce 
and money-lending, are unsuitable for the good person and citizen. While Aristotle’s 
economic thought deals with central questions of microeconomics—such as money 
and market exchange—his is an economics of the household since it is chiefly 
concerned with the efficient administration of the household, including the efficient 
distribution of resources, rather than the economics of markets (viz. the interplay of 
supply and demand). The latter is concerned with how the market mechanism 
achieves productive and allocative efficiency in order to solve the fundamental 
economizing problem. The administrative tradition of economics does not accept this 
solution to the economizing problem but aims at the efficient management of desires 
and resources. For Aristotle, “economics is chiefly concerned with the ordering of 
human purpose and function within the two dominant economic units of his day—the 




The Theory of Chrematistics 
Politics I.8-11
Overview 
This chapter is a reconstruction and interpretation of Pol. I.8-11 where we find the 
main bulk of Aristotle’s answer to the Master Question. Here is the structure of the 
second chapter. Aristotle, first, distinguishes between chrematistics and household-
management based on their difference in purpose—hence, he answers question (1). 
Second, he distinguishes between natural and unnatural chrematistics and argues that 
the first belongs to household-management—hence, he answers question (2). Third, 
he argues that natural chrematistics is both part and auxiliary to household-
management: the natural modes of acquisition belong to household-management and 
are suitable for the householder and citizen; the study and execution of natural 
chrematistics should be delegated to others. Fourth, he lays out the various modes of 
chrematistics in terms of their ethical status; commerce, money-lending, the crafts and 
working-for-pay are unnatural modes of chrematistics and the householder should 
refrain from them, especially from money-lending—hence, he answers question (2.a). 
However, Aristotle does not provide a single standard that separates natural from 
unnatural chrematistics as asked by question (2). Consequently, his taxonomy of the 
ethical modes of acquisition—namely, question (2.a)—is not neat. Also, in regards to 
question (1.a) he seems to allow that when need arises, unnatural chrematistics could 
be an auxiliary to household-management. Aristotle does not tackle with these 
questions neatly and thoroughly in Pol. I.8-11. In addition, the second chapter raises 
further questions on its own. First, why was Aristotle in favor of disenfranchising the 
industrial class of the best city? Is it because the lower occupations violate his 
standard of natural chrematistics or was it class-prejudice? Second, why does he think 
that commerce is rightly censured (Pol. I.10) given that elsewhere he treats 
commercial exchange as necessary for the householders, the landless citizens and the 
city (e.g. in NE V.5)? The related question, then, is which forms of commerce 
56
Aristotle approved and by which standard. Third, what is Aristotle’s theory of 
commercial justice—namely, his theory of just price— given that he approves of 
certain forms of commerce? Fourth, did Aristotle think that commercial profit-seeking 
is an inherently unfair economic practice that nurtures injustice and greed? In effect, I 
examine these questions in chapters 3-6. 
2.1 Chrematistics and Household-Management 
In this section I show how Aristotle replies to question (1). His answer starts in Pol. 
I.3-4 where Aristotle lays out the parts of the household and argues that chrematistics 
is an essential part of household-management. After a detour in slavery, he takes up 
the Master Question again in Pol. I.8. Chrematistics is the art of supply; it aims at the 
acquisition of things useful for survival and the good life. Household-management is 
the art of managing wealth; it aims at the use of wealth. 
 
2.1.1 Chrematistics in Politics I.3-4
Aristotle uses his familiar method of analyzing the parts of an entity in order to 
understand the end of the whole. We saw that the household “is the community 
constituted to satisfy everyday needs” (Pol. 1252b12-13). In Pol. I.4 Aristotle explains 
the duties of the householder by laying out the elements or parts (μέρη; merhê) of the 
household. The household consists of the master/husband, the slave, the wife, and the 
children. The rule of the householder is rule over slaves, wives and children, and 
involves three ruling arts corresponding to each of the three pairs: 
1. Δεσποτική (Despotikê), viz. the skill 'of a master' or ‘mastership’.
2. Γαμική (Gamikê), viz. 'marital' skill or ‘matrimonial’.
3. Τεκνοποιητική (Teknopoietikê), viz. 'procreative' skill or ‘paternal’.
The fourth art is chrematistics. Since, first, property is part of the household, and, 
second, both mere living and the good life require an adequate supply of goods or 
wealth, then, third, the householder must be concerned with the acquisition of 
property (Pol. 1253b23-26). According to Aristotle, property consists of various 
goods and instruments—both inanimate and animate instruments, i.e. tools and 
slaves—meant for doing or living—for life is action, not production (Pol. 1253b23-
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1254a8). However, the tools used for production belong to property derivatively since 
they are used for producing the things that the householder needs for action. 
After a detour in slavery (Pol. I.4-7), Aristotle returns to the question about the end of 
household-management (Pol. I.3). In NE 1094a9, he had stated without argument that 
household-management aims at wealth.86 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Aristotle’s concern is to inquire about the proper place of wealth in the good life, the 
economic duties of the householder and the ethical orientation of the household’s and 
the city’s economy. We need to take into account that, for Aristotle, a life devoted to 
wealth-acquisition, where wealth is sought for itself, (the life of a χρηματιστής; 
chrematistês, viz. money-maker) is not the good life:
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is 
evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake 
of something else. (NE 1096a5-7)
Since a life devoted to wealth-acquisition is not the good life, question (1) seeks the 
proper place of chrematistics in the hierarchy of arts, especially in relation to the other 
economic art, i.e. household-management.
2.1.2 Politics I.8: Economic Terms and Concepts
Aristotle restates the Master Question (1) in a tripartite form (Pol. 1256a4-6):
(a) Is the art of chrematistics the same as the art of household-management? 
If it is not the same, 
(b) Is the art of chrematistics a part of the art of household-management? 
Or 
(c) Is it  an auxiliary to the art of household-management (ὑπηρετική; 
hypêretikê)? 
As regards (a), Aristotle’s answer is straightforward: the two arts are not the same 
because they have different ends: the end of chrematistics is to provide goods while 
86 Perhaps, that was some kind of reputable opinion which held that the householder should be the 
provider of wealth. See e.g. Newman (1887:127). 
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the end of household-management is to use them (Pol. 1256a10-13). Since (a) is left 
out, Aristotle turns to examine (b) and (c). 
Before explaining these questions, let me note some points about terminology. First, 
in Pol. I.8, Aristotle uses the term κτητική (ktêtikê) instead of the term χρηματιστική. 
Κτητική appears to be the generic term for the art of property-acquisition concerned 
with things useful for the household and the city;87 it is his prototype of natural 
acquisition which is an indispensable part of οἰκονομικὴ (household-management). 
Hence, chrematistics belongs to κτητική since it is concerned with the acquisition of 
goods or property that one needs or uses (χρήματα; chrêmata),88 in particular, “money 
and the commodities whose worth is measured in money”.89 But, as we shall see 
shortly, exchange and money gave rise to the business kind of chrematistics which 
pursues unlimited wealth; this mode of chrematistics is not part of household-
management and κτητική. Hence, the term κτητική is the genus of natural 
chrematistics which refers to goods with exchange value.90 
This brings us to the second terminological point. While ‘οἰκονομικὴ’ primarily deals 
with the relations of the householder to the parts of the household (namely, wives, 
children, slaves and wealth) and bears no relevance to the modern discipline of 
‘economics’—the science which deals with the economizing problem—we should 
note that Aristotle offered recognizable economic ideas and made significant 
contributions to economic thought.91 In addition, the rendering of οἰκονομικὴ as 
87 Aristotle considers the wealth sought by κτητική as “a store of the goods that are necessary for life 
and useful to the community of city-state or household” (Pol. 1256b28-29). Κτητική is concerned with 
the acquisition of property that is necessary for both life and the good life: “ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς 
οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν” 
(Pol. 1253b24-25). 
88 Finley (1970:15); Langholm (1983:51).
89 Simpson (1998:50).
90 We may define chrematistics as that part of κτητική concerned with property which has exchange 
value in a market.
91 For example, he delved into the nature of such phenomena and institutions as economic value, 
market exchange, money, etc. Meikle (1995) argues that Aristotle took up the metaphysical question 
about economic value which is a considerable contribution to economic analysis. Schumpeter 
(1954a:54-55) argues that Aristotle wrote on economic phenomena with an ‘analytic intention’ in mind. 
Finley (1970:15) contends that there is no economic analysis in Aristotle’s Ethics; e.g. “pricing was 
actually not Aristotle’s concern” (p. 18). Crespo (2014) summarizes these discussions (chapters 1-3) 
and aptly explains (e.g., p. 11) that Aristotle was no economist in the modern sense of the term. Rather, 
he took up economic thinking as a moral and political philosopher. Nonetheless, as Crespo rightly 
points out, Aristotle offered recognizable economic ideas found in the foundations of medieval and 
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‘household-management’ should not obscure the fact that Aristotle was aware of the 
‘economic’ as a distinct sphere and that he dealt with problems of political 
economy.92 While his discussion of the ‘economic’ uses the household as the 
prototype of a ‘natural’ and ‘administrative’ form of economy,93 this discussion 
extends to the city. The city, too, requires the two economic arts, χρηματιστική and 
οἰκονομικὴ, for the acquisition and use of property. Of course, the two economic arts 
are subordinate to political expertise.94 This has a very important implication: for 
Aristotle, an economy’s ends, especially the task of wealth-acquisition, should not be 
divorced from ethical and political concerns. For this reason, economic historians 
rightly argue that Aristotle’s economic thinking is predominantly social, ethical and 
political.95 As we will see, Aristotle uses his prototype of the household economy as 
the standard for recognizing the natural kinds of chrematistics, viz. those within the 
scope of household-management. 
A third point about terminology is that, unfortunately, Aristotle sometimes slides 
between different uses of the term χρηματιστική: sometimes chrematistics is the 
natural part of household-management (οἰκονομικὴ) and at other times he uses the 
modern economic thinking; see Gordon (1993) and Polanyi (1957:66) about Aristotle’s influence on 
the Medieval Schoolmen and modern economic thinking (e.g. Marx).
92 By ‘Aristotle’s political economy’ I mean the way he theorizes the interchange between political 
governance, ethics and economic tasks. 
93 For proponents of the ‘administrative’ tradition (e.g. Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle), economics is 
the art of organizing and running the economic units—the household and the state—efficiently. Unlike 
the modern idea of productive and allocative efficiency, the ideal of the ancient tradition was 
‘administrative’ efficiency, namely, the prudent management of the household and the city. According 
to Lowry (1987), Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, the most seminal work on administrative economic 
thinking, “is a systematic treatment of the organization and administration of the agricultural estate, 
emphasizing human capital and organizational efficiency” (p. 13). The good administrator aims at 
increasing the quantity of the goods through proper organization, allocation of resources, and division 
of labor. Aristotle’s principle of division of labor is most characteristic of the governance of the 
Republic; for discussion of Plato’s political economy see Karasmanis (1997). These principles are 
applicable to all forms of association—the family, the village, and the state—by the householder, the 
military commander, the public administrator and the statesman.
94 Politics 1259a33-36. 
95 A number of scholars argue that the economy of classical Greece was similar in structure with 
modern market economies and only differed in scale. However, the received view of the economy of 
Aristotle’s time is that it was a primitive economy quite unlike the market economies of the modern era. 
Polanyi (1957), a prominent proponent of primitivism, argues that ancient economies were based on 
such factors as social status, gift exchange or state-controlled redistribution. In contrast, in market 
economies, economic interests are coordinated by the market mechanism and generate the social order 
(or governance) characteristic of capitalist societies. For primitivists the ‘economic’ is not a distinct 
concept and sphere since economic tasks were socially embedded.  
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term to denote unnatural chrematistics (Pol. I.11).96 So, our understanding of 
Aristotle’s theory of chrematistics requires disentangling the terms χρηματιστική, 
οἰκονομικὴ, κτητική and their variants, carefully.97 
2.1.3   The Master Question in Politics I.8 
We saw that chrematistics and the art of household-management are not identical. 
Now the Master Question breaks down to the following questions:
(b) Is the art of chrematistics a part of the art of household-management? Or 
(c) Is the art of chrematistics an auxiliary to the art of household-management 
(ὑπηρετική; hypêretikê)? 
Aristotle has already stated that κτητική is a part of household-management (Pol. 
1253b23-24). Hence, the householder, as user of property, must somehow get 
property first.98 If κτητική is part of household-management, then κτητική is a ‘duty’ 
of the householder, as (b) suggests (Pol. 1256b26-30). That is, ‘part’ implies ‘duty’ or 
‘responsibility’, viz. the householder is responsible for carrying out the task of 
property acquisition.99 
But, then, what does Aristotle mean by ‘auxiliary’ (ὑπηρετική) art? And what would 
be the bearing of the difference between κτητική as ‘part’ and κτητική as ‘auxiliary’ 
on the ethical characterization of chrematistics? Aristotle suggests that an auxiliary art 
provides the tools or the material to some higher-ranking art (Pol. 1256a5-10). To 
illustrate this idea, he draws an analogy: shuttle-making is subsidiary to weaving and 
bronze-founding is subsidiary to sculpture; both arts stand to their principals as 
providers stand to users (Pol. 1256a5-10). While both (b) and (c) rest on a provider-
user model, each implies different ways of engagement with κτητική. Statement (b) 
implies that the householder must be both user and provider, hence, an expert in both 
household-management and κτητική. On the other hand, (c) implies that the 
96 This is a problem recognized by most economic historians, e.g. Polanyi (1957), Finley (1970), 
Langholm (1983:51).
97 Κτητική is the generic term for the art of property acquisition. Chrematistics is a form of property-




householder must not necessarily be an expert in κτητική because an auxiliary art can 
be delegated to experts.100 Hence, being a ‘part’ implies ‘being a duty’ of the 
householder while being an ‘auxiliary’ suggests that the task can be delegated to 
someone who is expert—that is, someone with the know-how—in κτητική. In other 
words, the question (1) of the Master Question asks whether κτητική is a duty and 
expertise of the householder or whether it is a different kind of expertise and not a 
duty of the householder. 
Aristotle argues that the householder should be concerned with what is required for 
household-management (Pol. 1256b40-1257a2). Definitely, this idea, as such, does 
not dictate whether the householder should be an expert in κτητική or whether he 
could delegate its execution to others. In effect, Aristotle tasks himself of laying out 
the forms of chrematistics that belong to household-management and then examines 
which of them are part or auxiliary to household-management. I provide the full 
answer to Master Question (1.a) in section 2.3.4.
2.2 Natural Chrematistics
In this section I present Aristotle’s account of natural chrematistics, namely, κτητική 
(2.2.1) and necessary exchange (2.2.2). My second task is to explicate Aristotle’s 
standard that separates natural from unnatural chrematistics.
2.2.1 Politics I.8: Κτητική
Aristotle employs his familiar method of dividing a whole into parts in order to lay 
out the parts of property that falls under household-management. With this analysis he 
will prove that the proper kind of κτητική is that concerned with the property required 
for use by the householder. This analysis will elucidate how κτητική is a part of, and / 
or auxiliary to, household-management. It will further reveal the forms of κτητική 
which are genuine parts of household-management and the form of expertise required 
by the householder. In addition, this analysis will explain why certain forms of 
chrematistics appear to be part of household-management when they are not. 
100 This is a plausible suggestion by Saunders (2002:84) because Aristotle seeks to limit the 
householder’s engagement with chrematistics and prefers that the householder delegate the tasks of 
κτητική to someone else (e.g. a slave) and oversee its proper execution. The citizens/householders need 
time to devote themselves to statecraft and philosophy (Pol. 1255b36). 
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Aristotle’s analysis starts with the articles of property that are necessary for 
sustenance, in particular, food (Pol. 1256a19). He observes that nature provides for 
such necessities as food by design. In addition, and on account of natural teleology, 
the pursuit of different kinds of food (on account of need or desire) by different 
animals, involves a variety of ways of life and modes of acquisition (Pol. 1256a21-
29). This plurality holds for humans, too. For example, carnivores live in herds 
whereas herbivores may live scattered around (Pol. 1256a23-29). Humans pursue 
different ways of life in accord with their needs and tastes, likewise (Pol. 1256a29-
40). The first is the life of nomads who prefer to feed on domestic animals; the second 
is the life of hunters, raiders and fishermen; the third is the life of farmers who feed on 
cultivated crops. Aristotle notes that some combine two modes of acquisition, e.g. 
farming and hunting, in order to make up for any insufficiency whatsoever. 
In Pol. 1256a40-b1, Aristotle takes the first step towards delimiting κτητική, the 
natural mode of acquisition, from barter and trade. The natural mode, he says, is based 
on self-engendered (αὐτόφυτον; autophyton; 1256a41) toil which involves either the 
collection or the production of goods.101 In barter and trade, the acquisition of goods 
comes from the exchange of goods. Let me summarize the modes of acquisition as 
Aristotle presents them in Pol. I.8:
Modes of Natural Property-Acquisition (Κτητική):
 Nomadic
 Agricultural 
 Raiding, fishing, and hunting.
Modes of Non-Natural Property-Acquisition: 102
 Barter
101 According to Saunders (2002:85), αὐτόφυτον means ‘by natural growth’. Wilson (1895:187) 
renders αὐτόφυτον as ‘grow up of itself’, that is ‘naturally’, by natural growth. “…[T]his contrasts 
what springs up of itself with what arises from human design and choice. In other words, the natural 
from the artificial” (p.187).
102 I use the term ‘non-natural’ because Aristotle allows that some forms of acquisition which are not 
natural, are not unnatural either—as is the case with barter. In other words, ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ 
are contraries but not contradictories.  
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 Trade 
For Aristotle, κτητική is most natural because it is in accord with nature’s design; 
nature has created everything for the sake of humans (Pol. 1256b20-22).103  He argues 
that nature provides almost anything that organisms need for their preservation 
because “nature makes nothing either incomplete or to no purpose” (Pol. 1256b20-
21).104 Aristotle observes that, on account of natural teleology, plants exist for the 
sake of animals and animals (and plants) exist for the sake of humans. In particular, 
tame and wild animals, plants and trees serve as food and as material for tools, 
clothing, shelter, etc. Also, he considers piracy, warfare and the forcible enslavement 
of humans as natural modes of acquisition.105
Aristotle concludes his discussion of κτητική by stating that it is part of household-
management by nature: 
One kind of property acquisition [κτητική] is a natural part of household 
management, then, in that a store of the goods that are necessary for life and 
useful to the community of city-state or household either must be available to 
start with, or household management must arrange to make it available. (Pol. 
1256b26-30)
It is not clear yet whether κτητική is only part of household-management or an 
auxiliary to it as well. So far, Aristotle has used his teleological method to establish 
that κτητική is concerned with getting the fruits of natural providence: goods that are 
“necessary for life and useful to the community of city-state or household” (Pol. 
1256b30). Hence, κτητική belongs to household-management as a matter of natural 
teleology (see also Pol. 1253b23-26). This idea prescribes a form of ‘Natural 
103 Saunders (2002:85) rightly notes: “However, we should beware of concluding that Aristotle 
believed animals evolved historically into their present forms, under pressure of the environment: 
species are eternal and were ever thus; for nature has made them so. Nor does the quasi-personification 
of nature necessarily imply some cosmic intellect that designed the whole world as we know it, in all 
its detail. Aristotle means only that animals are (somehow) fitted for living in their respective 
environments. It is in this sense that certain foods, the modes of acquiring them, and the consequential 
life-styles, are 'natural' to certain animals-including … human beings”. 
104 For discussion see, for example, Shulsky (1991:80). Wilson (1896:186) says that the source of profit 
for Aristotle is the natural product; Newman (1887:113) says that the natural mode of acquisition is in 
“intrinsic conformity to the design of Nature.” 
105 As Saunders (2002:85) points out, we may wonder how such an immoral action as raiding or 
enslavement could belong to natural chrematistics which Aristotle considers ethical. 
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Economy’, an economy where nature is the source of the goods required for the end 
of household-management:
Natural Economy
Nature provides for everything necessary for life and useful to the community 
of city-state or household.
However, it is not always possible to use what nature provides directly. Chrematistics 
must “contrive that property is available” (ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως 
ὑπάρχῃ; Pol. 1256b28). Aristotle here introduces the non-natural forms of 
acquisition—barter and trade. On the one hand, the natural modes of acquisition 
“have their work self-engendered [αὐτόφυτον], and do not procure their food through 
exchange, barter or trade” (Pol. 1256a40-b1).106 On the other hand, non-natural forms 
of acquisition are not based on what nature provides directly. Non-natural acquisition 
is not based on self-engendered items; it is based on exchange. In a general way, the 
natural forms of acquisition conform to the design of nature. Let us call the standard 
which Aristotle uses to separate the natural from the non-natural forms of acquisition 
Aristotle’s ‘Natural Standard’. This appears in more than one form. In Pol. I.8 it 
appears in the following form:107
Natural Standard1
A form of wealth-acquisition is natural when it is based on the collection of 
goods from nature or on the production of goods.
Does this standard prescribe that the householder be an expert in chrematistics and the 
practician of the tasks related to it? That is, should, for instance, the householder be a 
farmer or shepherd? Aristotle postpones his answer to this question and moves to 
show that κτητική is an art that pursues wealth with a limit, namely, ‘true’ wealth:
At any rate, true wealth seems to consist in such goods. For the amount of this 
sort of property that one needs for the self-sufficiency that promotes the good 
106 This term (viz. self-engendered) helps Aristotle further stress the difference between natural and 
non-natural chrematistics.  
107Shulsky (1991:80); Wilson (1896:186); Newman (1887:113). The two main kinds of chrematistics, 
says Newman, are “here distinguished, not according to their effect on the agent, but according to their 
intrinsic conformity to the design of Nature.” 
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life is not unlimited, though Solon in his poetry says it is: "No boundary to 
wealth has been established for human beings." But such a limit or boundary 
has been established, just as in the other crafts. For none has any tool 
unlimited in size or number, and wealth is a collection of tools belonging to 
statesmen and household managers. It is clear, then, that there is a natural kind 
of property acquisition for household managers and statesmen, and it is also 
clear why this is so. (Pol. 1256b30-39)
We see here that, apart from the naturalness of its sources, κτητική is properly related 
to household-management for an additional reason: it is concerned with property that 
has a limit. This property Aristotle calls ‘true’ wealth, i.e. property required for the 
end of household-management. Aristotle’s argument is as follows:108 (a) the property 
required for the end of household-management (i.e. sustenance and the good life) is 
true wealth;109 (b) contra Solon’s verse, true wealth has a limit; (c) the sufficiency in 
property required for the exercise of household-management is not unlimited;110 (d) 
hence, the sufficiency in property required for household-management is true wealth. 
But why should the property required for the good life have a limit? That is, why 
should true wealth have a limit?111 Aristotle must prove that only property with a limit 
(i.e. true wealth) is what the good life requires, namely, he must prove premise (b). 
With the concept of ‘true wealth’, he introduces a variant of the Natural Standard. 
Natural chrematistics does not only rest on producing or getting goods from nature 
but also on the natural self-sufficiency in property required for sustenance and 
flourishing:
Natural Standard2
A form of wealth-acquisition is natural if it aims at true wealth. 
In light of the previous standard (NS1), κτητική is the art of acquiring wealth from 
nature directly, in conformity with the design of nature. By this new standard (NS2), 
108 See Pol. 1256b26-40. This reconstruction is based on Simpson (1998:46-50).
109 We saw that κτητική aims at providing an adequate supply of property necessary for both life and 
the good life (Pol. 1253b23-25). Humans do not need an unlimited amount of wealth for the realization 
of their natural ends of subsistence and flourishing.
110 The sufficiency in property is limited by the material requirements of sustenance and the good life.
111 Simpson (1998:50) raises this question because Aristotle must show that only property with a limit 
is required for the good life; otherwise unlimited money (which is property without a limit) could be 
the property required for the good life. Aristotle must rule out the latter for his argument to work. 
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κτητική becomes the art of acquiring true wealth, i.e. property limited by natural self-
sufficiency. NS1 is based on the idea that nature would not have provided less of what 
humans need for their survival and flourishing. However, while NS1 ensures that 
humans will not have less than the material conditions of the good life prescribe, it 
alone does not place an upper limit on acquisition. In other words, Aristotle needs to 
establish that human happiness does not require an unlimited amount of wealth. 
In effect, he devises the following proof (Pol. 1256b26-40):112 (a) every art requires a 
collection of tools for its exercise; (b) these tools have a limit in quantity or size 
because beyond a certain quantity or size they would be useless for the end of the art; 
(c) accordingly, the exercise of household-management requires a multitude of tools 
(e.g. crops, animals, slaves, etc.); (d) the multitude of tools required for the exercise of 
household-management is limited because wealth is useless for household-
management if it exceeds the limit of self-sufficiency;113 (e) hence, the property 
required for household-management has a limit.
Let me summarize what Aristotle has said about κτητική and why he thinks it is the 
proper part of household-management (Pol. 1253b23-26; 1256b26-27). Nature, 
Aristotle says, makes everything for the sake of humans in order to assist them in 
realizing the goal of self-sufficiency. In particular, nature provides the things required 
for the satisfaction of the needs of the household and the city-state which are naturally 
formed to satisfy the human need for sustenance and the good life. The end of 
household-management is the use of true wealth. The things required for the 
satisfaction of the needs of the household and the city constitute true wealth—i.e. 
wealth that is provided by nature’s design and limited by natural self-sufficiency. 
Hence, household-management requires the acquisition of true wealth. The kind of 
chrematistics whose end is to provide the association of state or household with true 
wealth is κτητική. 
112 Simpson (1998:49-50). 
113 Wilson (1896:187) says that our natural need for food makes κτητική natural, too. This Aristotle 
does not state clearly but the perishability of food and human satiation place a natural limit on κτητική; 
see Shulsky (1991: 82-83) for a discussion of how NS2 places a natural limit on acquisition. 
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Aristotle does not say here that the city should be run as a large household. But since 
the city aims at the good life and the administration of the city requires the acquisition 
and use of wealth, chrematistics is necessarily a concern of political expertise. The 
tasks of the householder and the statesman in regards to wealth-acquisition are the 
same. Aristotle clarifies these tasks in Pol. I.10-11.  
2.2.2 Politics I.9: Exchange-based Acquisition
So far, Aristotle has argued that κτητική is a significant part of household-
management—as provider is related to user. Having concluded his discussion of 
κτητική, Aristotle re-introduces the term χρηματιστική which is, as he says, justly 
called so because it appears to be concerned with unlimited wealth:
But there is another type of property acquisition [κτητική] which is especially 
called wealth acquisition [χρηματιστική], and justifiably so. It is the reason 
wealth and property are thought to have no limit. For many people believe that 
wealth-acquisition is one and the same thing as the kind of property 
acquisition we have been discussing, because the two are close neighbors. But 
it is neither the same as the one we discussed nor all that far from it: one of 
them is natural, whereas the other is not natural, but comes from a sort of 
experience and craft. (Pol. 1256b40-1257a5)
Here Aristotle explains why people confuse the genus of κτητική with the unnatural 
kind of χρηματιστική that pursues unlimited wealth—let us call the kind that pursues 
unlimited wealth as the ‘business’ kind of chrematistics—and requires experience and 
skill. He points out that people fail to recognize that each kind pursues different forms 
of wealth because of their resemblance. Here Aristotle introduces a further way of 
distinguishing between natural and non-natural chrematistics: the non-natural kind 
comes from “experience and craft”. But in what sense natural chrematistics—such as 
hunting, fishing and farming—does not require skill and experience.114 Perhaps, 
Aristotle wants to describe how each form of chrematistics arises in the first place. Or, 
he might want to say that nature has prepared humans to develop the skill required for 
the natural modes of acquisition—e.g. the idea that hunting comes more naturally to 
114 Saunders (2002:91) rightly points out: “Yet he [Aristotle] can hardly be denying that mankind had 
to learn the skills of hunting too”. 
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humans than commerce does.115 An alternative reading is that the objects of natural 
acquisition are created (γίνονται; ginontai, i.e. ‘come about’) and provided by nature, 
whereas the objects of non-natural chrematistics come about as a result of art (i.e. 
invention). As we shall see shortly, non-natural chrematistics arose when humans 
invented money to facilitate exchange. However, the chrematistics whose objects are 
contrived from ‘a certain kind of experience and craft’ do not automatically fall in the 
unnatural kind. In other words, we need to see whether acquisition from exchange 
violates both NS1 and NS2; if it does, then it is not a proper part of household-
management. 
In effect, Aristotle takes up the task of explaining in detail how exchange and money 
gave rise to the non-natural kind of chrematistics, how exactly this kind differs from 
the natural forms of chrematistics, and, finally, how it relates to household-
management. Aristotle starts his inquiry into the forms of exchange by drawing his 
much-discussed distinction between proper use and use for-exchange:
Every piece of property has two uses. Both of these are uses of it as such, but 
they are not the same uses of it as such: one is proper to the thing and the other 
is not. Take the wearing of a shoe, for example, and its use in exchange. Both 
are uses to which shoes can be put. For someone who exchanges a shoe, for 
money or food, with someone else who needs a shoe, is using the shoe as a 
shoe. But this is not its proper use because it does not come to exist for the 
sake of exchange. (Pol. 1257a7-12)
Aristotle says that the first use of a thing is the proper use (οἰκεία; oikeia) whereas the 
second use is the use for-exchange (μεταβλητική; metablêtikê). For example, one may 
use a pair of shoes to wear it (the proper use) or to exchange it for, say, food or 
money. Aristotle notes that in both cases the thing used is used for what it is. Wearing 
a shoe is using it as a shoe. Similarly, exchanging a shoe is using it as an 
115 Saunders (2002) explains the difference between the skills in natural and non-natural chrematistics 
as follows: “Presumably trade requires more experience and skill than (say) hunting, because animals 
are simply and naturally 'there', as it were ready-made, to be taken by us, who are by nature already at 
least partly equipped to take them; but nature has not equipped us with the skills of trade, which had to 
be developed from scratch, either by individuals or by the race over a period of history” (p.91). In other 
words, the difference lies in that we are more prepared by nature to pursue κτητική than we are 
prepared for trade. In my view, it is also possible, as Simpson (1998:50) and Wilson (1896:187) point 
out, that the word ‘γίνονται’ (come about) stresses that the two arts differ in kind in virtue of how their 
objects come about, naturally or artificially. The skill of natural chrematistics is skill in getting wealth 
while non-natural chrematistics requires skill in creating wealth (ποιητική χρημάτων) from exchange. 
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exchangeable item. The difference between these two ways of using a shoe lies in that 
the proper use is in accord with the nature of the thing, that is, in accord with the 
purpose it was made, viz. a shoe is made for wearing. In contrast, exchange 
(ἀλλαγή; allagê) involves using a shoe for the purpose of exchanging it with 
something else—a thing or money. 
Aristotle’s analysis of μεταβλητική starts with a genealogy of exchange:
The same is true of other pieces of property as well, since the science of 
exchange embraces all of them. It first arises out of the natural circumstance of 
some people having more than enough and others less. (Pol. 1257a12-15)
We saw that exchange is possible because anything has a dual use. In practice, 
according to Aristotle, exchange arose as a natural way of making up for deficiencies 
in necessary goods—viz. to “fill in gaps in a natural self-sufficiency” (Pol. 1257a29). 
As he explains, exchange “has no task to perform in the first community (that is to say, 
the household), but only when the community has become larger” (Pol. 1257a19-20) 
because members of the household share their possessions. In contrast: 
…[T]hose in separate households shared next many different things, which 
they had to exchange with one another through barter when the need arose, as 
many non-Greek peoples still do even to this day. For they exchange useful 
things for other useful things, but nothing beyond that—for example, wine is 
exchanged for wheat, and so on with everything else of this kind (Pol. 
1257a23-28)
Exchange, then, arises from the fact that there is a lack in a natural self-sufficiency; 
any household or city, at any time, may have a surplus of x and a shortage of y (Pol. 
1257a14-16). Hence, the natural move was to make an exchange with another 
household or city which used to have a surplus of y and a shortage in x. Aristotle calls 
this form of exchange ‘necessary’ (ἀναγκαῖα ἀλλαγή) because it is based on the need 
for self-sufficiency:
…[P]eople needed to engage in exchange only up to the point at which they 
had enough (ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν; 
Pol. 1257a19)
He also says that exchanges between states (μεταδόσεις) were necessary (ἀναγκαῖον 
ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις) in virtue of the fact that they are the only way to satisfy 
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their needs (ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις; Pol. 1257a23-
25). However, necessary exchange is not unnatural when it aims at filling “gaps in a 
natural self-sufficiency” (εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν; 
1257a30), i.e. when it aims at true wealth—the wealth limited by natural self-
sufficiency.
Then, Aristotle contrasts necessary exchange with καπηλική (kapêlikê), viz. retail 
trade.116 However, with the term καπηλική Aristotle also refers to skill in ‘business’ 
more broadly:117 it is the art of maximizing profit through exchange (Pol. 1257b2-5). 
Καπηλική is not necessary exchange and therefore it is unnatural chrematistics: “καὶ 
δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική” (1257a17-18). By which 
standard does Aristotle classify καπηλική to the unnatural kind of chrematistics?  
Aristotle says:
…[T]he part of wealth acquisition [χρηματιστική] which is commerce 
[καπηλική] does not exist by nature; people needed to engage in exchange 
only up to the point at which they had enough. (Pol. 1257a14-19)118
The phrase “καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική” connotes 
that καπηλική is not natural. Here are some renderings of the predicate ‘οὐκ ἔστι 
φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς’:
1. The art of trade does not exist by nature 119 
A different rendering of the passage is as follows:
2. The art of trade is not a natural part of the art of money-making [i.e. 
chrematistics].120
116 Retail traders (κάπηλοι) carried out local trade. Long-distance and foreign trade was carried out by 
merchants (ἔμπορος/οι) who were usually (μέτοικοι; metics, i.e. free non-citizens); see Hasebroek 
(1965:1-6) and Finley (1970).
117 Aristotle uses the term καπηλική to denote both retail trade and the kind of chrematistics that seeks 
unlimited wealth; Finley (1970:16). Also, Simpson (1998:50) suggests that Aristotle uses καπηλική 
here, broadly, as the skill in acquisition that operates on the profit-maximization principle and seeks 
unlimited wealth, namely, business. 
118 This translation is by Saunders (2002:13).
119 Saunders (2002); Reeve (1998).
120 Jowett (1885:15).
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Translation (1) rather misleadingly implies that only the modes of chrematistics 
prescribed by NS1 are natural, and hence, καπηλική is unnatural because it “is not a 
natural way of getting goods”.121 Also, it is an invention. Hence, it muddies the fact 
that necessary exchange is natural chrematistics by NS2122 but non-natural by NS1, 
whereas καπηλική violates both NS1 and NS2 because it gets goods through exchange 
but it is not necessary exchange, viz. it pursues spurious wealth. 
Translation (2) highlights what I think is Aristotle’s point: καπηλική is unnatural 
because it is not the kind (εἶδος) of chrematistics that belongs to household-
management. Rather, it is detached from household-management. Jowett’s translation 
is more continuous with the passage where Aristotle considers necessary exchange:
This kind of exchange [μεταβλητική] is not contrary to nature, nor is it any 
kind of wealth acquisition [χρηματιστική]; for its purpose was to fill a lack in 
a natural self-sufficiency. None the less, wealth acquisition arose out of it, and 
in an intelligible manner. Through importing what they needed and exporting 
their surplus, people increasingly got their supplies from more distant foreign 
sources. Since not all the natural necessities are easily transportable, the use of 
money had of necessity to be devised. (Pol. 1257a28-35)
We see here that, for Aristotle, the art of changing-round (μεταβλητική here, i.e. 
necessary exchange) is not contrary to nature for it arises from the natural need to 
make up for any shortage in things essential and useful for life. As Aristotle says, in 
simple barter, which is necessary exchange, partners exchange “useful things for other 
useful things” (Pol. 1257a25).123 Jowett’s translation captures the fact that καπηλική 
is not a kind of natural chrematistics, the kind that belongs to household-management. 
Yet, his claim that μεταβλητική is neither unnatural nor “any type of skill [or art] in 
acquiring goods” is puzzling: namely, μεταβλητική is not part of chrematistics either 
(ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστιν εἶδος 
οὐδέν; Pol. 1257a28-29). The basic sense we can get from this passage is that 
μεταβλητική is not a form of natural chrematistics by NS1 but, of course, it is a form 
121 For example, Saunders (1992:82) renders it as “trade is not a natural way of getting goods”.
122 NS1 is not sufficient for placing καπηλική in unnatural chrematistics. It can do so jointly with NS2. 
Saunders’ translation seems to hinge on his thinking that the forms of acquisition approved by NS1 are 
more natural to humans than trade. However, ‘naturalness’ here is not a matter of degree but a matter 
of kind.
123 See Wilson (1896:188).
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of natural chrematistics by NS2 since necessary exchange is good μεταβλητική, i.e. it 
aims at true wealth. 
Let me introduce a further distinction here between two kinds of μεταβλητική. The 
first kind is natural chrematistics and part of household-management (also called 
οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική; oikeiotatê; Pol. 1258b21).124 In necessary exchange, the 
exchange value of a good is based on the proper (οἰκεία) use of the thing: people use 
things to get other useful things. In other words, the exchange values or prices of 
goods are based on the real use values of things. In the second kind, καπηλική, the 
exchange value of goods is partly generated by the exchange itself (Pol. 1257b7). 
While the good μεταβλητική (οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική) is an art that may use money, 
it is not contrary to nature because money arose under pressure of necessity in order 
to facilitate necessary exchange. 
In NE V.5 Aristotle explains that money emerged as a conventional representative of 
value (need or utility) which allows incomparable goods to be exchanged (NE 
1133a19-26); hence, money makes exchange possible (NE 1133b14-18). In Politics, 
he explains that coinage emerged to facilitate trade by being a portable store of value. 
Barter was cumbersome because “not all every natural necessity is easily carried” 
(Pol. 1257a35-38).125 For example, a household or city A with a surplus of grain and a 
shortage of milk cannot trade directly with a household or city B which has a surplus 
of milk, when B does not need grain (e.g. B has a surplus of grain). Such a situation 
requires that A first exchange with a household or city C which is short on grain but 
sufficient on something that B needs, e.g. meat. Only after A exchanges grain for 
meat with C, can A exchange with B and get the milk. Money, as a medium of 
exchange and storage of value, solves this problem.
Although the good and bad forms of μεταβλητική share the same origin and use the 
same means, they differ because the former belongs to οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική, 
whereas the latter does not. Also, the use of the term ‘οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική’ 
should alert us to the possibility that Aristotle sought to distinguish two forms of 
124 The good μεταβλητική is part of οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική (Pol. 1258b21); see Wilson (1896:188). 
125 Translation: Saunders (2002).
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trading goods, namely, καπηλική from good μεταβλητική, on the basis of the concepts 
of ‘proper use’ and ‘use for-exchange’. Let me sketch briefly this idea. The prototype 
of exchange for-use is barter where people do not use things as sources of maximizing 
profit but exchange useful things for useful things (Pol. 1257a25-26). Barter does not 
alter the natural purpose of exchange, which is use within the bounds of self-
sufficiency (τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας).126 Nor does barter alter the proper use of 
things which is tied to their nature or function. Hence, in barter, the exchange value of 
things is tied to their proper use or use value; exchangers exchange use-values or 
things useful, e.g. wine for corn. On the other hand, the business kind of μεταβλητική 
(καπηλική, broadly) alters and perverts the original purpose of exchange since it aims 
at the maximization of profit, not at use for self-sufficiency. Also, in καπηλική the 
exchange value of things does not derive from their use value as a whole—the value 
that derives from the nature or function of things—since traders and middlemen 
increase the exchange value of goods in order to make as much profit as possible; this 
incremental value does not derive from their proper use. 
While this is a tentative reading, Aristotle needs the concept of use in order to make 
the distinction between good and bad μεταβλητική more neatly. Let me state 
tentatively the Natural Standard that distinguishes the two kinds of μεταβλητική:  
Natural Standard3
An exchange-based form of acquisition is natural when (a) it is limited by the 
natural end of exchange (filling a gap in self-sufficiency); (b) it is based on 
production; (c) the exchange value of the goods exchanged or sold derives 
from the proper use of things.
This standard explains why barter may be non-natural by NS1 but not unnatural by the 
standards NS2 and NS3. Barter is usually an exchange of useful things for useful 
things. Although Aristotle objects to the business kind of chrematistics, i.e. καπηλική, 
μεταβλητική can be natural (Pol. I.11). This may be explained by NS3 since in various 
forms of trade, as in commercial agriculture, sellers make money from the sale of 
their own products, not from the exchange itself. But we need to keep in mind that 
126 Proper use aims at natural self-sufficiency.   
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this is a tentative reading, for the moment. In general, Aristotle does not use a single 
standard that distinguishes καπηλική from natural forms of exchange.127 In the next 
section I present καπηλική.
2.3 Unnatural Chrematistics
In this section I reconstruct and present in detail Aristotle’s analysis of the unnatural 
forms of chrematistics: καπηλική (i.e. trade practiced by hucksters, middlemen and 
brokers), ὀβολοστατικὴ (i.e. money lending), μισθαρνία (wage-labor), and the crafts. 
My purpose is to examine why Aristotle objects to these modes of acquisition.  
2.3.1 Politics I.9: Καπηλική 
According to Aristotle καπηλική and money originated in trade between city-states, 
that is, from necessary exchange with the aid of coinage:
After money was devised, necessary exchange gave rise to the second of the 
two kinds of wealth acquisition, commerce [καπηλική]. At first, commerce 
was probably a simple affair, but then it became more of a craft as experience 
taught people how and from what sources the greatest profit could be made 
through exchange. That is why it is held that wealth acquisition 
[χρηματιστική] is concerned primarily with money, and that its task is to be 
able to find sources from which a pile of wealth will come. For it is productive 
of wealth and money, and wealth is often assumed to be a pile of money, on 
the grounds that this is what wealth acquisition and commerce are concerned 
to provide. (Pol. 1257a41-b10)
Aristotle defines καπηλική as productive (ποιητική; poiêtikê) of wealth and money; it 
creates wealth from profitable exchanges (Pol. 1257b6-10). The competent practician 
of καπηλική is someone who can find out the sources of maximum profit 
(πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος; Pol. 1257b5). Hence, καπηλική can be used as a way to 
maximize one’s wealth (Pol. 1257b2-5). Typically, καπηλική is the commercial 
127 Simpson (1998:52n70). Meikle (1995) suggests that for Aristotle exchange and use belong to 
different ontological categories (quality and quantity respectively). For Meikle, the whole of 
commercial μεταβλητική is unnatural because it is not exchange for use. Simpson (1998:51) argues that 
“exchange is parasitic on use” but not divorced from use. Hence, he doubts that Aristotle’s critique of 
commercial chrematistics (especially, καπηλική) rests on a distinction between exchange value and use 
value, as Meikle suggests. 
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practice that starts with buying a commodity at price p1 and then selling it at a higher 
price p2. The margin between the two prices is the profit.128 
According to Aristotle, the received view at his time was that true wealth consists of 
large sums of coinage and that chrematistics is concerned with finding out the sources 
of such wealth (Pol. 1257b7-10). Aristotle argues that people fail to notice that a large 
stock of coinage is not true wealth since money is useful by convention. If the 
convention about money changes, one’s supply of money is useless; one cannot use it 
in exchange of commodities, like food, and would die of hunger, “like Midas in the 
fable, when everything set before him turned to gold in answer to his own greedy 
prayer” (Pol. 1257b15-17; see also Rhet. 1362a24-25 that wealth consists in use rather 
than possession). 
Furthermore, according to Aristotle, coinage is the unit and limit of exchange (τὸ γὰρ 
νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν; Pol. 1257b22-23). Also, the wealth 
of καπηλική is infinite (apeiros; καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος, ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς 
χρηματιστικῆς; Pol. 1257b24). Let us try to understand first, in what way coinage is 
the limit of exchange (πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν), second, how Aristotle defends his 
claim that the wealth pursued by καπηλική has no limit, and, third, what he says about 
the relationship between καπηλική and household-management. Aristotle makes an 
analogy between chrematistics and medicine (Pol. 1257b25-31). He says that every 
art pursues its end in an unlimited way—because each art tries to achieve its end as 
fully as possible. However, the means towards an art’s end are not unlimited (we saw 
this before: no art has any tool which “is unlimited in size or number”; Pol. 1256b35) 
because the end is the limit of the means. Accordingly, money is the end of 
commercial exchange. Yet, unlike medicine whose means are different from, and 
limited by, its end, in καπηλική, money is both the end and the means of commercial 
exchange. In principle, καπηλική is an art without limit (οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς 
χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων 
κτῆσις; Pol. 1257b28-30) because money itself has no limit (ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ 
128 Meikle (1996:140) represents commerce (καπηλική) as a cycle: Money1—Commodity—Money2 (or 
M1—C—M2). That is, the merchant uses money to buy a commodity at a price (M1) and then sells the 
commodity at a price (M2) where M1 < M2. The margin between the two prices is the profit. 
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πλοῦτος, ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς; Pol. 1257b25). Since money is infinite, τὸ 
γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν, most likely, refers to the price of 
a good. Hence, first, the only limit of an exchange seems to be the unwillingness of 
exchangers to accept a price.129 Second, since καπηλική usually produces money by 
using money, its means is also its end in itself. In other words, καπηλική is not a 
means to a further end that is unlimited.130 In particular, third, καπηλική is not limited 
by the end of household-management, and since its means—money—is infinite and 
unlimited, it is an art without limit. Καπηλική is only limited by the unwillingness of 
exchangers to accept a price. Traders treat money as their final end and pervert its 
original function as a measure and storage of value, and as a medium of exchange. 
They also pervert the original function of exchange as a subsidiary to the higher-
ranking end of household-management (Pol. 1257a28-30). 
In Pol. 1257b32-40 Aristotle explains why people assent to the business kind of 
chrematistics. He argues that the two kinds of μεταβλητική—necessary exchange, as 
in μεταδόσεις between states and καπηλική—resemble one another since they both 
use money as a medium of exchange. Hence, the monetary basis of both arts obscures 
the difference in their purpose: necessary exchange aims at true wealth, whereas 
καπηλική aims at the increase of wealth through profit-seeking. Hence, people fail to 
notice that the same use hides two different aims. They think that καπηλική is the 
blanket practice of the whole of chrematistics, and conclude that necessary exchange 
aims at unlimited wealth, too. Hence, they further conclude that household-
management aims at the increase of wealth, not at a natural self-sufficiency in wealth. 
Then, Aristotle explains the psychological origins of καπηλική (Pol. 1257b40-
1258a8). We saw that people confuse the two kinds of chrematistics because these 
seem alike. But why are people disposed to the kind of chrematistics which pursues 
unlimited wealth? Why do people think that they should maintain or increase their 
wealth? According to Aristotle, people are so disposed (they desire unlimited wealth) 
because they are preoccupied with mere living, not with the good life (Pol. 1257b41). 
129 Prices are formed by the needs of exchangers (see NE 1133b18-20).
130 In principle, there is no limit in monetary or numerical value. However, the means of medicine are 
in principle limited in number. 
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In particular, he reasons as follows: the desire for living is unlimited; hence, most 
people desire the things that are conducive to the satisfaction of this desire; such 
things are unlimited; hence, most people desire unlimited things (i.e. money). In 
addition, according to Aristotle, people tend to think that the good life is the life of 
physical gratification (Pol. 1258a3-4). Since the latter life requires large sums of 
wealth, they devote their lives in the pursuit of ever-increasing wealth. This excessive 
desire for gratification is, Aristotle concludes, the psychological origin of the pursuit 
for unlimited wealth—for people use the art that satisfies this desire. 
Moreover, the desire for excessive wealth explains why people convert various arts, 
like medicine and generalship, into money machines. In their pursuit for unlimited 
wealth, people may go as far as to convert virtuous traits, like courage, into 
instruments of money-making. For Aristotle this is a misuse of virtue and contrary to 
nature: 
For the end of courage is not to produce wealth but to produce confidence in 
the face of danger; nor is it the end of generalship or medicine to do so, but 
rather victory and health. None the less, these people make all of these into 
forms of wealth acquisition in the belief that acquiring wealth is the end, and 
that everything ought to promote the end. (Pol. 1258a10-14)
With this remark about the lurking perils of commercialization which I discuss further 
in chapter six, Aristotle concludes his discussion about the economic and 
psychological origins of καπηλική. 
After a quick return to the Master Question (1) where he gives a puzzling answer—
namely, that chrematistics is both a part and auxiliary to household-management (Pol. 
1258a27-38)—Aristotle launches a critique to business and money-lending. We 
should await Politics I.11, where Aristotle summarizes the main forms of 
chrematistics and discusses monopolies, in order to see how the householder should 
practically engage with the tasks of chrematistics and which forms of acquisition are 
improper for the householder. For now, let me present his ethical critique of business 
(καπηλική) and ὀβολοστατικὴ (money-lending) which explains further why the 
householder and citizen of an ideal city-state should not practice these forms of 
chrematistics—namely, the Master Question (2.a).
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2.3.2 Politics I.10: The Ethical Critique of Καπηλική and Όβολοστατικὴ
In Politics I.10, Aristotle argues:  
But, as we said, there are two kinds of wealth acquisition [χρηματιστική]. One 
has to do with commerce [καπηλική], the other with household management. 
The latter is necessary and commendable, but the kind that has to do with 
exchange [μεταβλητική] is justly disparaged, since it is not natural but is from 
one another. Hence usury [ὀβολοστατικὴ] is very justifiably detested, since it 
gets wealth from money itself, rather than from the very thing money was 
devised to facilitate. For money was introduced to facilitate exchange, but 
interest makes money itself grow bigger. (That is how it gets its name; for 
offspring resemble their parents, and interest is money that comes from 
money.) Hence of all the kinds of wealth acquisition this one is the most 
unnatural. (Pol. 1258a38-b8)
Καπηλική, Aristotle explains, is blameworthy because one creates wealth by taking 
from others, not from nature (ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν). The received interpretation is 
that καπηλική is a zero-sum game where one can gain only at the expense of others.131 
The retailer or the middleman buys goods and resells them for as much as he can 
make it.132 On the other hand, as we see in the next section, Aristotle does not object 
to foreign trade, the trade of surpluses and services, commercial agriculture, and the 
extractive industries. So, the reading that business is inherently zero-sum requires 
further examination. I come back to this problem in chapter five.
In addition, Aristotle says that money-lending involves the misuse of money. It 
perverts the nature or function of money as a medium of exchange and store of value: 
by using it as a source of wealth, money-lenders pervert its function, in order to 
achieve unlimited gain. It is also possible that for Aristotle charging interest distorts a 
natural pattern. The parent-child analogy above suggests that according to the natural 
131 This is the zero-sum view of profit. I discuss this interpretation in chapter five because Aristotle’s 
objection to commercial profit is not clearly that commerce is by definition a zero-sum game. Rather, 
‘taking from others’ might also refer to ‘not taking from nature’ which is a violation of the Natural 
Standard, viz. a perversion of aims, not primarily a matter of parasitism.
132 Retail traders and hucksters (κάπηλοι) carried out local trade. Long-distance and international trade 
was carried out by merchants (ἔμπορος/οι) who were usually (μέτοικοι; metics, i.e. free non-citizens); 
see Finley (1970).
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prototype of reproduction, parents give birth to children. Money-lending violates this 
pattern because money breeds money. For Aristotle, this is unnatural.133  
2.3.3 Politics I.11: Further Kinds of Μεταβλητική
Aristotle returns in Pol. I.11 to the Master Question and analyzes further how the 
householder should practically engage with chrematistics. Then, he offers a detailed 
classification of the main kinds of μεταβλητική. 
Starting with the natural kind, Aristotle says that the householder should have useful 
and necessary experience of natural chrematistics (τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν; Pol. 
1258b11). He subdivides natural chrematistics in three kinds (τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης 
χρηματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα; Pol. 1258b11-12): livestock, farming, animal-
rearing. What kind of experience and engagement should the householder have? 
Should the householder be a hunter or farmer himself? Aristotle explains:
[O]ne needs practical experience of which breeds are by comparison with one 
another the most profitable, and which breeds yield the most profit in which 
places, as different ones thrive in different places. (Pol. 1258b15-18)
‘Experience’ in this context is over what is profitable or valuable (ἔμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς 
ἄλληλά τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα; Pol. 1258b20). Does Aristotle also mean that 
the householder should have gained this experience from working, e.g. as a farmer? 
He does not rule out this possibility explicitly but as I show below his analogy 
between chrematistics and weaving suggests that the householder should avoid 
practicing himself such tasks as production, farming, hunting, or fishing. As we saw, 
for Aristotle, a life burdened with the toil of farming, fishing or hunting would be a 
barrier to the higher commitments of political activity, moral development, and 
133 Simpson (1998:59). The economy of Classical Athens was fully monetized and this led to the 
development of banking. There were no financial and capital markets and money was not considered as 
capital. Bankers were individuals, metics in particular, who offered the following services: they secured 
cash deposits, money-changing, money-lending, pawn-broking. As regards bank lending, this was 
based on the bank’s reserves which bankers then lent to their clients at interest. While most loans were 
provided for consumption, bankers provided some loans for tradesmen, especially maritime loans, 
which were repaid once a cargo was delivered. It is a matter of dispute whether this form of business 
lending and borrowing aimed at business growth or whether it was a form of insurance. However, the 
bulk of lending was non-commercial and non-productive. It was lending in the form of έρανος between 
friends and acquaintances; See Millet (1991) especially chapter 8.  
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philosophy (Pol. 1255b36; 1328b40-1329a2). Hence, the experience Aristotle refers 
to here should be of an intellectual or cognitive kind, albeit different from the kind of 
knowledge already assigned to experts which is theoretical as well: the householder 
should know which sources and methods are profitable (λυσιτελέστατα) by 
consulting the books of people “who have written on these topics, for instance 
Charetides of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos on tillage of land for grain and land 
planted for fruit, and others too on other subjects similarly, anyone who is interested 
may study them in their works” (Pol. 1258b39-1259a3).134 In short, the requirements 
of household-management and the good life, including the commitments to civic 
activity and virtue, prescribe that the householder should use the knowledge of 
experts in order to manage natural chrematistics, including the procurement of the 
right supplies, etc. As we shall see in the next chapter, for Aristotle the execution of 
these tasks should be delegated to the industrial class and slaves.135 This is arranged 
by nature’s design.136
Then, Aristotle lists the actual forms of μεταβλητική:
Exchange's [μεταβλητική] most important part, on the other hand, is (1) 
trading [ἐμπορία (foreign trade)], which has three parts: (1.1) ship owning, 
(1.2) transport, and (1.3) marketing. These differ from one another in that 
some are safer, others more profitable. The second part of exchange is (2) 
money-lending; the third is (3) wage earning. As for wage earning, some wage 
earners are (3.1) vulgar craftsmen, whereas (3.2) others are unskilled, useful 
for manual labor only. (Pol. 1258b20-26)137
His presentation concludes with an odd kind of chrematistics which is in-between 
natural and unnatural chrematistics:
A third kind of wealth acquisition comes between this kind [μεταβλητική] and 
the primary or natural kind, since it contains elements both of the natural kind 
and of exchange. It deals with inedible but useful things from the earth or 
extracted from the earth. Logging and mining are examples. Mining too is of 
134 Translation: Saunders (2002).
135 Newman (1887:125-126) says that the necessary functions (occupations) of the Hellenic state, 
including trade, should be delegated to non-citizens. For Aristotle natural slaves are provided as living 
instruments to take up the task of soil cultivation and other household tasks.
136 Shulsky (1991:102).
137 …τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία φορτηγία 
παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν 
ἐπικαρπίαν).
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many types, since many kinds of things are mined from the earth. (Pol. 
1258b26-33)
As regards his use of the term ‘μεταβλητική’ in Pol. 1258b21, Aristotle does not 
clarify whether ἐμπορία (namely, foreign trade) and its three branches—namely, ship 
owning, the transportation of goods, and the marketing of goods—are instances of 
καπηλική (business), the bad form of μεταβλητική.138 Aristotle elsewhere says that 
foreign trade is necessary for the city, and that landless citizens can take up ἐμπορία, 
that is, become merchants (ἔμπορος; Pol. 1320a32-b1). This implies that some 
citizens will have to carry out this essential economic task. Also, here he does not 
evaluate the kinds of μεταβλητική in terms of his natural standard but in economic 
terms, namely, as ‘profitable’ (τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν); the less secure 
the trade, the more profitable it is. The third kind of chrematistics, the mixed kind, 
involves selling non-edible products which come directly from nature. On the other 
hand, this kind appears to involve the exchange of household surpluses. It is rather a 
form of production for-profit. 
Aristotle classifies working-for-pay (μισθαρνία; mêstharnêa) as a form of exchange 
(μεταβλητική), too and censures it a little below:
The operations that are most craft-like depend least on luck; the more they 
damage the body, the more vulgar they are; the most slavish are those in 
which the body is used the most; the most ignoble are those least in need of 
virtue. (Pol. 1258b35-39)
It might strike us contemporary readers why he objects to working for-pay. Why is it 
unnatural to offering one’s labor or services in exchange for a fee or wage given that 
one offers a service and aims at true wealth? I examine this further in chapter three.
Let us take stock of the exegetical gaps so far. Aristotle does not clarify which of the 
above kinds of μεταβλητική are good (natural) and which ones are bad (unnatural). So, 
this passage raises the following questions for further examination. First, does the 
commercial branch (ἐμπορία) conform to NS3 or is it an in-between kind (between 
138 For Simpson (1998:61) these three tasks were performed by a single trader: arranging a shipment, 
transporting the goods, selling them at a marketplace. 
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good and bad μεταβλητική), like the third kind of chrematistics? Also, how does the 
third kind of chrematistics differ from καπηλική? I deal with these questions in 
chapters three and five. This will enable us to answer fully which forms of 
chrematistics are unethical, namely, question (2.a). Second, as regards working for-
pay: why does Aristotle object to the manual and technical jobs? Is it only because 
they are menial and ignoble as Aristotle claims?139 Some commentators argue that his 
objection to these occupations is ideological.140 In the next chapter I examine 
Aristotle’s idea that nature assigns the menial and unskilled occupations to non-
citizens and the noble occupations to citizens.141 Yet, Aristotle does not say whether 
he approves of practicing the noble professions for pay (i.e. for fees). He only 
censures the idea of using generalship and medicine as money machines in Pol. 
1258a10-14. This discussion will illuminate question (2.a). As I explained in chapter 
one, the discussion about occupations is entangled with his views about citizenship 
(Pol. III.1-4), the social placement of the industrial class (Pol. III.5), and the ideal 
constitution (Pol. IV and VII).
2.3.4 Politics I.10-11: Recapping the Tasks of the Householder
Aristotle’s answer to the Master Question (1) and (1.a) is puzzling:
 
And in fact there is a way in which it is the task of a household manager or 
ruler to see to health, but in another way it is not his task but a doctor's. So too 
with wealth: there is a way in which a household manager has to see to it, and 
another in which he does not, and an assistant craft does. (Pol. 1258a33-34)
Here Aristotle says that natural chrematistics is a part and an auxiliary to household-
management but in different ways. But in which ways would chrematistics be both 
part and assistant of household-management? Aristotle illuminates this question with 
two analogies. First, like the weaver, who only has to know how to procure the 
“usable and suitable” kind of wool (Pol. 1258a27), the householder should know how 
to acquire the useful goods (χρήματα) required by household-management. This 
139 Simpson (1998:61) suggests that manual labor is the work of natural slaves. Hence, a free man who 
does these jobs goes contrary to nature and, hence, violates Aristotle’s natural standard, presumably, it 
perverts the nature of the free human-being. Possibly, Aristotle employs the Natural Standard1 here in 
the sense that natural providence has assigned the technical and manual tasks (the most mechanical 
ones) to natural slaves. Hence, it would be unnatural for the householder to practice these occupations.
140 See for example Ross (2005:255).
141 The professions that require intelligence, training, precision and excellence.
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analogy suggests that, as the weaver, who should not be a producer of wool, the 
householder should not produce goods oneself (viz. should not be a farmer) but only 
know how to recognize the sources of wealth (Pol. 1258b20) and delegate the tasks of 
production or acquisition to others. Hence, chrematistics is part of household-
management in regards to knowledge: the householder should know how to acquire 
wealth. On the other hand, chrematistics is an auxiliary art, i.e. the householder should 
delegate the tasks to others. But, first, to what extent should the householder be an 
expert of chrematistics? And, second, which tasks regarding acquisition should the 
householder delegate to others? He replies to the first question with another analogy 
(Pol. 1258a27-35). The householder’s expertise in chrematistics should not be like the 
doctor’s. The householder should not have to be a doctor in order to look after the 
health of his family. Yet, the householder should know how to look after the health of 
the family using the doctor’s instructions and knowledge (Pol. 1258a34-38). Likewise, 
the householder should consult or use the knowledge of experts who have studied the 
subject (Pol. 1258b39-1259a3). 
This analogy is Aristotle’s reply to (1.a). Expert knowledge of chrematistics is not 
part of household-management but auxiliary to it. The householders should not be 
experts of chrematistics themselves. They should know how to discern the profitable 
sources of wealth and how to manage the tasks of acquisition and production; hence, 
the use of knowledge of chrematistics is part of household-management. In addition, 
the householders should delegate the tasks of acquisition or production to the suitable 
persons and to oversee the execution of these tasks; hence, chrematistics is an 
auxiliary to household-management in regards to the execution of these tasks.
Aristotle ends his account of chrematistics in Pol. I.11 with a discussion of 
monopolies. He recounts the story of Thales from Miletus who created a monopoly by 
hiring all olive presses in Miletus and Chios at a low rate before the harvest and then, 
when the olive season came, he hired them out at whatever rate he wanted (Pol. 
1259a6-21). Aristotle says that Thales’ intention was to demonstrate that 
“philosophers could easily become wealthy if they wished, but that this is not their 
concern” (Pol. 1259a16-18). It is not clear whether Aristotle suggests that 
householders use monopolistic tactics when need arises. Perhaps, he takes delight in 
84
Thales’ story because he thinks that philosophers could be rich if they so wanted but 
there are higher commitments in life than wealth-acquisition. However, it might strike 
us that Aristotle endorses monopolies in trade:
Hence some city-states also adopt this scheme when they are in need of 
money: they secure a monopoly in goods for sale. (Pol. 1259a21-22)
It is also useful for statesmen to know about these things, since many city-
states have an even greater need for wealth acquisition and the associated 
revenues than a private household does. (Pol.1259a33-35)
Aristotle does not say that the city-state should pursue spurious wealth. He only says 
that monopolies could be used as part or auxiliary of οἰκονομική when need arises. 
Most likely, monopolies should be auxiliary to the economics of the city-state because 
the statesman should not have to be a businessman, e.g. a merchant, in order to know 
how to secure a monopoly in trade. In any case, Aristotle seems to relax his strictures 
on what he considers as natural chrematistics. However, it is not clear whether he 
endorses only natural monopolies or both natural and coercive ones. 
In sum, Aristotle’s analogies do not provide a very neat way for understanding the 
different ways that chrematistics should be part as opposed to being auxiliary to 
household-management. While the weaving analogy suggests that the householder, 
like the weaver, must see to the supply of goods, the extent of involvement with such 
tasks, as farming or the trade of household surpluses is less obvious. It is also 
unobvious whether the practice of vocations for pay (e.g. teaching and medicine) is 
part of natural chrematistics. I discuss these exegetical issues in subsequent chapters.   
2.4 Conclusion and Summary
Aristotle answer to Master Question (1) is that chrematistics is the art of supplying 
wealth and household-management is the art of using wealth; natural chrematistics 
serves household-management but it is part and auxiliary to household-management 
in different ways. Also, both economic arts should serve politics. His answer to 
Master Question (2) is that natural chrematistics conforms to the Natural Standard: 
first, the source of goods must be production or nature itself; second, chrematistics 
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must aim at true wealth; third, in exchange-based acquisition the exchange value of 
goods must be based on their use value. The answer to Master Question (1.a) is that 
the householder should use the knowledge of experts in order to manage chrematistics. 
In addition, the householder should better delegate the tasks related to the practice of 
chrematistics, e.g. farming, to others. Questions (2.a), (2.b) and (3) need further 
examination. 
As regards question (2.a), we need to clear certain inconsistencies. While in Pol. I.8 
Aristotle classifies farming in natural chrematistics, in Pol. VII.9 he argues that it is 
not proper for citizens and delegates it to non-citizens. Also, in Pol. III.5 he argues 
that workers and craftsmen should not be citizens; this raises the problem of the social 
categorization of the industrial class. Most scholars argue that his objections to the 
lower occupations and the mercantile class rest on class prejudice. I examine further 
this interpretation in chapter three in light of his accounts of citizenship and the best 
constitution. Moreover, Aristotle does not clarify whether he considers foreign trade 
as natural or unnatural in Pol. I.8-11. Nor does he offer a discussion of commercial 
justice in the Politics except for a quick remark in Pol. 1258a38-b2 (in commerce 
wealth comes from one another; ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν)̓ which most commentators 
think is about the injustice of business. I examine Aristotle’s thinking about just price, 
viz. question (3), in chapter four. In chapter five I examine which forms of commerce 
are ethical in the light of (3). Lastly, Pol. I.9 raises question (2.b): does greed and 
injustice rise with business and money or independently of them? I examine 
Aristotle’s analysis of injustice and greed in light of his NE V.1-2 in chapter six. The 
answer to (2.b) informs and completes my examination of (2.a).
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CHAPTER 3
Chrematistics, Citizenship and the City
Overview 
The primary aim of this chapter is to reconstruct the missing parts of Aristotle’s 
answer to question (2.a) in the light of his political philosophy. My second aim is to 
discuss whether his rejection of the lower occupations is ideological. In the previous 
chapter, I laid out his main principles of division between natural and unnatural 
chrematistics. However, his discussion of unnatural chrematistics, especially of hired 
labor and the crafts, in Pol. I.11 is very brief and incomplete. It is also in conflict with 
various passages from the Politics. For example, in Pol. I.8-11 Aristotle classifies 
farming in natural chrematistics but in Pol. VII.9 he argues that citizens should not be 
farmers. Also, Aristotle’s objection to hired labor, commerce and the crafts appears to 
be no longer based on his distinction between natural and unnatural chrematistics. 
Most scholars argue that his objections rest on class prejudice and ideology rather 
than on ethical or psychological theory.142 I argue that his criticism of the industrial 
class is based on his teleological thinking and political philosophy. 
In effect, I reconstruct and examine why Aristotle censures the so-called ‘banausic’ or 
‘lower’ occupations. In particular, my aim is to illuminate further which modes of 
acquisition Aristotle thinks suitable for the good person and citizen of the ideal state 
and non-ideal states.143 First, I explain the inconsistencies between Aristotle’s 
discussions of Pol. I.8-11 and Pol. IV, VII and VIII—for example, his different 
approach to farming in Pol. I.8-11 and Pol. VII.9. Second, I examine whether scholars 
are right that Aristotle’s objections to the lower occupations rest on class prejudice or 
142 Newman (1887:138); Barker (1906:376); Ross (2005:255); Schumpeter (1954a:60); Mulgan 
(1987:48-50).
143 By ‘ideal’ state here I refer to a city-state with the ideal regime (κατ’ εὐχήν). Aristotle outlines this 
regime in Pol. VII: it is the best conceivable regime “if there were no external obstacles” (Pol. 
1288b23). This is not the same with the best practicable city-state of Pol. IV. The latter is constituted 
by a regime that combines the unqualifiedly ideal regime and “the best [regime] in the circumstances” 
(Pol. 1288b25).
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ideology. In brief, I reject this reading and suggest that Aristotle’s objections stem 
from his teleological thinking, his view of citizenship and his virtue theory. 
3.1 The Lower Occupations and the Problem of Ideology
In this section, I present the main steps of Aristotle’s argument against the vulgar 
occupations as these appear in various passages from Pol. IV, VII and VIII where he 
discusses his theories of citizenship and the ideal city-state. As we shall see, some 
commentators dismiss this argument as ideological. 
3.1.1 The Argument from Citizenship 
In Pol. I.11 Aristotle explains why hired labor and the crafts are not natural modes of 
acquisition:
The operations that are most craft-like depend least on luck; the more they 
damage the body, the more vulgar they are; the most slavish are those in 
which the body is used the most; the most ignoble are those least in need of 
virtue. (Pol. 1258b35-38)
By the term ‘vulgar’ occupations Aristotle refers to the crafts and hired labor. I will 
use the term ‘lower’ occupations to denote the banausic occupations along with 
commerce and farming because Aristotle considers them inappropriate for the citizen 
of the ideal city, too.144 While Aristotle uses his Natural Standard to criticize 
commerce as unnatural, he does not use the same standard to place the vulgar 
occupations in the unnatural kind here. Instead, he says that the more unskilled and 
manual the occupation, the more ignoble and slavish it is. In principle, artisans could 
seek spurious wealth by becoming businessmen, too.145 It might also strike us that 
Aristotle does not consider the banausic occupations as a form of necessary 
exchange—like barter—although they usually aim at true wealth.146 Since Aristotle 
censures the lower occupations as unnatural without using NS2, he possibly uses 
‘natural’ in the sense of ‘function’. Perhaps, he means that the vulgar occupations are 
not in accord with the human function. However, this is not clear from this passage 
144 As we shall see in Pol. 1328b39-40, Aristotle places farming with the lower occupations.
145 Some artisans owned workshops of significant size and employed a high number of slaves and non-
slave workers. Engen (2008): http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economy-of-ancient-greece/
146 Hired labor and the crafts used to be a means to making a living at the level of subsistence.
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and we will have to reconstruct this idea further because Aristotle shifts his discussion 
of the lower occupations to political-theoretic ground.  
As we shall see shortly, Aristotle’s discussion about the ethical status of the lower 
occupations makes some indirect use of the Natural Standard but the main bulk of his 
criticism is based on his accounts of citizenship (Pol. III) and the ideal state (Pol. VII-
VIII). By ‘ideal’ state I refer to the city with the ideal regime (κατ’ εὐχήν): it is the 
best conceivable regime “if there were no external obstacles” (Pol. 1288b24). This is 
not the same with the best practicable city of Pol. IV. The latter is constituted by a 
regime that combines the unqualifiedly ideal regime and “the best [regime] in the 
circumstances” (Pol. 1288b27). 
Aristotle stresses that the vulgar occupations are not suitable for citizens of the ideal 
city. On the one hand, the best city must be prosperous.147 On the other hand, the best 
city flourishes only if its members are both good citizens and virtuous in order to be 
able to share in political rule and take wise political decisions with a view to the best 
life of happiness:
It is in the best one, however, that he is the one who has the power and who 
deliberately chooses to be ruled and to rule with an eye to the virtuous life. 
(Pol. 1284a1-3)
A city-state is excellent, however, because the citizens who participate in the 
constitution are excellent; and in our city-state all the citizens must participate 
in the constitution. (Pol. 1332a33-34)
If active political participation requires leisure and a toil-free life, then, who would 
carry out the economic functions of the city? Aristotle divides the population of the 
best state in ‘parts’ (the citizens) and ‘necessary conditions’ (the non-citizens).
Since, as in the case of every other naturally constituted whole, the things that 
it cannot exist without are not all parts of it, clearly the things that are 
necessary for the existence of a city-state should not be assumed to be parts of 
it either, and likewise for any other community that constitutes a single type of 
thing...But whenever one thing is for the sake of another and the other is the 
147 “But for now, let us assume this much, that the best life, both for individuals separately and for city-
states collectively, is a life of virtue sufficiently equipped with the resources needed to take part in 
virtuous actions” (Pol. 1323b40-1324a2). See also Pol. 1323b21-36.
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end for whose sake it is, they have nothing in common except that one 
produces and the other gets produced. (Pol. 1328a23-29)
According to Aristotle, the ‘necessary conditions’ of the city are not ‘parts’ (i.e. 
citizens) but exist for the sake of the latter. Therefore: 
The best city-state will not confer citizenship on vulgar craftsmen, however; 
but if they too are citizens, then what we have characterized as a citizen's 
virtue cannot be ascribed to everyone, or even to all free people, but only to 
those who are freed from necessary tasks. Those who perform necessary tasks 
for an individual are slaves; those who perform them for the community are 
vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers. (Pol. 1278a7-12)
Those who are not freed from the necessary tasks are the necessary conditions for the 
function of a city. Roughly, necessary work is work done for the convenience of 
others. These are the vulgar occupations and should be performed by those who are 
necessary conditions for the function of a city. The basis of this division is unclear but 
it seems that, for Aristotle, it is a matter of teleology: those who must do the necessary 
work are those who cannot reach a high level of ethical development. 
For it is impossible to engage in virtuous pursuits while living the life of a 
vulgar craftsman or a hired laborer. (Pol. 1278a20-21)148
 
Later, in his account of the best state, Aristotle summarizes his argument as follows: 
Since we are investigating the best constitution, however, the one that would 
make a city-state most happy—and happiness cannot exist apart from virtue, 
as was said earlier—it evidently follows that in a city-state governed in the 
finest manner, possessing men who are unqualifiedly just (and not given 
certain assumptions), the citizens should not live the life of a vulgar craftsman 
or tradesman. For lives of these sorts are ignoble and inimical to virtue. Nor 
should those who are going to be citizens engage in farming, since leisure is 
needed both to develop virtue and to engage in political actions. (Pol. 
1328b34-1329a1) 
Let me reconstruct Aristotle’s argument:
1. Citizens of the best city must be virtuous—or be capable of virtue—at a high 
148 See also Pol. 1260a38-bl and Pol. 1337b4-21.
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standard (Pol. 1332a33).149
a. Because cities aim at the best possible life of happiness (Pol. 1328a35).
i. True happiness is an activation of virtue (Pol. 1328a36-37).
b. Because citizens of the best city must be able to be ruled and to rule 
with an eye to the virtuous life (Pol. 1284a1-3).150
2. Necessary work is a barrier to political activity, servile, ignoble and inimical 
to virtue.
a. Necessary work is a barrier to the leisure and the virtue required for 
political participation in the best city (Pol. 1278a20-21). 
b. Necessary work is servile and ignoble because it is practiced for the 
convenience of others (Pol. 1258b35-38; 1278a7-12). 
3. Hence, citizens of the best city should not practice necessary work and those 
who engage in it should not be citizens of the best state. 
The main task of the remaining chapter is to explain further the two premises of 
Aristotle’s argument in the light of his political philosophy.151 
3.1.2 The Problem of Ideology  
A considerable number of commentators argue that both premises of the argument 
above are based on ideology.152 For example, Schumpeter writes: 
Nothing would be easier than to show that he [i.e. Aristotle] was primarily 
concerned with the ‘natural’ and the ‘just’ as seen from the standpoint of his 
ideal of the good and virtuous life, and that the economic facts and relations 
between economic facts which he considered and evaluated appear in the light 
of the ideological preconceptions to be expected in a man who lived in, and 
wrote for, a cultivated leisure class, which held work and business pursuits in 
contempt and, of course, loved the farmer who fed it and hated the money 
lender who exploited it.153
149 For Aristotle’s requirements of citizenship in the ideal city-state, see the exchange between Martha 
Nussbaum (1988) and David Charles (1988) who debate whether the actual possession of virtue or the 
capability for virtue is a necessary condition for citizenship in the ideal state. 
150 Aristotle argues that the citizen of the ideal state is both a good citizen and a good man and rulership 
requires practical wisdom.  
151 My purpose is to connect the discussion of Pol. 1258b35-38 with his Natural Standard and certain 
passages from the Politics, especially from III, VII and VIII.
152 For example, Ross (2005:255), Barker (1906:376), Newman (1887:138), Jowett (1885:24), Irwin 
(1988:415).
153 Schumpeter (1954a:60). 
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Some commentators also hold that Aristotle reacted to the rising class of merchants 
who threatened the status-quo of the rich, land-owning aristocracy of his time.154 
While the charge of ideological bias is difficult to confirm or disprove,155 we should 
expect that if Aristotle fails to offer independent reasons for his two premises above, 
this charge would be justified.156 To be sure, Aristotle clearly favors aristocracy as the 
best regime for the ideal city but, on the other hand, we need to keep in mind his 
praise of the middle-class people and that polity, not aristocracy, is his idea of the best 
practicable regime. In the next section, I explain Aristotle’s first premise and then 
show how he divides the population of the ideal city by occupation. In section 3.3.3, I 
reconstruct and explain in detail the second premise: his ethical objections against the 
lower occupations. 
3.2 Chrematistics and Citizenship in the Best State 
My aim in the present section is to explain the first premise of Aristotle’s argument 
which states that citizens must be virtuous, or capable of reaching a high standard of 
virtue.157 Let us call this view ‘perfectionism’ about citizenship and see how Aristotle 
develops it on the basis of his theory of constitutions and citizenship. Then I present 
the occupational structure of Aristotle’s best city which informs his answer to (2.a).
3.2.1 Types of Regime and Citizenship
We saw before that the natural purpose of the city is happiness.158 Aristotle restates 
that humans are political animals brought together by the common aim of happiness 
154 Schumpeter (1954b:11) says that Plato’s and Aristotle’s “examination of the various economic 
functions reflects the attitude of an aristocracy which is confronted by a rising merchant class and has 
essentially an agrarian outlook”. Soudek (1952:72) also holds that Aristotle “never gave up his 
opposition to this class [i.e. the class of money-makers and the plutocracy]”. Finley (1970:17n60), says 
that Schumpeter and Soudek have painted an illusory class conflict between aristocrats and merchants. 
155 Proponents of this reading do not offer us a precise characterization of what constitutes ideological 
bias in philosophical argumentation, nor do they provide a method of confirming such a bias. 
156 Samaras (2007:82) and Ober (1998:306n17) argue that Aristotle does not offer such an argument, 
i.e. for the psychological inferiority of the artisans and workers.
157 This view of citizenship stems from Aristotle’s ‘perfectionist’ political philosophy; see Charles 
(1988:185-6) about perfectionism in Aristotle’s moral and political philosophy. According to this view, 
only those who have reached a high standard of moral and intellectual virtue should be citizens of the 
ideal state. Nussbaum (1988:146-150) argues that actual possession of virtue is not a necessary 
condition for citizenship in Aristotle’s ideal state. She suggests that Aristotle extends the right of 
citizenship to all those capable of intellectual and moral excellence.
158 This is Aristotle’s naturalistic or teleological view of the state; Pol. 1252a1-7.
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(Pol. 1278b15-30). Then, he uses the distinction between political rule and despotic 
rule and argues that political rule is exercised for the interest of all citizens, whereas 
despotic rule is primarily exercised for the advantage of the ruler (the master) and 
only incidentally for the advantage of the ruled (Pol. 1278b30-1279a7). The interests 
of the master are overriding because the master is superior to the slave, whereas 
citizens must be ruled by political rule because their interests are not inferior to the 
interests of the ruler—citizens are free and equal in rule.159 Hence, the ruling element 
of a political association—an association that aims at happiness—must serve the 
common advantage. 
Then, Aristotle provides a classification of the correct and deviant regimes (Pol. III.6-
7). His classification is based on two criteria. The first condition is ‘who is ruler’ and 
‘how many are those who rule’. There are three types of regime each corresponding to 
a different form of rule: rule by one person, rule by a few men, and rule by the many. 
The second condition is whether the rule aims at the common interest. Aristotle 
claims that correct regimes rule for the interest of all citizens “according to what is 
unqualifiedly just…whereas those which look only to the benefit of the rulers are 
mistaken and are deviations from the correct constitutions” (Pol. 1279a16-21). 
Aristotle combines his two conditions and devises a classification of correct and 
deviant regimes. Correct regimes serve the common good and differ by the number of 
rulers. These regimes are monarchy (rule by a king), aristocracy (rule by a few best 
men), and polity (rule by the many). Deviant regimes do not serve the common 
interest. These are tyranny (it serves the interest of one person), ‘oligarchy’ (it serves 
the interest of a few persons), and ‘democracy’ (it serves the interest of the many at 
the expense of the few). The table below summarizes Aristotle’s classification of 
correct and deviant regimes:
 Correct Deviant
159 Pol. 1279a16-21; 1283a16-20; 1283b39-41; 1287a12: “For justice and merit must be by nature the 
same for those who are by nature similar…Which is precisely why it is just for them to rule no more 
than they are ruled, and, therefore, to do so in turn”.
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One Ruler Kingship Tyranny
Few Rulers Aristocracy Oligarchy
Many Rulers Polity Democracy
In addition, Aristotle proposes an economic distinction between oligarchy and 
democracy. Since the many are mostly poor and the wealthy are usually few, 
democracy is the rule of the poor, whereas oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy (Pol. 
1290a30-b6). This is an important distinction because the social structure of a regime 
depends on which economic class has more power. The socio-political status of the 
lower occupations varies with the constitution at hand—artisans, farmers and workers 
are citizens in democratic city-states since these regimes aim at equality of 
freedom.160 As we shall see, Aristotle’s analysis of Pol. IV concludes that 
aristocracy161 is the only regime with a relatively egalitarian socio-economic structure 
of land-owning citizens, freed from the necessary occupations. While the main body 
of Aristotle’s critique of the lower occupations concerns the ideal city-state of Pol. 
VII, the status of these occupations in his realist-theoretic account of Pol. IV is 
relatively higher. We will see the details of this difference in section 3.3.2.
In Pol. III.1-2, Aristotle tackles with the question of citizenship: who the citizen is 
and who should be citizen. A citizen is trivially a member of a city; the substantive 
question is what constitutes citizenship.162 According to Aristotle, a citizen is: 
[S]omeone who is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office… 
(Pol. 1275b17) 
160 The varieties of constitutions arise from combinations of the parts of a population in accord with the 
ruling element and the conception of the best life that the ruling element pursues, e.g. oligarchies 
pursue wealth while democracies pursue equality and freedom (Pol. 1317a40-b17). See Simpson 
(1998:219).
161 In Pol. IV.7-8 Aristotle outlines the varieties of aristocracy and explains that the term ‘aristocracy’ 
applies also to constitutions that mix virtue with equal freedom and wealth; these are aristocracies in a 
secondary sense, like Carthage. 
162 Aristotle asks this question in order to understand the parts that constitute the city, hence, its nature; 
see Pol. III.1.
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The entitlement of participation in office is either indefinite (in democracies) or for 
some definite duration (in oligarchies).163 Obviously, since Aristotle’s definition of 
‘citizen’ is analytically connected with the political community—for a city is a 
multitude of citizens—, rule over citizens is political rule. Hence, citizens are subject 
to political rule which is rule over men “who are similar in birth and free” (Pol. 
1277b7). Hence, political authority is within the bounds of equality of freedom and 
similarity of birth. This lets all citizens to take turns in ruling (Pol. 1279a8-10). In a 
general way, then, a citizen “is someone who participates in ruling and in being ruled” 
(Pol. 1284a1). For Aristotle, the good citizen of any regime is anyone who contributes 
to the preservation and stability of the regime (Pol. 1276b16-35). However, the virtue 
of the good citizen is not single but relative to the constitution: 
[T]he virtue of a citizen must be suited to his constitution. Consequently, if 
indeed there are several kinds of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be a 
single virtue that is the virtue—the complete virtue—of a good citizen. (Pol. 
1276b29-32)
Hence, since there are several regimes, each with its own specific function, there are 
different types of good citizen, viz. traits that enable them to perform their role and to 
support the purpose of the regime (Pol. 1276b27). 
Aristotle further distinguishes between the good citizen and the good man. 
But the good man, we say, does express a single virtue: the complete one. 
Evidently, then, it is possible for someone to be a good citizen without having 
acquired the virtue expressed by a good man. (Pol. 1276b32-35)
The good man is the practically wise man (φρόνιμος). And practical wisdom is 
essential for rulership in a political community that aims at virtue (Pol. 1277a14-15). 
On the other hand, practical wisdom is not essential for being a good citizen (Pol. 
1277a15).164 This is how the two concepts pull apart in a variety of non-ideal city-
states. Only in the best city of Pol. VII, the good citizen must also be a good man. In 
163 “[I]n the other constitutions [i.e. in non-democratic constitutions], it is not the holder of indefinite 
office who is assemblyman and juror, but someone whose office is definite” (Pol. 1275b13-14).
164 Aristotle refers to citizens of cities with non-ideal regimes.
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that regime, any citizen takes turn in ruling over the other free men—by political rule, 
not as a despot—and in being ruled as a free man, viz. without being servile.165 
It is in the best one, however, that he is the one who has the power and who 
deliberately chooses to be ruled and to rule with an eye to the virtuous life. 
(Pol. 1284a1-3)
We say that there are three correct constitutions, and that the best of them 
must of necessity be the one managed by the best people... Furthermore, as we 
showed in our first discussions, the virtue of a man must of necessity be 
identical to that of a citizen of the best city-state. (Pol. 1288a32-38)
Here is the connection between the ideal regime and ideal citizenship: only the 
practically wise citizen of the ideal regime can rule with an eye to the virtuous life. 
Participation in office in an oligarchy or in a democracy, which aim at wealth or equal 
freedom respectively, does not require practical wisdom. In sum, the perfectionist 
element in Aristotle’s political philosophy is the idea that the characteristic function 
of humans is best exercised in city-states with the ideal regime. The only way to share 
in the aim of the best state and to participate in office is for someone to be both a 
good citizen and a good man. Here is the connection between the ideal regime and the 
proper occupations for the ideal citizen: since the cities which are constituted by the 
ideal regime aim at virtue, citizens should not devote their lives to money-making or 
engage with the necessary occupations because wealth is not the final end and ignoble 
work is a barrier to virtue and political activity. But which occupations are proper for 
citizens of the ideal state?
3.2.2 The Necessary Occupations 
We saw Aristotle’s distinction between necessary conditions and parts of the ideal 
city based on the following analogy: the parts of a compound object differ from the 
necessary conditions of its existence. For example, a plant needs soil to exist—soil is 
a condition of a plant’s existence—but soil is not a part of the plant. He argues that 
the former exist for the sake of the latter. In Pol. IV.4 he argues by use of another 
analogy that a city cannot function without some essential occupations. As any 
organism depends on certain organs for its function, i.e. organs of sense-perception, 
165 Pol. 1277a12-25; 1278a40-b5; 1288a32–b2.
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nourishment, locomotion, etc., it is essential that any city be based on the following 
occupational classes (Pol. 1290b39-1291a40): 
1. Farmers (γεωργοί)
2. Manufacturers and craftsmen (τό βάναυσον; βάναυσοι)
3. Merchants and middlemen (τό ἀγοραῖον; ἔμποροι καί κάπηλοι)
4. Laborers (τό θητικόν; θήτες)
5. Soldiers (τό προπολεμήσον)
6. Unidentified
7. The Rich (benefactors; τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν)
8. Civil servants (το δημιουργικόν) and officials or governing class (τὸ περὶ τὰς 
ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν)
9. The Deliberative (τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς 
ἀμφισβητοῦσιν)
Let us call this list (A). This list shows the occupational classes which are necessary 
for the operation of any city. However, according to Aristotle, as different 
combinations of organs result in different kinds of animals, different combinations of 
a city’s classes result in a variety of constitutions or varieties of the same constitution 
(Pol. 1290b39-1291a10). In particular, the element that is dominant in a city—the 
wealthy or the poor—gives rise to an oligarchy or democracy. Also, a democracy 
where the farming element is dominant differs from a democracy where craftsmen are 
the dominant class. (Pol. 1291b14-1292a31).
In Pol. 1328b5-22 Aristotle offers a classification of occupational classes that is 
suitable for the best city:166
1. Farmers (γεωργοί)
2. Craftsmen (τεχνίτες)
3. Soldiers (το μάχιμον)
166 Aristotle places both the parts and the essential functions of the state in the same list presumably 
because they are all necessary for its survival and flourishing (Pol. 1328b15-23). However, he does not 
explain the difference between the two lists although it seems that list (A) aims at explaining how 
different varieties of regime arise, while list (B) aims at explaining why some groups of the population 
of the best city should not share in the regime, viz. why they should not be citizens. For this reading see 
Simpson (1998:220).
97
4. Rich people (εὐποροι)
5. Priests (ἱερείς)
6. Judges (κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων)
7. Laborers (τό θητικόν; Pol. 1329a36; καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον [ὑπάρχειν] 
ταῖς πόλεσιν)
Let us call this list (B). This list includes the whole population of the best city; a city-
state cannot exist without farmers, workers and craftsmen but these groups should not 
be citizens of the best city.167 Likewise, citizens should not practice these necessary 
occupations.168 But while all occupations from list (B) are essential for the function of 
the best city, some of them are not necessary work. 
As we saw, the ‘necessary conditions’ of the city are for the sake of the parts (Pol. 
1328a26-29);169 they are those who must do necessary work in list (B). According to 
Aristotle, this work consists of the crafts, hired labor and farming (Pol. 1329a35-38). 
Along with commerce, these occupations should not be practiced by citizens of the 
best city. Also, essential professions are not necessary work because those who 
practice them are not forced to work by economic necessity. In addition, as we shall 
see in the next section, these occupations are the noble ones.170 These are the military, 
the judicial and the clergy. The rich are essential for the city but they do not practice 
any occupation. 
According to Aristotle, citizens could be both soldiers and statesmen but not at the 
same time (Pol. 1329a2-17). Young citizens should belong to the military class—for 
they are physically stronger—and when they grow older they should become 
members of the deliberative class—for they are practically wiser (1329a12-16; also 
Top. 117a27-28). Priesthood should be assigned to the elders who have retired (Pol. 
167 Aristotle has stressed earlier that “what we have characterized as a citizen's virtue cannot be 
ascribed to everyone, or even to all free people, but only to those who are freed from necessary tasks” 
(Pol. 1278a7-10).
168 “[T]he citizens should not live the life of a vulgar craftsman or tradesman” (Pol. 1328b38).
169 Aristotle illuminates the distinction by a further analogy: the builder and his tools are necessary for 
building a house but they are not parts of it. Then he goes one step further and says that that which is 
necessary is for the sake of something; "the builder’s craft is for the sake of the house” (Pol. 1328a32). 
As tools are essential for building a house but not part of a house, likewise property is necessary for 
states but it is not a part of a state; property is for the sake of the state’s function.  
170 Newman (1887:113-117).
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1329a30-34). The division between ‘parts’ and ‘necessary conditions’ bars those who 
practice necessary work from priesthood.171 We also saw that citizens should not be 
farmers because Aristotle says that farmers lack the leisure required for political and 
ethical activity (Pol. 1328b40-1329a1). Although in Pol. I.8 agriculture is classified as 
a natural and ethically appropriate mode of wealth-acquisition, in Pol. VII.9 Aristotle 
delegates farming to foreigners: 
As for the farmers, ideally speaking, they should be racially heterogeneous 
and spiritless slaves, since they would then be useful workers, unlikely to stir 
up change. As a second best, they should be non-Greek subject peoples, 
similar in nature to the slaves just mentioned. (Pol. 1330a25-29)
Aristotle does not raise any ethical objection to farming as such. His only objection is 
that the life of the farmer lacks leisure. Unfortunately, the other modes of natural 
chrematistics, like hunting and fishing, are missing from both lists; hence, we do not 
know their status in the best city. We also lack a classification of professionals, like 
officials, teachers, physicians, architects, artists, writers, etc. Hence, we do not know 
how Aristotle thinks that such services should be compensated. In regards to the 
officials—the members of the governing class—who are not in list (B), Aristotle 
discusses their role in the administration of the best city shortly afterwards 
separately.172 Civil servants (το δημιουργικόν) are missing from list (B), too but it is 
highly unlikely that Aristotle considers them unnecessary for the city.173 
Also, we lack an account of the place of the commercial class (τό ἀγοραῖον) in the 
best city since merchants and retail traders are missing from list (B). While Aristotle 
holds that the best state should engage in trade with other nations and should have a 
171 Also, they should not be allowed to become soldiers and statesmen of the best city; Pol. 1329a27-34.
172 See Pol. 1331b3-10. Officials (ἄρχοντες) are administrators of the city and they serve in the boards 
that supervise “contracts, legal indictments, summonses, and other administrative matters” (Pol. 
1331b5-6). Public servants were usually slaves who executed the administrative tasks, such as 
marketplace police (ἀγορανόμοι). 
173 The fact that Aristotle does not include the public administrators in list (B) is no evidence that they 
are not necessary in the best city. In Pol. 1291a34-35 he says that a city cannot function without 
officials. Since officials have supervisory and managerial role, there should be public servants who 
executed the administrative orders. Also, while laborers are not in list (B), Aristotle adds them in the 
list elsewhere; see Pol. 1329a36. 
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marketplace for commerce (the ‘necessary’ market),174 merchants are not part of list 
(B). Also, Aristotle does not explain who will carry out trade with other states.175 In 
certain passages, he classifies commerce with the vulgar occupations which 
automatically delegates the commercial activities to non-citizens.176 The fact that he 
classifies commerce with the vulgar occupations (citizens must not live the mercantile 
life) does not imply that market exchanges should not take place among citizens. We 
saw in Pol. I.9 that householders exchange their surpluses with other householders 
using barter or money as a stand-in; also, all professionals need to exchange their 
services; e.g. farmers with doctors. It is natural, then, to think that citizens of the best 
city exchange products and services since exchange is the only way to fill in gaps in 
their self-sufficiency. However, Aristotle does not describe how exchange among 
various professionals—e.g. doctors with farmers—should take place. In the context of 
his discussion about the profit-motive, he only says that physicians and generals 
should not practice their vocations for profit (Pol. 1258a11-12). While he denounces 
profit from vocations, it stands to reason that landless doctors or teachers should be 
paid for their services in order to acquire various goods.177 
This was an outline of the best city’s occupational structure—viz. modes of 
acquisition. For Aristotle, this socio-economic structure suits the ethical orientation of 
the best state and its respective distribution of power. On the other hand, the 
occupational structure of democracies is different: “in some constitutions [i.e. in 
democracies] vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers must be citizens, whereas in others 
it is impossible—for example, in any so-called aristocracy in which offices are 
awarded on the basis of virtue and merit” (Pol. 1278a15-18). Also, in oligarchies, 
“hired laborers could not be citizens (since participation in office is based on high 
property assessments), vulgar craftsmen could be, since in fact most craftsmen 
174 About international trade, see Pol. 1327a26-28. Aristotle separates the marketplace that is intended 
for leisurely activities (έλευθέραν) from the lower marketplace which is intended for necessary 
activities, mainly barter and commerce; see Pol. 1331b11-12.
175 Since the members of the commercial class should not be citizens, they must be foreigners. Those 
who work in farming should be slaves or foreigners, too; see Pol. 1330a25-29. There is evidence of the 
state’s involvement in international trade. 
176 For example, “[C]itizens should not live the life of a vulgar craftsman or tradesman. For lives of 
these sorts are ignoble and inimical to virtue” (Pol. 1328b37-38). 
177 Newman (1887:115) suggests that it would be rather ignoble if these occupations were practiced for 
pay. However, Aristotle’s objects to the commercialization of professions, like medicine or generalship, 
because that would pervert their purpose, not clearly to getting paid for one’s services. 
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become rich” (Pol. 1278a21-23). Let us now examine the second premise of 
Aristotle’s argument against the lower occupations. 
3.3 Aristotle’s Objections to the Lower Occupations
In this section I reconstruct and explain the second premise of the argument from 
citizenship. Aristotle’s first premise (1) states that citizens cannot share in office of 
city-states that aim at the best possible life unless they have reached a high standard 
of moral and intellectual virtue. According to his second premise: 
2. Necessary work is a barrier to political activity, servile, ignoble and 
inimical to virtue.
a. Necessary work is a barrier to the leisure and the virtue required for 
citizenship in the best city (Pol. 1278a20-21). 
b. Necessary work is servile and ignoble because it is practiced for the 
convenience of others (Pol. 1258b35-38; 1278a7-12). 
His argument is straightforward: since the necessary occupations deprive citizens of 
the leisure required for the life of virtue and political activity, and since they are 
servile and ignoble, they are not proper for the citizens of the best city.178 Let me 
explain, first, statement (a). 
3.3.1 The Necessary Occupations as Barriers to Political Activity and Virtue  
i. Leisure 
The best regime requires that the good citizen is also virtuous. Aristotle argues that 
leisure “is needed both to develop virtue and to engage in political actions” (Pol. 
1329a1) and that “it is impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life 
of a vulgar person or a laborer” (Pol. 1278a20). Let me briefly sketch Aristotle’s view 
of leisure.179 
178 Virtuous activity, including political activity, requires leisure (Pol. 1278a20; Pol. 1328b34-1329a1).
179 My discussion of leisure is based on Owens (1981) and Solmsen (1964). 
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Aristotle argues that happiness depends on leisure (NE 1177b4), it is more choice-
worthy than work, and it is the end of work (NE 1177b4-6; Pol. 1334a15).180 In a 
trivial sense, leisure might seem to refer to spare time or idleness because Aristotle 
contrasts leisure with work (Pol. 1333a30-32) but the intended contrast is that 
between the un-freedom of having to do necessary work and the toil-free life (Pol. 
1330a30-36).181 Hence, Aristotle’s notion of ‘leisure’ differs from the notion of ‘being 
at leisure’. He also contrasts leisure with play and recreation because leisure aims at 
the best life, not at play and recreation—the latter are not the end of life. Play and 
recreation aim at rest from the toil of necessary tasks (Pol. 1337b35-36). We can 
recognize at least two kinds of leisure in Aristotle’s writings. The first is the leisure 
time required for political and virtuous activity which involves freedom from 
necessary work (Pol. 1333a30-36). The second kind is the cultured leisure that 
Aristotle discusses in Pol. VIII. The latter kind includes philosophy (Pol. 1334a22-25), 
music and the other arts (Pol. 1339a25-26; 1339b13; 1341b17). The best life must 
include such activities. This type of leisure requires education from an early age in 
music, reading, writing, gymnastics (Pol. VIII). 
Aristotle’s objection to a life lacking in leisure is the pedestrian point that those who 
have to work for a living have no time for participation in the popular assembly and 
the courts. They also have no time to engage with the higher pursuits of cultured 
leisure and the theoretical life of philosophy. This is his main objection to the life of 
the farmer; it lacks in the leisure required for political and cultured activity. 
ii. Inimical to Virtue (πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος)182 
Aristotle’s objection to the lower occupations is not only the pedestrian point that 
those who practice them lack leisure time. His other worry is the following:  
Any task, craft, or branch of learning should be considered vulgar if it renders 
the body or mind of free people useless for the practices and activities of 
virtue. That is why the crafts that put the body into a worse condition and 
work done for wages are called vulgar; for they debase the mind and deprive it 
of leisure. (Pol. 1337b8-14)
180 Work may include both necessary tasks and noble work.
181 Leisure is a condition of freedom, including freedom from necessary tasks; see Irwin (1988:411).
182 Pol. 1328b40.
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Here Aristotle argues that the vulgar occupations render the body useless for the 
performance of certain virtuous acts. However, he does not explain how these 
occupations render the body useless for the practice of virtuous acts. Does he mean 
that one’s virtuous activity requires that one be in good shape—e.g. as a matter of 
unity of body and mind?183 Or is it a matter of lacking the leisure for physical exercise 
required to perform virtuous acts, e.g. brave acts in warfare?184 As regards the mind, 
Aristotle says that the lower occupations render the mind useless for the exercise of 
virtue by debasing the mind and making it abject (ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν 
καὶ ταπεινήν). By ταπεινήν Aristotle seems to contrast the mind (διάνοιαν) of the free 
and noble person with the mind of the ταπεινός person, someone who is servile and 
base.185 He censures the vulgar occupations because of their effects on the free 
person: (a) someone who works for the convenience of others develops the mindset of 
a servile person; (b) by working for a living, one focuses on the necessary and the 
useful alone and loses the power to discern the good or the ability to act for the sake 
of a noble end by choice.186 By ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν, Aristotle contrasts 
the leisured mind—i.e. the mind devoted to higher pursuits—with the mind bound by 
the concerns of necessary work and money-making. Here Aristotle stresses again the 
negative impact of necessary work on the mind. We do not know if he thinks that 
farming too renders the body or mind of free persons useless for the practices and 
activities of virtue or whether it debases the mind.
For Aristotle, necessary work is usually mechanical, menial and unskilled work. 
When he says that it becomes a barrier to virtue he may mean any one of the 
following. First, one who practices necessary work does not use intelligence, 
decision-making or practical wisdom; these are essential functions for those who 
practice the citizen occupations, e.g. administrative and political undertakings. Nor do 
183 Rhet. 1360b18-22. Aristotle notes that health is an internal good because the goods of the body, i.e. 
health, beauty, physical power, etc. are internal goods (Pol. 1360b18-31). And “the excellence of the 
body is health” (Pol. 1361b3).
184 Simpson (1998:257). See also about gymnastics and the body; Aristotle stresses that gymnastics 
promotes courage (Pol. 1337b27). 
185 Liddell and Scott. On various renderings, the ταπεινός person is submissive, of low rank, lowly 
(contrast with the ‘noble’). Aristotle possibly echoes here the low opinion of his contemporaries about 
ταπεινήν work, like hired labor.
186 Simpson (1998:257) suggests that vulgar work makes the mind “unfit for discerning virtue”.
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these occupations involve the exercise and development of moral virtues, like the 
courage required for being a good soldier. Since virtue is activity and develops by 
doing virtuous acts, one’s ethical development stagnates when one is absorbed in the 
life of money-making or subsistence. Second, the vulgar occupations bar virtue in the 
sense that the person who is compelled to work for a living usually lacks either the 
surplus or the uncalculating attitude required for the exercise of virtues that depend on 
wealth, like liberality and magnificence.187 Third, a life devoted to necessary work or 
to the increase of wealth crowds out the higher ends, like virtue and noble action. In 
other words, such a life subverts the rational ordering of ends sketched by Aristotle in 
NE I.7-8. In this hierarchy, wealth is primarily an instrument of the good life. Those 
occupied with necessary work may become absorbed with mere living and confuse 
the life of subsistence or pleasure with the best life, as Aristotle explains in Pol. 
1257b31-1258a1. Fourth, and as a corollary of the previous point, when someone is 
compelled to hold a necessary job for a living, then one does not shape one’s life by 
decision and, most importantly, by the kind of rational agency realized by virtuous 
activity.188 Lastly, the utilitarian or calculating outlook of someone whose life is 
shaped by necessity is not compatible with Aristotle’s view of political activity and 
civic friendship. Ruling and judging require that the person is able to deliberate about 
the useful and the just, where the useful aims at the common advantage. For Aristotle, 
those who practice the lower occupations could not be good deliberators of things just, 
187 Those who are compelled to work for subsistence and those who want to increase their property 
adopt a calculating attitude that is contrary to Aristotle’s idea of acting well from choice, viz. for the 
sake of the noble itself by decision. Aristotle is convinced that the utilitarian outlook is antithetical to 
virtue, especially with virtues like magnanimity: “It is completely inappropriate for magnanimous and 
free people to be always asking what use something is” (Pol. 1338b2). For Aristotle, an act is virtuous 
if it is done from choice, i.e. if one chooses to act for the sake of the act itself or because it is noble; NE 
1105a32. Hence, generosity requires the uncalculating attitude of someone who chooses to donate 
money because it is a good act in itself. Also, virtue involves choice (προαίρεσις) by definition; see 
Aristotle’s definition of virtue as έξις προαιρετική (NE 1106b36-1107a3). For the idea that virtue is 
bound up with choice and the ‘voluntary’, see also NE 1111b5-6.
188 This point is aptly explained by Irwin (1988:410). Virtuous activity requires rational decision and 
voluntariness (NE 1109b35-1110a1). The point of Irwin is that a life shaped by necessity lacks the 
voluntary character of the virtuous life. It resembles the category of ‘mixed’ acts of NE 1110a4-14 
which are neither voluntary nor involuntary. They are done by decision but are not chosen for what 
they are because the agent acts under duress—e.g. the sea-captain in the midst of a storm who decides 
to throw away the cargo in order to save the ship with the crew. Likewise, a life shaped by decisions 
taken under compulsion, lacks in the freedom characteristic of the virtuous person. 
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noble and collective.189 These occupations are more suitable for citizens of states that 
are constituted for mere living and the increase of wealth.190
3.3.2 The Necessary Occupations are Servile and Ignoble  
With statement (b) Aristotle proscribes the necessary occupations for citizens because 
they are servile. We saw in Pol. 1258b35-38 that the more manual the necessary work 
the more servile it is. They are also servile because they are practiced for the 
convenience of others (Pol. 1337b17-21). He also says: 
Those who perform necessary tasks for an individual are slaves; those who 
perform them for the community are vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers. (Pol. 
1278a10-12)
For Aristotle, working for others is contrary to the freedom required for citizenship; 
free men are those who exist for their own sake, not for the sake of another man.191 
We also saw that political rule is fit for those who are free and able to rule and be 
ruled. In the best city, free men share in rule by choice with a view to the best life. On 
that score, it is not unnatural for a slave to perform slavish work. Nor is it unnatural 
for a hired worker or artisan to serve the needs of others. On the other hand, a citizen 
should not practice these occupations because such labor is servile and, hence, 
unsuitable for the free person (Pol. 1329a33-39).
However, the passage of Pol. 1278a10-12 names the difference between servile and 
189 Human beings are political animals in virtue of their capacity to recognize and deliberate about the 
useful and the just; e.g. Pol. 1253a12-18. And political activity is essentially self-realizing activity; 
Irwin (1988:410) says: “…Aristotle recognizes essentially political constituents of happiness. 
Happiness includes virtuous activity, since this fully realizes rational agency; virtuous activity must 
include the extended deliberation and rational action that results from friendship; and the same 
argument justifies the further extension to political activity. The good citizen in the ideal state is not 
merely doing what is instrumentally necessary for his good; he realizes it in his political activities 
themselves.” Irwin stresses here that political activity for Aristotle is a constituent of happiness in the 
sense that through proper political activity humans realize their nature as rational and political beings 
who are able to deliberate about matters that lie beyond their narrow interests. Also, Irwin (1988:404) 
points out that, for Aristotle, to share in happiness requires concern for the welfare of one’s fellow 
citizens.
190 Political activity is intrinsically good, especially in the ideal city-state which aims at living well, not 
mere living or living together (Pol. 1280b39-1281a4). Since non-ideal regimes are constituted as 
instruments that satisfy mere living or living together (e.g. for protection), political activity in such 
cities has instrumental character; it is not self-realizing activity, viz. activity that aims at realizing the 
essential function of human nature as political beings.
191 “[A]s the man is free, we say, who exists for himself and not for another” (Met. 982b25).
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free work but does not explain why artisans and workers are servants of a community 
while priests, soldiers and statesmen are not servants given that the latter serve the 
community, too. A plausible explanation is that:
…[W]hat one does for one's own sake, for the sake of friends, or on account of 
virtue is not unfree (οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον), but someone who does the same thing 
for others would often be held to be acting like a hired laborer or a slave. (Pol. 
1337b17-21)
The mechanical work of artisans and workers is servile (ἀνελεύθερον) because it is 
done (a) neither for one’s own sake, (b) nor for the sake of friendship, (c) nor for the 
sake of virtue. Hence, Aristotle possibly means that soldiers, statesmen, officials and 
priests are not servants—although their work serves the community—because their 
work is done for the sake of a noble purpose. However, Aristotle’s analysis is not neat. 
So far he has said that the necessary occupations are unsuitable for citizens because:
1) They create a shortage of leisure and freedom
2) They are a barrier to virtue
3) They are servile
We may wonder though why he says that “what one does for one's own sake, for the 
sake of friends, or on account of virtue is not unfree” (Pol. 1337b17-18) when even 
tasks done for one’s own sake or virtue may—contra condition (1)—create a shortage 
of leisure, too, e.g. household-management or the military life. A further complication 
is that Aristotle allows that citizens may practice some forms of servile work, viz. the 
crafts, either for their own benefit or for the sake of a noble purpose:
Accordingly, the tasks performed by people ruled in this way [i.e. craftsmen] 
should not be learned by a good person, nor by a statesman, nor by a good 
citizen, except perhaps to satisfy some personal need of his own (for then it is 
no longer a case of one person becoming master and the other slave). (Pol. 
1277b5-7)
Now some commands differ not with respect to the tasks they assign but with 
respect to that for the sake of which they are done. That is why it is noble even 
for free young men to perform many of the tasks that are held to be 
appropriate for slaves. For the difference between noble and shameful actions 
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does not lie so much in the acts themselves as in their ends, on that for the 
sake of which they are performed. (Pol. 1336a6-11)192
These claims conflict with the conditions above. We may wonder whether such work 
could undermine the virtue and freedom of the youth; by doing such work they might 
develop the mindset of servile persons. 
A possible way to have a neat analysis is to attend more closely to the two senses of 
the term ‘necessary’ task.193 The first sense refers to the opposite of leisure, viz. tasks 
or occupations taken up under compulsion—necessary work as the opposite of leisure 
(Pol. 1333a30-36). In this respect, a necessary task or occupation creates a shortage of 
the leisure required for political activity and ethical development. The second sense of 
‘necessary’ refers to the tasks or occupations which are pursued for the sake of 
something else.194 For example, hired labor and the crafts are pursued for the sake of 
others and as a means to subsistence. On that score, these occupations are not pursued 
for what they are—they do not have intrinsic value. 
The first sense of ‘necessary’ does not explain why commerce, labor and the crafts are 
ignoble; it is an empirical observation about the negative effects of necessary work on 
moral character. The second sense is more helpful for understanding servile tasks: 
they are ignoble because they do not aim at a noble end but only at serving others. 
Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free 
man not to live at another’s beck and call. (Rhet. 1367a28)
The noble is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of 
praise; or that which is both good and also pleasant because good. (Rhet. 
1366a33-34)
In contrast, the ends of noble occupations are chosen for what they are, not because 
they are useful or profitable. Hence, ‘necessary’ work implies that the work is either 
192 According to Reeve (1998:215n69), “the contribution (eranos) the young make is their obedience to 
their elders; they are compensated when they are older by being obeyed in turn”. 
193 Newman (1887:113-114) suggests these senses of ‘necessary’ based on the familiar distinction 
between things desirable in themselves and things desirable for the sake of something else. He cites the 
following passage: ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ (NE 
1147b24). Noble occupations are αἱρετὰ καθ' αὑτὰ. He also cites the following passage: “studies [of 
noble subjects] are undertaken for their own sake, whereas those relating to work are necessary and for 
the sake of things other than themselves” (Pol. 1338a12-13).
194 Pol. 1338a12-13.
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servile or ignoble. In other words, ‘necessary’ is contrasted with both the ‘free’ and 
the ‘noble’. Let us see some further properties of the ‘noble’. 
 The noble is what promotes or brings about virtue (Pol. 1366b25) 
 The reward for noble actions is “simply honour, or honour more than money” 
(Pol. 1366b34).
Also, any of the actions below are noble (Rhet. 1366b23-1367b6):
 Actions which are good absolutely, such as those a man does for his country 
without thinking of himself
 Actions which are good in their own nature
 Actions that are not good simply for the individual, since individual interests 
are selfish
 Services done to one’s benefactors (for this is just)
 Good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one’s own profit.
Let us try to explicate the difference between necessary and noble acts. First, it is a 
difference in ends: the former aim at utility, profit or at the production of necessities, 
whereas the latter aim at intrinsic or higher ends, like service to one’s community. 
Second, they differ in their relation to virtue. Noble occupations require virtue (Pol. 
1258b35-38) or promote virtue (Rhet. 1366b35), whereas the necessary occupations 
do neither require virtue nor do they promote it. Hence, necessary work: 
1) Creates a shortage of leisure and freedom
2) It is a barrier to virtue
3) It is servile
Furthermore:
4) Necessary work is done for the sake of utility alone or aims at ignoble 
ends.
Property (4) is important because it helps us explicate the difference between 
necessary and noble occupations in a neater way. Aristotle does not discuss whether 
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medicine, teaching, architecture, music, writing, etc. are noble occupations.195 
Possibly he would consider them noble because they aim at noble ends, like 
knowledge, or because they promote one’s intellectual and moral excellence. Surely, 
he would object to practicing noble occupations for the sake of gain or for other 
ignoble ends.196 
We reject professional education in instruments, then, (and by professional 
education I mean the kind that aims at competition). For the performer does 
not take part in this kind of education for the sake of his own virtue but to give 
his audience pleasure, and a boorish pleasure at that. That is precisely why we 
judge this sort of activity to be more appropriate for hired laborers than for 
free men. For performers do indeed become vulgar, since the end they aim at 
is a base one. (Pol. 1341b9-15)
However, it is not clear whether Aristotle would object to the idea of exchanging 
certain services, like medicine or teaching, with other products and services in order 
to supply the means for household-management. We also do not know whether 
Aristotle thought that a lower occupation—e.g. a craft—is ignoble when it is practiced 
for the sake of a natural end, like subsistence and providing for one’s family. It seems 
that the proper structure of Aristotle’s ideal city is a land-owning citizenry who are 
freed from necessary tasks but are trained in these tasks for the sake of household-
management, that is, in order to be able to manage the execution of necessary work 
and the exchange of household surpluses. 
Let us take stock. Conditions (2) and (4) are the main principles of division between 
necessary and noble occupations. Each of the other two conditions—(1) and (3)—
must be joined with either (2) or (4) in order to characterize a necessary task as 
ignoble. For example, Aristotle says that manual or servile work is not slavish when 
one practices it for the sake of oneself or for a noble end. Hence, a manual or servile 
work is really improper when it is done for the sake of others—condition (3)—and for 
an ignoble end. Condition (4) also explains why Aristotle mildly objects to farming; 
mainly, it deprives farmers of leisure—because of condition (1). But while household 
management is necessary work—hence, may deprive one of leisure time—it is not 
195 Newman (1897:115).
196 Aristotle says that medicine and generalship should not be used as sources of profit (Pol. 1258a7-
14). This is not the same as practicing these occupations in exchange for other goods or services as 
long as the price is just. 
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ignoble. Having mapped the criteria of Aristotle’s ethical evaluation of occupations, 
viz. modes of acquisition, let us now turn to discuss the aristocratic-bias reading.
3.4 The Aristocratic-Bias Reading
If Aristotle’s objection to the lower occupations was based on ideology, then his 
analysis would be philosophically vacuous. However, this reading owes us a clear 
characterization of what constitutes ideological bias in philosophical argumentation 
and, of course, a method for tracking such bias. One suggestion is that Aristotle does 
not offer a psychological theory to justify why those who practice the lower jobs lack 
the capacity for citizenship and virtue.197 Another suggestion is that Aristotle’s 
account of chrematistics has rhetorical function in the sense that it is a cautionary tale 
for the land-owning citizenry to refrain from the ignoble life of the craftsman or the 
tradesman.198 In my view, there are two ways to sustain this reading. The first way 
would be to show that Aristotle stipulated his first premise without argument or that 
he offered no support for his second premise. The second way would be to establish 
that these two premises inexplicably clash with some central tenet(s) of his thought. 
3.4.1 Criticism (1)
Let us discuss the first premise. The aristocratic-bias reading is based on the fact that 
Aristotle posits aristocracy as the best regime (Pol. 1293b20). However, we should 
not overlook that Aristotle’s defense of aristocracy is informed by his perfectionist 
political philosophy and his objectivist view of human nature that undergirds it.199 His 
defense results from his account of the correct regimes as rule by the best men 
without qualification (Pol. 1293b1) for the advantage of all citizens—rule that aims at 
“what is best for the city-state and its members” (Pol. 1279a36). In other words, 
Aristotle thinks that aristocracy secures the natural end of the city-state, as he 
explicated it in Pol. I.1. 
Also, we should take into account that his recommendations about constitutional 
matters depend on his theoretical task at hand. Aristocracy is Aristotle’s answer to his 
197 See Samaras (2007:82).
198 Shulsky (1991:104-111).
199 See his function argument (NE 1097b22-1098a4). 
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ideal-theoretic task of Pol. VII which seeks the best conceivable regime in abstraction 
from the existing circumstances, viz. “if there were no external obstacles” (Pol. 
1288b23). On the other hand, ‘polity’ is his answer to his realist-theoretic task—the 
search of a regime that is a combination of the unqualifiedly best regime and “the best 
[regime] in the circumstances” (Pol. 1288b25). Polity, Aristotle argues, is the best 
practicable regime. This is a combination of oligarchic and democratic institutions. 
Aristotle argues that the middle-class people are in general more virtuous than the rich 
or the poor. If he was in favor of a regime based on class-privilege and wealth, he 
would not have recommended the middle-constitution. Aristotle makes the empirical 
observation that extremes of poverty and affluence are usually prone to vice: the poor 
and the rich are prone to wrongdoing because of malice or arrogance respectively.200 
Polity is a mixture of oligarchic and democratic institutions with a large middle-class 
standing between the rich and the poor201 that best safeguards the stability of the city-
state (Pol. 1296a7-9).202 The person of moderate wealth is more responsive to reason 
and more virtuous.203 The cities that lack in a strong middling element allow the 
opposing extremes to rise and conflict. The few wealthy “neither wish to be ruled nor 
know how to be ruled”; they know “only how to rule as masters rule” (Pol. 1295b14-
17). Those who are exceedingly poor “do not know how to rule, but only how to be 
ruled in the way slaves are ruled…The result is a city-state consisting not of free men 
but of slaves and masters, the one group full of envy and the other full of arrogance” 
(Pol. 1295b18-22). In contrast, the middling-element is more suitable to take turns in 
ruling because they are neither excessively eager to rule nor servile:
[T]he middle classes are least inclined either to avoid ruling or to pursue it, 
both of which are harmful to city-states. (Pol. 1295b11-12) 
200 “…[W]hatever is exceedingly beautiful, strong, well-born, or wealthy, or conversely whatever is 
exceedingly poor, weak, or lacking in honor, has a hard time obeying reason. For the former sort tend 
more toward arrogance (hubristai) and major vice (megaloponhroi), whereas the latter tend too much 
toward malice and petty vice; and wrongdoing is caused in the one case by arrogance (hubris) and in 
the other by malice (kakourgia)” (Pol. 1295b4-10).
201 According to Aristotle, there are three socio-economic classes in all cities: “the very rich, the very 
poor; and, third, those in between these” (Pol. 1295b1). 
202 Aristotle’s proposal seems to be an application of his Doctrine of the Mean. Like moral virtue, 
which is a mean between excesses, the middle class is the mean between the very rich and the very 
poor. Aristotle considers the middle class people as having the right amount of goods and the right 
ethical attitude towards wealth. 
203 “So, since it is agreed that what is moderate and in a mean is best, it is evident that possessing a 
middle amount of the goods of luck is also best. For it most readily obeys reason…” (Pol. 1395b2-3).
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Aristotle argues that a three-class social structure with a strong middle-class is the 
buffer between the wealthy few and the many poor.204 He is also confident of the 
stabilizing power of democracies, as opposed to oligarchies, because of their large-
sized middle classes: 
Democracies are also more stable and longer lasting than oligarchies because 
of those in the middle (for they are more numerous in democracies than in 
oligarchies and participate in office more), since when the poor predominate 
without these, failure sets in and they are quickly ruined. (Pol. 1296a13-17)
We need also to bear in mind that Aristotle applies the term ‘aristocratic’ loosely to 
any regime that combines virtue with either equal freedom for the common people—
such as the regime of Sparta—or equality and wealth—such as the regime of 
Carthage (Pol. 1293b16-22). In addition, he believes that aristocratic regimes must be 
mixed with other constitutions in order to be stable (Pol. 1297a6-14). 
In sum, Aristotle’s perfectionist views of politics and citizenship require ideally an 
aristocratic regime run by the best men but practically this could be a mixed 
constitution, preferably one that combines virtue with freedom or virtue with freedom 
and wealth.
3.4.2 Criticism (2)
Aristotle’s first premise restricts citizenship only to those who are freed from the 
necessary occupations. We may wonder why Aristotle does not consider, like Plato 
did, the possibility that citizenship should extend to all those who are capable of 
virtue, including those doing the necessary occupations. Is it because he thinks that 
some individuals are more fit by natural design for the lower occupations and, hence, 
unfit for virtuous and political activity?205 Or does he think that they are capable for 
virtue but their lack of property is sufficient for disenfranchising them? In the first 
case, Aristotle owes us a nativist psychological argument or a teleological argument. 
In the second case, he needs to explain why the ideal state would not secure the 
204 “It is clear, therefore, that the political community that depends on those in the middle is best too, 
and that city-states can be well governed where those in the middle are numerous and stronger, 
preferably than both of the others, or, failing that, than one of them. For it will tip the balance when 
added to either and prevent the opposing extremes from arising” (Pol. 1295b34-39).
205 Does Aristotle think that they are naturally less capable of virtue, as it appears at Pol. 1260a36-b7 
and Pol. 1328a37-40?
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material conditions for citizenship to all those who are capable of virtue regardless of 
their birth. For if citizenship is a matter of having such resources as property and time 
in order to be free from necessary work, then the state could redistribute its resources 
as to enable the lower classes to participate in politics and be citizens.
Martha Nussbaum tries to deflect the charge of ideology and argues that having the 
capacity for virtue is sufficient for citizenship in the best city.206  In particular, she 
argues that Aristotle recognizes the right of citizenship to all those capable of 
virtue—virtually to all members of a city’s population—because the best city secures 
the material conditions of a good life for all its members. This includes the provision 
of basic necessities, like medical care, and benefits that enable citizens to develop 
morally and pursue the good life.207 Nussbaum cites the following evidence: 
(a) It is evident that the best constitution must be that organization in which 
anyone might do best and live a blessedly happy life. (Pol. 1324a24-25) 
(b) The task of an excellent legislator, then, is to study how a city-state, a race 
of men, or any other community can come to have a share in a good life and in 
the happiness that is possible for them. (Pol. 1325a7-10)
If Nussbaum is right, then all inhabitants of a state—including those engaged with the 
lower occupations—should be citizens of the best city. In my view, the evidence that 
Nussbaum cites is very limited. However, the evidence in favor of a narrow reading of 
(1)208 is overwhelming and unambiguous. Aristotle clearly suggests that hired laborers 
and craftsmen should not be citizens (Pol. 1278a4-5; 1329a2-5; 1329a33-39); those 
who work as farmers should not be citizens either (Pol. 1330a25-30). If Nussbaum’s 
reading was correct, then Aristotle’s solution would be similar to Plato’s: the lower 
classes should be formal (or nominal) citizens although they should not share in 
office.209 However, Aristotle says that those who practice the lower occupations 
206 Nussbaum (1988).
207 Ibid. 146-150.
208 By ‘narrow’ I mean the formulation that ‘only the virtuous can be citizens of the best city-state’. If 
the scope of the first premise were wide, as Nussbaum argues, Aristotle should have said that ‘all those 
who are capable of virtue should be potential citizens’.  
209 Newman (1887:109-110) and Samaras (2007:84-86) cite Republic 590C-D.
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should not be citizens of the best state, in any sense, formal or substantive (Pol. 
1278a4-5). Hence, Nussbaum’s reading cannot deflect the charge of ideological bias 
on the basis of a narrow reading of premise (1).210
Did Aristotle want to disenfranchise the lower occupational classes? I think that his 
solution is to delegate the lower occupations to foreign residents and slaves, 
completely (Pol. 1330a25-30). As Newman says, Aristotle prefers to build the 
industrial and mercantile substructure of his ideal city-state from “non-Hellenic 
material”.211 His purpose is not to disenfranchise the citizens of existing cities who 
practice the lower occupations or to offer them formal citizenship but deny them 
access to office.212 In other words, his concern is not to reform the existing cities with 
non-ideal regimes of mainland Greece by disenfranchising those citizens who are 
already craftsmen, farmers and workers.213 We should take into account that his ideal-
theoretic account of Pol. VII is probably a blueprint for new colonies in Asia 
Minor.214 In these new city-states, Greek settlers would be land-owners and citizens, 
whereas non-Greeks would practice the necessary tasks. The following passage about 
the effect of climate on racial characteristics may explain why Aristotle thinks that 
foreigners should not be citizens of an ideal city-state in Asia Minor:
The nations in cold regions, particularly Europe, are full of spirit but 
somewhat deficient in intelligence and craft knowledge. That is precisely why 
they remain comparatively free, but are apolitical and incapable of ruling their 
neighbors. Those in Asia, on the other hand, have souls endowed with 
210 Nussbaum (1988) admits that education and actual virtue are required for claiming office (Pol. 
1283a25-26). In this respect she brings Aristotle in line with Plato of the Republic who recognized the 
right of citizenship to artisans, tradesmen and workers but denied them access to office (Rep. 590C-D). 
Being a Producer is to be dominated by the appetitive part (Rep. 495b-e; 590c). They are the spirited 
element and they cannot rule. However, Plato suggested that talented children of the lower class should 
have the opportunity to become guardians and share in office (Rep. 414a-c). In the Laws, Plato gives a 
different solution that Aristotle seems to adopt: those who practice the lower occupations exist for the 
sake of the ruling class and should not be citizens (in the Laws cited by Newman (1887:110)).
211 Newman (1887:125).
212 For Aristotle a low class of landless mechanics and merchants on the one hand and an upper class of 
land-owners on the other, would be an unstable socio-economic structure. Hence, he has good reason to 
delegate the necessary tasks to non-citizen foreigners instead of conferring formal citizenship to a class 
of Greeks who would practice these tasks because citizens, by definition, should share in office.    
213 Aristotle seeks to steer between Plato’s solution of conferring formal citizenship to the lower 
occupational classes and Hippodamus’s solution which confers substantive citizenship to these classes 
(Pol. II.8). See, for example, his criticism of Hippodamus’ proposal in Pol. 1268a17-25. Aristotle 
thinks that this solution would undermine the stability of the city-state.
214 Ober (1998:339-349).
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intelligence and craft knowledge, but they lack spirit. That is precisely why 
they are ruled and enslaved. The Greek race, however, occupies an 
intermediate position geographically, and so shares in both sets of 
characteristics. For it is both spirited and intelligent. That is precisely why it 
remains free, governed in the best way, and capable, if it chances upon a 
single constitution, of ruling all the others. (Pol. 1327b22-33)
Aristotle here argues that foreigners are unfit for political activity in his ideal city-
state. He thinks that foreigners lack either the spirit (the races from Asia) or the 
intelligence and craft knowledge (the races of the North), whereas citizenship—the 
ability to rule and be ruled—requires both spirit and intelligence. For Aristotle, the 
Greeks are more suitable to be citizens of an ideal city—because they possess both 
spirit and intelligence—where individuals must be able to take turns in ruling. 
The commentators of Aristotle do not discuss the possibility that his account of the 
ideal city could also be a blueprint for new cities with Greek citizens and a non-
Hellenic industrial and mercantile class of non-citizens. They think that Aristotle’s 
proposal aims at disenfranchising those who already practice the vulgar occupations 
due to his aristocratic contempt for manual work. But there is no evidence that 
Aristotle seeks to disenfranchise those who already practice the necessary tasks, i.e. 
the citizens of Greek cities. Nor do commentators discuss the possibility of a 
distinction between parts and necessary functions based on nativist psychology or 
natural teleology. Aristotle’s idea of dividing labor in terms of parts and necessary 
functions might have been influenced by Plato’s principle of division of labor: 
different people are naturally fit for different kinds of work (Rep. 370a-b). Like Plato, 
he thinks that the craftsmen are intemperate:   
If what we have now said is true, one might raise the problem of whether 
vulgar craftsmen too need to have virtue; for they often fail to perform their 
tasks through intemperance. Or are the two cases actually very different? For a 
slave shares his master's life, whereas a vulgar craftsman is at a greater 
remove, and virtue pertains to him to just the extent that slavery does; for a 
vulgar craftsman has a kind of delimited slavery. Moreover, a slave is among 
the things that exist by nature, whereas no shoemaker is, nor any other sort of 
craftsman. (Pol. 1260a36-b2)
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Yet, Aristotle does not explain their deficiency —e.g. if it is by nature.215 The passage 
about the servility of Asian people is a hint that craft-like people tend to lack the 
capacity of self-governance and the ability to rule and be ruled. Aristotle was possibly 
influenced by his teacher Plato who thought that the appetitive element dominates 
over the rational part of the Producers. That is, the appetitive part tends to overrun the 
rational part and, hence, craftsmen lack sufficient rational self-control—they are not 
sufficiently reason-responsive. According to Plato’s principle of the division of labor, 
people are naturally fit to practice different kinds of work and belong to one of the 
three classes in accord with their psychological constitution (Rep. 370a-b). Hence, the 
appetitive element is stronger in the Producers; they represent the appetitive element 
in Plato’s Republic. For Aristotle, craftsmen have a deliberative or volitional 
deficiency, like the natural slaves do, but their deficiency cannot be about the capacity 
to deliberate over means—because the craftsmen are instrumentally rational.216 
While it is likely that Aristotle was somehow influenced by his teacher on the matter 
and thought that the craftsmen are born with some form of deliberative or affective 
deficiency, he departs from Plato’s principle of division of labor; as he says above, 
craftsmen do not exist by nature. However, this might be the point that craftsmen 
become craftsmen by training.217 The distinction between parts and necessary 
functions may not be based on nativism but on his Principle of Teleology; nature 
provides people who are more fit for necessary work (necessary conditions) in the 
same way it provides natural slaves. However, Aristotle does not offer any such clear 
argument. This leaves him open to the charge of class prejudice.
The other possibility is that he exaggerated the effects of the lower occupations on the 
life and character of individuals for rhetorical purposes in order to convince citizens 
to refrain from the lower occupations. Certainly, the fact that Aristotle does not 
consider the reasonable possibility of practicing a lower occupation without living an 
ignoble life may be a sign that he shared the contempt of aristocrats for the craftsmen 
215 Because they might lack ‘natural’ virtue; NE 1151a18-20.
216 They need to think how to produce artefacts.
217 ‘Natural’ most possibly means here ‘not the product of art or training’; Simpson (1998:69).
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and the workers. But it is also possible that he made an empirical error. Aristotle 
seems convinced that these occupations warp the character of agents.
Another explanation is that he prefers to delegate the lower occupations to foreigners 
because a large industrial class of relatively poor, landless citizens (workers, farmers 
and craftsmen) would inevitably clash with the landowners (Pol. 1262b25-32), hence, 
causing civil unrest. The industrial and mercantile classes might press the land-
owning elite, who often felt entitled to a greater share of political power, for a more 
egalitarian distribution of political power based on equality of freedom. Aristotle’s 
practicable solution is the three-class social structure of a polity with a strong middle-
class of moderate means being the buffer between the wealthy few and the lower 
classes. Yet, his solution for the ideal city is different. The way to avoid class conflict 
is to create a relatively egalitarian citizen body of landowners with foreign non-
citizens doing all the necessary occupations for the convenience of citizens.218 
3.5 Conclusion and Summary
In this chapter I reconstructed and examined Aristotle’s account and critique of the 
lower occupations. In particular, I examined the inconsistencies between Aristotle’s 
discussions of Pol. I.8-11 and Pol. IV, VII and VIII, as well as his different approach 
to farming in Pol. I.8-11 and Pol. VII. I tried to show that these inconsistencies arise 
because, for Aristotle, the ethical status of an occupation depends on the constitutional 
arrangement at hand, on its effects on the character of individuals, and on whether it is 
a necessary or noble occupation—this distinction has escaped consideration by most 
commentators. In addition, unlike in Pol. I.8-11, in later chapters Aristotle makes 
rather limited use of his Natural Economic Standard—except in the case of the 
craftsmen. However, his teleological thinking underlies his distinction between the 
noble and the lower occupations; these differ in virtue of the purpose they serve. The 
aristocratic-bias reading holds that Aristotle’s critique of the lower occupations is 
218 Irwin (1988:415) rightly points out that Aristotle’s solution does not safeguard social peace and 
political stability. He argues that “if the citizens are freed from menial labor altogether, they must use 
the labor of non-citizen menial workers—natural slaves and foreigners. If they do this, they will be 
admitting potentially discontented and dangerous non-citizens into the state. Since they cannot pretend 
to consider the interests of the menials, they must rule them by force, threats, and incentives that make 
them even more menial and potentially dangerous than they were already”.
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ideological. However, they overlook that in the best state, the industrial and 
mercantile classes consist of a non-Hellenic population of non-citizens. The citizen 
body consists of land-owners who are free from the necessary tasks and are devoted to 
political activity. Commentators also downplay Aristotle’s sympathy for polity which 
is not aristocratic; it is a mixed constitution with a large middle-class pursuing various 
occupations. While some of his empirical observations about the effects of the lower 
occupations, including commerce, on freedom and moral character may strike as 
exaggerated or biased, they are rather based on error or have a rhetorical function. He 
warns that a life devoted to money-making and business is inimical to the life of 
virtue and political activity. However, his arguments run deeper than mere rhetoric 
and the ideological reading is rather unfair because in Pol. I.9-10 Aristotle launches a 
thorough though incomplete critique of business. As I show in subsequent chapters he 






The aim of this chapter is to present and examine Aristotle’s solution to the problem 
of commercial justice, as he analyzes it in NE V.5, because in Pol. I.8-11 he only 
makes a quick remark about justice and commercial chrematistics: “…trade 
[μεταβλητική] is a mode by which men gain from one another” (Pol. 1258a38-b2). In 
particular, my main concern is to interpret Aristotle’s answer to the problem of 
commercial justice: how can justice in exchange be achieved?219 This examination is 
useful for two reasons. First, this is the third component of the Master question, 
namely, question (3), namely, when an exchange is just. Second, if we know when an 
exchange is just, then we will be able to understand whether Aristotle believed that 
business profit is unfair gain and, hence, which forms of μεταβλητική are just or 
unjust—i.e. question (2.a).220 
According to Aristotle, commercial justice requires reciprocity: the amount of value 
that the exchangers receive in an exchange must equal the amount of value they give 
away, in accord with proportionate equality.221 His formula of just price (i.e. 
proportionate equality) is obscure: ‘as builder is to shoemaker, so many shoes to a 
house or food’ (NE 1133a22-23; δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ 
ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν). This formula has generated an astonishing amount 
of interpretations seeking Aristotle’s standard of value that determines, for example, 
the number of shoes or beds that should equal one house. Is it the labor and other 
costs that each producer-exchanger has expended, as NE 1133a22-23 seems to 
suggest? Or is it the utility of the producers-exchangers (i.e. their want-satisfaction) as 
219 This is a question about the ratio that equalizes unequal quantities of different products.  
220 In chapter five I examine whether Aristotle’s thinking about economic value and just price, as this 
underlies his thinking about commercial profit, allows for profit from retail and foreign trade, the 
extractive industries (the mixed kind of chrematistics), commercial agriculture, etc. 
221Commercial justice requires proportionate equality, not arithmetic equality (ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς 
κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' 
ἰσότητα; NE 1132b32-33). Commercial exchange (buying and selling) actually replaced the mutual gift 
economy which was based on friendship; Meikle (1991b:193).   
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Aristotle claims in NE 1133b18-20? And how is proportionate equality achieved? 
Hence, Aristotle’s account of just price requires an understanding of his economic 
thinking about value.222 However, this is not economic analysis in the modern sense 
of the term, i.e. a self-standing analysis of exchange value in a market economy. 
Aristotle rather delved into the economic phenomena of the emerging market 
economy of his time as a moral and political philosopher who thought that when 
exchanges are not reciprocal, they become a source of injustice and social unrest.223 
For most commentators, Pol. 1258a38-b2 implies that one trader must sell in excess 
of the just price in order to gain. As I show in the present chapter, this reading 
presupposes that commodities have an objective just price which is determined by 
some objective, quantitative standard, like labor or cost-of-production. However, 
Aristotle’s solution to the problem of commensurability of goods in NE 1133b18-20 
suggests that prices are actually formed by bargain based on the subjective 
preferences of exchangers.224 Hence, it should puzzle us how he could think that 
business is an inherently unjust mode of acquisition and at the same time hold that the 
just price is formed by agreement.225 
In the first section of this chapter, I present Aristotle’s theory of justice and its kinds. 
Then I explain what is distinctive about commercial justice as a form of reciprocal 
justice. In section 4.2, I present Aristotle’s analysis of commercial justice from NE 
V.5. In effect, I explain how his analysis raises the problems of economic value and 
commensurability, and how he tackles with them. In section 4.3, I present the 
subjectivist and objectivist theories of economic value, viz. the utility and labor 
222 A theory of economic value is an “explanation of how prices [i.e. exchange values] are formed in a 
market economy, how the system is held together by interlocking markets and the normative properties 
of such a system”; Wilson (1975:56). In other words, it is an inquiry in the two major determinants of 
exchange value, i.e. supply and demand, and the minimal conditions of justice in price formation.
223 Aristotle argued that without reciprocal exchanges a city may fall apart (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σῴζει τὰς 
πόλεις; Pol. 1261a30). Also: τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις (NE 1132b32-35). 
224 This is the problem of commensurability between incomparable goods. Aristotle’s challenge was to 
discover the property that brings such diverse and incomparable goods as houses, beds, medical 
services, etc., in proportionate equality. In effect, he tackled this problem practically with the concept 
of χρεία (chreia, i.e. ‘need’ or ‘demand’): “Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much 
should become commensurate, but with reference to need they may become so sufficiently” (NE 
1133b18-20).
225 If exchangers agree on a price that satisfies their subjective preferences, then that price is the just 
price. The just price is constructed by the exchangers who bargain in isolated exchanges.
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theories of value. Most commentators use these two main paradigms in order to 
interpret Aristotle’s formula of just price. In the last section, I explain why I find these 
two readings unsatisfactory and propose an alternative interpretation of the formula. I 
suggest that, for Aristotle, the just price of goods should be understood in terms of 
their natural price, viz. the price that results from undistorted competition or bilateral 
monopoly; justice requires that the market price of goods should approximate their 
natural price. 
4.1 Aristotle’s Theory of Justice
In this section I outline Aristotle’s analysis of justice and I explain how commercial 
justice differs from other forms of justice, corrective and distributive justice.226 In 
addition, I will explain how his virtue-theoretic analysis of justice—justice as a 
virtue—is intertwined with his normative-economic thinking about just price. 
4.1.1. General and Particular Justice
The main bulk of Aristotle’s analysis of commercial justice is located in NE V.5. 
Before that chapter, he divides justice into ‘general’ justice and ‘particular’ justice 
(NE V.1-2) and then he analyzes particular justice into distributive justice (NE V.3) 
and corrective justice (NE V.4). Aristotle says that commercial justice is a separate 
kind—it is a form of reciprocal justice—whereas distributive and corrective justice 
should not be identified with reciprocal justice (NE 1132b32-1133a2).
Let me first outline Aristotle’s theory of justice which starts with an analysis of the 
use of the predicate ‘just’ in ordinary language. Actually, he says, the terms ‘justice’ 
and ‘injustice’ are couched in character terms, viz. as the dispositions to desire and do 
what is just or unjust:
We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character which 
makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish 
for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes them act 
unjustly and wish for what is unjust. (NE 1129a7-10)
Aristotle finds two senses of ‘justice’ at play in ordinary language: 
226 My sketch is based on several commentaries, most notably Irwin (1988), Young (2006) and Kraut 
(2002). 
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The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair 
(τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ 
ἄνισον). (NE 1129a30)
The predicate ‘just’ (τὸ δίκαιον) denotes the ‘lawful’ (τὸ νόμιμον) and the ‘fair’ (τὸ 
ἴσον; the equal-minded), and these correspond to two character terms (NE 1129a30). 
First, the ‘lawful’ refers to the disposition to conform to the law (τὸ νόμιμον; ὅ 
νόμιμος) or the disposition to do the right thing in accord with the laws of a city. 
Second, the ‘fair’ (τὸ ἴσον; i.e. equal-minded) refers to the disposition to seek one’s 
due. In contrast, the predicate ‘unjust’ (τὸ ἄδικον), first, refers to the disposition to 
disobey the law (παράνομον; ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι; i.e. “the law-breaker is 
unjust”; NE 1129a31-32). Second, the ‘unfair’ (τὸ ἄνισον) refers to graspingness (NE 
1132a32). 
On the basis of these two senses of ‘justice’ Aristotle draws his distinction between 
‘general’ and ‘particular’ justice.227 General justice (κατὰ τὴν ὅλην 
ἀρετὴν δικαιοσύνη; dikaiosynê) is complete virtue (NE 1129b25-27; 1130a7-13) 
because it is concerned with the good of others: the just man does what is 
advantageous to another (NE 1130a4) or to the political community (NE 
1129b13-19).228 On that score, Aristotle says, general justice is the whole of virtue 
(NE 1130a8-10), not a separate virtue— like courage or temperance. The just person’s 
inclination to obey the law and to care for the common good of the city requires the 
other virtues; “the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man…and those of a 
temperate man…and those of a good-tempered man and similarly with regard to the 
other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding 
others…” (NE 1129b17-24).229 
227 See Young (2006:181) on the basis of the distinction. 
228 Aristotle identifies general justice with the lawful, viz. the laws of a political community; the laws 
preserve and promote the common good of the political community. “Now the laws in their enactments 
on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or 
something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve 
happiness and its components for the political society” (NE 1129b13-17). 
229 Irwin (1988:424) argues that this is based on the Unity of Virtue thesis: one cannot have one virtue 
without having them all (NE 1144b32-1145a2). Likewise, one cannot be lawful unless one possesses 
the virtues and one cannot exercise the virtues unless one is just. According to Young (2006:183), the 
laws of a community aim at the common advantage of citizens, viz. to promote their happiness; 
virtuous activity promotes happiness; happiness and the law require the same virtuous activity; hence, 
the injunctions of law will be the same with the injunctions of virtuous activity—virtuous activity 
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Since general justice is complete virtue, particular justice (τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς 
δικαιοσύνη) is, therefore, a part of general justice (NE 1130a14-15; 1130a22-23).230 
For Aristotle, particular justice is a distinct virtue (NE 1130a22-23), like the other 
particular virtues, e.g. honesty and temperance. The sphere of its application and 
exercise is the distribution of benefits and burdens, viz. the goods of fortune and the 
ills of adversity. Aristotle’s list of goods of fortune includes honor, safety and money. 
These are contested goods (περιμάχητα; objects of competition; NE 1168b15-23) and, 
hence, must be shared fairly (NE 1129b1; NE 1130b1-3; NE 1168b15-23). Particular 
justice is, then, the virtue that disposes the agent to pursue a due share of the 
contested goods and to refrain from greedy behavior. And particular injustice is the 
vice which disposes one to get an undue share of a good or a burden—e.g. by 
profiteering or tax evasion. Let us now turn to Aristotle’s analysis of particular justice.
4.1.2 Distributive and Corrective Justice
Aristotle divides particular justice into distributive and corrective justice. His aim is to 
find out how to explicate the ‘just’ in the distribution of benefits / burdens and in the 
correction of transactional injustice (NE 1130b30-1131a). In distributive justice the 
‘just’ is the intermediate between having a larger share of a good or a smaller share in 
a burden (NE 1131a10-14); it is the intermediate between an excessive and a deficient 
share (NE 1131b17-20).231 The ‘intermediate’ has the sense of ‘equal’ (two equal 
shares) but it is proportional to the merit of two persons; it is an equality of two ratios 
(NE 1131a30) and involves four terms (NE 1131a17-20): two terms for the shares and 
two terms for the persons. These terms form the two ratios: the ratio between persons 
and the ratio between shares. Proportional equality requires that the ratio of goods 
must be in accord with the ratio of persons: as person A is to person B, so is A’s share 
to B’s share of a good (NE 1131b5). The two persons must get equal shares of the 
promotes happiness and the laws of the city aim at the happiness of its citizens. Irwin (1988:424) 
explains that “general justice turns out to be the same state of character as virtue as a whole, and in 
calling it general justice, we refer especially to the concern of the virtuous person for the common good 
of the political community.” 
230 Broadie (2002:335) notes that general justice consists of the virtues, one of which is the virtue of 
particular justice. In a weaker sense, general justice is co-extensive with all the virtues.
231 Aristotle’s argument is as follows: what is just is equal (ἴσον); what is equal is intermediate, that is, 
the ‘equal’ stands between ‘too large’ and ‘too small’; hence the just is an intermediate between too 
large and too small (NE 1131a10-14). 
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same thing in accord with their relative merit (NE 1131a25-26).232 If two persons, A 
and B, have equal worth, namely, 1:1, then their shares should be 1:1 accordingly. If 
A and B differ in worth, e.g. 1:2, then B’s share should be twice the share of A’s. For 
example, if B contributed twice as much labor or capital in a venture as A, then, other 
things being equal, the ratio of their shares should be 1:2, accordingly. Lastly, a 
distribution is unjust if it violates the proportion—e.g. if A received an excessive or 
deficient share than his/her due. 
In NE V.4 Aristotle discusses corrective justice. The aim of corrective justice is to 
restore equality when a transaction has been unjust. This is again an intermediate 
between excess and deficiency; it is the arithmetic mean between gain and loss. 
Aristotle’s account concerns voluntary and involuntary transactions. In the first 
division belong such “…transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, 
pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting…” (NE 1131a3-4). In the involuntary kind 
belong such transactions “as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of 
slaves, assassination, false witness, and others involve force, such as assault, 
imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult” (NE 1131a6-
9). Unlike distributive justice, corrective justice requires arithmetic equality, not 
proportional equality. In particular, the merit of persons plays no role in adjudicating 
disputes. Aristotle says: “[I]t makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded 
a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has 
committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and 
treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if 
one inflicted injury and the other has received it” (NE 1132a2-6). Hence, if a 
carpenter has agreed to deliver five beds for one house and delivers four, then 
corrective justice requires that the carpenter must give one more bed to the builder. In 
short, corrective justice aims at restoring the intermediate—in our example: 5 beds = 
1 house. Aristotle concludes that “the just in rectification will be the intermediate 
between loss and gain” (NE 1132a18-19). This is because he defines ‘gain’ as “to 
have more than one’s own” and ‘loss’ as “to have less than one’s original share” (NE 
232 Aristotle mentions three standards for assessing the relative merit of persons: “…democrats identify 
it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters 
of aristocracy with virtue” (NE 1131a25-27). 
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1132b11-18). 
The just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss.... [I]t consists 
in having an equal amount [of value] before and after the transaction. (NE 
1132b18-20)
In other words, each exchanger must receive as much value as he/she gives away. 
However, while corrective justice aims at the intermediate between gain and loss—at 
restoring the equality—as this is determined originally by agreement between two 
exchangers, the equality between exchangers is not an arithmetic mean because 
different producers and their goods have different value (NE 1132b33). As we will see 
reciprocal justice is proportionate equality, not arithmetic equality (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς 
κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα). Corrective justice requires arithmetic equality 
when the established proportional equality between exchangers is violated.
4.1.3 Reciprocal Justice 
In NE V.5 Aristotle introduces reciprocal justice (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς) which is the basis 
of justice in exchange or commercial justice hereafter. He says that reciprocal justice 
does not fit with either distributive or corrective justice (NE 1132b24-25). First, as we 
shall see in section 4.2, commercial justice is reciprocal justice and is concerned with 
the equitable exchange of goods. Second, commercial justice requires proportional 
equality: 
But in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together—
reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely 
equal return. For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together. 
(NE 1132b32-34)
Aristotle’s principle of reciprocity requires that both parties in an exchange receive 
proportionately equivalent values because “the just is intermediate between a sort of 
gain and a sort of loss....” (NE 1132b18). Third, Aristotle says that reciprocal 
exchanges are vital for a city. We saw in Pol. I.9 that exchange-based acquisition 
(μεταβλητική) is a necessary mode of acquisition for the survival of households and 
cities. But exchanges must be reciprocal because reciprocity is the bond that 
maintains communities together (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σῴζει τὰς πόλεις; Pol. 1261a30; 
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also in NE 1132b32-35); without these bonds a city may fall apart.233 This is not 
surprising because, for Aristotle, cities are partly constituted and exist for the sake of 
the advantageous or utility—e.g. a city secures material resources for its citizens (NE 
1160a8-14).234 On that score, utility-friendship is the pattern of friendship that 
characterizes the bonds among fellow-citizens. These bonds are sustained by, among 
other things, just exchanges.
Aristotle does not explain how reciprocal justice differs from distributive justice—
perhaps he thinks this is obvious.235 More perplexingly, both kinds of justice are 
applied before injustice has been committed and they both conform to the pattern of 
geometrical proportion.236 However, reciprocal justice is concerned with relations of 
exchange in particular, while distributive justice is concerned with the equitable 
distribution of goods and burdens. Also, a less obvious but noteworthy difference 
between them is the following: the just proportion in distributions is determined by 
the relative merit of the two persons, while the just ratio of exchange is not clearly 
determined by the relative merit of persons.237 
Aristotle offers an explicit, although puzzling, analysis of the difference between 
corrective and reciprocal justice. He dismisses the Pythagorean idea that corrective 
justice is reciprocity unqualifiedly (‘an eye for an eye’ or lex talionis; NE 1132b21-
1133a5) and that reciprocity covers the whole of justice—distributive and corrective 
justice. In particular, he argues that unqualified talionis reciprocity is not corrective 
justice: if a magistrate strikes a citizen, the citizen should not strike the official in 
return as talionis reciprocity implies. On the other hand, if a citizen strikes a 
233 Aristotle refers to proportionate equality, not arithmetic equality (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν 
καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα). Also, τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. Meikle (1991b:193) 
contends that Aristotle took ‘mutual gift’ as the prototype of fair exchange. This is also the spirit of 
Aristotle’s remarks about the Temple of the Graces: “Men seek to return either evil for evil—and if 
they cannot do so, think their position a mere slavery—or good for good—and if they cannot do so 
there is no exchange, but it is by exchange that they hold together. This is why they give a prominent 
place to the temple of the Graces— to promote the requital of services; for this is characteristic of 
grace—we should serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and should another time take the 
initiative in showing it” (NE 1132b33-1133a5).
234 Irwin (1988:425-33) rightly points out that this does not contradict the higher aim of the city, 
namely, happiness (see Pol. 1278b20; 1328a35-b2).
235 Young (2006:186) argues that Aristotle “gives no reasons for thinking that reciprocity is not to be 
identified with distributive justice; he may assume that this is obvious”. 
236 Scaltsas (1995:259).
237 Ibid. 259; for Scaltsas (1995) it is based on the relative value of goods. 
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magistrate, justice requires that the officer not only returns the strike, as the talionis 
reciprocity requires, but also that the perpetrator receives additional punishment. 
Simply striking the perpetrator back is not sufficient for justice to be restored—in 
particular, to restore the officer’s status. Since Aristotle insists on that reciprocal and 
corrective justice differ, and talionis reciprocity cannot capture this difference, as the 
example with the magistrate demonstrates, it appears that reciprocal justice has a 
further role. First, it has a role in commercial justice but not in the talionis sense 
because talionis is arithmetic return, whereas commercial justice requires 
proportionate equality. Second, it is possible that reciprocal justice of the geometrical 
kind has a further role in corrective justice, such as the correction of injustices in 
proportionate terms.238 It is possible, then, that reciprocal justice is an addendum to 
corrective justice that Aristotle left unnamed. Also, commercial justice is part of 
particular justice since the person who commits a commercial injustice is greedy and, 
hence, unjust in the particular sense.239 The greedy person is someone who seeks an 
undue share of the goods and ills of fortune in distributions or in exchanges (ΝΕ 
1129b7-10). In this respect, commercial justice is an addendum to particular justice 
since graspingness in trade—e.g. profiteering—falls under particular injustice.240 
Since it is not my purpose to pursue this question further, let me sum section 4.1. 
Aristotle distinguishes between general and particular justice. He claims that the first 
kind of justice is complete virtue; it is the other-regarding virtue of doing good to 
individuals and to one’s city. The second kind of justice is particular justice which 
consists of distributive and corrective justice. Distributive justice concerns the 
equitable distribution of goods and burdens, while corrective justice refers to the 
rectification of injustice in transactions. Then Aristotle introduces reciprocal justice 
238 According to Scaltsas (1995), reciprocal justice covers a gap left by corrective justice of the talionis 
arithmetic kind: reciprocal justice is not only concerned with the exchanges of goods but also with the 
“retribution for injustice done and is practiced on the basis of geometrical proportion, regulated by the 
merit of the parties involved” (p. 259). Hence, for Scaltsas, reciprocal justice has two branches: 
retributive and commercial justice where both conform to the pattern of geometrical proportion.
239 Πλεονεξία (greed), says Aristotle, is the vice that motivates particular injustice (NE 1130a16-24).
240 As Irwin (1988:429-430 ) points out, it “offers these definite guarantees and protections against 
πλεονεξία [i.e. graspingness]. Without a just system of prices, exchange would be an opportunity for 
πλεονεξία, since an astute person could manipulate it to improve his own competitive position at the 
expense of another. Though Aristotle does not describe the workings of the intended system of prices 
and exchange in any detail, he says enough to show how it is meant to display the characteristic 
features of special [i.e. particular] justice”. Soudek (1952:51-53) too, holds that for Aristotle 
commercial justice is a mean between gain and loss (as corrective justice) and has regulatory role.
127
and argues that it is a separate kind of justice (ΝΕ 1332b23-25).241 It differs from 
corrective justice because it is not arithmetic equality. Reciprocal justice covers 
commercial justice and, perhaps, corrective justice: the latter is practiced in cases 
where correction must be proportionate to the status or merit of the persons involved. 
Commercial justice is the subject of the next section to which I now turn. 
4.2 Justice in Exchange 
In this section I present Aristotle’s theory of commercial justice. I explain how his 
analysis raises the exegetical problem of economic value: justice in exchange requires 
the exchange of equivalent values in proportionate terms but we need to understand 
the standard which effects their equivalence.
4.2.1 Justice in Exchange and Economic Value 
We saw briefly in 4.1.3 that commercial justice requires reciprocity: the amount of 
value that each exchanger receives should equal the amount of value that each gives 
away. Definitely, the just price should not be an arithmetic mean because goods are of 
unequal value per unit of quantity: one house cannot cost as much as one bed. Hence, 
commercial justice requires that unequal quantities of goods be equal in terms of 
proportionate equality (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα; NE 
1132b32). The challenge for Aristotle was to come up with the formula by which 
unequal quantities of goods, like beds and houses, are equal in value so that 
exchangers receive as much value as they give away. This is the Just Price Question. 
Just Price Question
How could we bring different quantities of commodities in the proportion at 
which exchangers receive and transfer equivalent amounts of value?242 
In effect, this question seeks the formula which entails that, for example, five beds 
equal one house in value. In other words, the just price is the proportion where 
241 Reciprocal justice does not exhaust the whole of justice as the Pythagoreans assumed; Hardie 
(1968:193-200), Irwin (1988:625n.11), Scaltsas (1995:257), and Young (2006:187) rightly point out 
that reciprocal justice is a separate kind of justice. Irwin (1988:625) overlooks that reciprocal justice is 
not concerned with commerce alone, whereas Aristotle points out that reciprocity is important for 
justice as a whole. 
242 Judson (1997:156). In a general way, the just “is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of 
loss.... [I]t consists in having an equal amount [of value] before and after the transaction” (NE 
1132b18-20; my emphasis). Hence, the just price is the intermediate between loss and gain. 
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different quantities of two goods are equivalent in value.243 I will use the terms ‘ratio 
of exchange’, ‘exchange value’ and ‘price’ interchangeably hereafter.244 
Moreover, Aristotle needs to explain what constitutes the value of commodities and 
their prices:
Exchange Value Question
What is the determinant of the value of commodities? 
This question brings us to the problem of economic value. In a general way, a theory 
of economic value is an explanation of how prices are formed in a market.245 In 
particular, as we see in section 4.3, the just price depends on the nature of economic 
value. If the just price is a matter of transferring and receiving equal amounts of value, 
we need to know what the nature of economic value is. Is it the labor expended to 
produce a good or is it its utility? 
As we will see shortly, Aristotle’s analysis of just price is an indispensable addendum 
to his ethical theory of chrematistics because it problematizes the ethics of 
commercial profit: is business profit an unfair increment on the just price of products? 
I examine this question in chapter five as a step to disentangling Aristotle’s mixed and 
confusing views about the ethical/unethical forms of exchange-based chrematistics 
(μεταβλητική)—question (2.α).246 While in NE V.5 Aristotle highlights the mutual 
gains from trade,247 in the Politics he seems to censure trade (μεταβλητική) for its 
injustice: “…μεταβλητική [is] a mode by which men gain from one another” (Pol. 
1258a38-b2). Most commentators argue that traders and middlemen must sell in 
excess of the just price in order to gain. As I show in the next chapter, this reading 
presupposes that, for Aristotle, commodities have an objective just price which is 
determined independently of the exchangers’ need by some quantitative standard of 
243 See Child (1998); Lowry (1973:59) and (1987:19); Judson (1997:147-8) and Ekelund (1997:15) 
downplay the descriptive attempt of Aristotle’s discussion of fair price although it requires an 
understanding of the mechanism of price formation. 
244 Price is the relative proportion or ratio of exchange between two goods.
245 Wilson (1975:56).
246 My aim is to examine whether Aristotle considers foreign trade, the extractive industries, 
commercial agriculture, and rents as just forms of acquisition or whether he condemns a commercial 
economy as a whole. 
247 His analysis of justice in NE V.5 concerns isolated, bilateral exchange between producers (artisans, 
farmers, doctors, etc.) or between householders. For evidence that he is not against commerce see 5.2.3.
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value, like labor time or cost-of-production. However, Aristotle’s subjectivist solution 
to the problem of commensurability in NE 1133b18-20—viz. the need of exchangers 
determines price—makes fair profit possible; the just price is that which satisfies the 
needs of both exchangers. In section 4.3 I examine which of these two main 
approaches is Aristotle’s. Let me now present his theory of commercial justice.
4.2.2 Nicomachean Ethics V.5 & Politics I.9
Aristotle’s discussion of commercial justice in NE V.5 is concerned with justice in 
isolated two-party exchanges (viz. barter), not in competitive markets where prices are 
formed by the interaction of many suppliers and buyers.248 His analysis of just 
exchange states the pattern that equalizes the relative value of products. According to 
Aristotle, commercial justice is achieved by the cross-diagonal conjunction of four 
terms: two terms for the persons and two terms for the products.
Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a builder, 
B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the 
shoemaker the latter’s work, and must himself give him in return his own. (NE 
1133a5-9)
The four terms of the formula are conjoined diagonally because the builder (A) gets 
shoes (D) and the shoemaker (B) gets a house (C). Aristotle stresses that a bargain is 
reciprocal only when different quantities of goods are equalized in proportion: 
If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal 
action takes place, the result we mention will be effected. If not, the bargain is 
not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work [ἔργον] 
of the one being better than that of the other; they must therefore be equated. 
(NE 1133a10-12)
But here Aristotle says that the ‘work’ of producers must be equated, too. That is why 
commercial justice is expressed as two ratios, A:B, the ratio of producers or their 
248 Aristotle’s concern in NE V.5 is commercial exchange by bargain between artisans, not aggregate 
supply and demand. See Ekelund (1997:15-17). However, this does not imply that there were no 
running market prices or that bargain was not affected by variations in supply and demand at the 
aggregate level. Nor is Aristotle’s focus on isolated exchange evidence that he ignored the interplay of 
supply and demand or that the determinants of prices in bargain differ from the determinants of supply 
and demand. As I show in this chapter, Aristotle was aware that both utility and production factors 
affect prices in isolated exchanges. Finley (1970:13) rightly stresses this point given that in the fourth 
century B.C. actually prices varied with variations in supply and demand; cf. Polanyi (1957:87) argues 
that the mechanism of supply and demand escaped him. 
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work, and D:C (the ratio of products of their work), where A:B=1 and D:C=1.249 The 
idea seems to be that different quantities of goods, e.g. one hundred shoes and one 
house, must be equated in value so that C=1 and D=1—or D:C=1. Similarly, different 
‘works’ (ἔργα) must be equated in value so that A=1 and B=1—or A:B=1 because: 
…[I]t is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, 
or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must be equated. 
(NE 1133a18-19)
Aristotle said before that doctors and farmers must be equated because they are not 
only different but also unequal and must be equated before the bargain takes place. He 
explains this point in more detail shortly afterwards. For the moment he restates how 
commercial justice is achieved by conjoining the four terms:
The number of shoes exchanged for a house [or for a given amount of food] 
must therefore correspond to the ratio of builder to shoemaker. For if this be 
not so, there will be no exchange and no intercourse. (NE 1133a22-23)
And:
There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as 
farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker’s work is to that of the 
farmer’s work for which it exchanges. (NE 1133a33-35)
In short, justice requires that the ratio of commodities D:C be equal to the ratio of 
‘works’ (ἔργα) of the producers A:B. Hence, A:B and D:C must be equal to 1. This is 
Aristotle’s answer to the Just Price Question. We will have to unpack this answer in 
order to understand how the two ratios (the producers and the products) ought to be 
related for justice to be achieved. 
But first Aristotle needs to tackle with the following problem. Since producers and 
their products are different and unequal, how could they be comparable?250 Aristotle’s 
249 Soudek (1952:61) argues that the four terms are actually four ratios: A:C = e, B:D = f, A:D = g,  
B:C = h. The ratios e : f and g : h are equal. According to Soudek, Aristotle’s formula of reciprocal 
justice is the cross-diagonal conjunction of these four ratios e : g :: f : h.
250 “For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people 
who are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why all things that are exchanged 
must be somehow comparable” (NE 1133a18-19). As we saw before, the plural functions of the 
members of a community (the work of doctors, teachers, farmers, etc.) are necessary for the function of 
the community “for a city-state cannot be composed of people who are like one another”; people who 
are the same have nothing to offer to each other (Pol. 1261a23–4). That is why the exchange relations, 
as Aristotle remarks, are the salvation of cities.
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next task is to find out the property that allows different and unequal producers and 
their works (viz. their ἔργα, e.g. farming and medicine) to be comparable: there would 
be no “association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, 
nor equality if there were not commensurability” (NE 113b17-18). This is Aristotle’s 
plea for the standard by which we can measure the relative value of different and 
unequal producers and their products. In general, the value of product C is its 
proportionate relationship to another product, say, D; e.g. one house equals one 
hundred pairs of shoes (1:100). Aristotle seeks, first, the common property by which 
different products, as houses and shoes, become commensurate and, hence, 
measurable.251 In effect, he tests two different solutions. First, he proposes money:
It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an 
intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore the excess and the 
defect—how many shoes are equal to a house or to a given amount of food. 
(NE 1133a19-25)
Aristotle rejects this solution because money is only the measure of the relative values 
of commodities—the intermediary, as he says, between excesses from the mean—and 
is fixed by convention; money is not the natural basis of their commensuration: 
…[B]ut money has become by convention a sort of representative of need; and 
this is why it has the name ‘money’ [νόμισμα]—because it exists not by nature 
[φύσει] but by law [νόμος] and it is in our power to change it and make it 
useless. (NE 1133a28-31)
It appears that Aristotle seeks a standard that makes things commensurate and 
exchangeable in a non-conventional sense. His second proposal is the following:
All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before. 
Now this unit is in truth need [χρεία], which holds all things together (for if 
men did not need one another’s goods at all, or did not need them equally, 
there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange). (NE 1133a26-
28)
251 The seminal discussion of Aristotle on commensurability is Meikle (1995), especially chapter 3. See 
also Pack (2010:11-14). According to Aristotle, the measure is always homogeneous with the thing 
measured; Met. 1053a1-14. For example ‘weight’ is a common measure of the mass of different objects, 
like desks and cars. But we cannot compare the knife and the wine with regard to certain qualities, viz. 
sharpness; see Phys. 248b. 
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‘Need’ (chreia; also ‘demand’), he says, is the common denominator of all goods; it is 
the non-conventional and common measure that brings different and unequal 
exchangers and products into proportionate equality.252 Aristotle’s solution is based 
on the fact that exchange starts from the mutual need of exchangers. Money is, by 
extension, a conventional representative of the mutual need of exchangers.
Money, then, acting as a kind of measure, equates goods by making them 
commensurate; for neither would there have been association if there were not 
exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were 
not commensurability. (NE 1133b16-18)253
However, then, Aristotle appears to contradict himself: 
Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become 
commensurate. (NE 1133b18-19) 
He says that it is impossible for different things to be strictly commensurate. It is not 
clear why Aristotle is not satisfied with his own solution. Does this mean that he 
admits failure to solve the problem? Or is it that he recognizes that he should be 
asking a different question? Perhaps, he thought that seeking to explain how different 
things, like houses and shoes, could be strictly commensurate is not the right question, 
since different goods have different functions or natures.254 Another possibility is that 
Aristotle realized that the search of a non-relational property with which we could 
compare qualitatively different commodities is misguided. In other words, if the 
question of commensurability is about a common measure that is alien to the point of 
view of exchangers, then for Aristotle there can be no solution. Eventually, Aristotle 
qualifies the problem of commensurability as follows:
With reference to need [χρεία] they [products] may become so 
[commensurate] sufficiently. (NE 1133b19-20)
252 The gloss of χρεία as ‘demand’ is found in Hardie (1968:196) and Barker (1906:379). In modern 
economics, demand and utility are tied together. Demand is active desire for the utility of a good and 
utility is defined as the satisfaction of wants or preferences; Graafland (2007:32). The ‘demand as 
utility’ interpretation is also found in Soudek (1952) and Van Johnson (1939). Judson (1997) and 
Meikle (1995:120-21) argue that χρεία is objective need, not subjective utility, and is tied to the 
function of a good, not to demand.
253 Money provides the measure in accord with which arithmetically different quantities of products 
have equal value. But need, not money, is the property of commensuration.
254 This interpretation is by Meikle (1995:9) who argues that different products are qualitatively 
incommensurate because they have different ends. 
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That is, products may become commensurate enough in regards to the need of 
exchangers—or from the point of view of exchangers. This is rather the realization 
that incommensurate products cannot be quantified by a common, non-relational 
property. In this arrangement, money should be the common standard or measure of 
‘need’:
There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is 
called money); for it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all 
things are measured by money. (NE 1133b21-22)
Here is Aristotle’s example of how money facilitates the calculation of relative prices: 
Let A be a house, B ten minae [units of currency], C a bed. A is half of B, if 
the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is 
plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz. five. (NE 1133b23-25)
If one house is equal to ½ of 10 minae, then its worth is 5 minae. If the bed is equal to 
a tenth of 10 minae, then its worth is 1 mna. From the above relation, it follows that 
one house is equal to five beds. Nevertheless, money does not determine the ratio of 
their exchange (one house / five beds). As Aristotle says:
That exchange took place thus before there was money is plain; for it makes 
no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or the money 
value of five beds. (NE 1133b25-27)
Exchange is possible without the use of money as a medium of exchange. With this 
idea Aristotle stresses the conventional nature of money as a representative of need. 
There is no agreed meaning of Aristotle’s formula of just price ‘as builder is to 
shoemaker’. The literature on the subject is enormous. As Finley says “that this is not 
one of Aristotle’s more transparent discussions is painfully apparent.”255 Let me turn 
now to the interpretations of the formula.
4.2.3 Interpretations
After a brief sketch of the two main theories of economic value, I present the two 
leading interpretations of Aristotle’s formula: the ‘objectivist’ and the ‘subjectivist’ 
interpretations which are based on the classical and the neo-classical schools of 
255 Finley (1970:9). 
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economic thought respectively.256 In a general way, the economic value of a good is a 
measure of the utility or benefit that a good offers to the individual person. For 
classical economists the economic value of a good somehow inheres as use value in 
that good.257 They also separate the use value of a good from its exchange value, i.e. 
the price that a good commands in the marketplace.258 In classical economics, the 
economic value of a good is not formed in the marketplace—for example, water is 
valuable even when there might be no demand for it. Also, for classical economists, 
economic value is independent from the forces of market and the price of goods is 
determined by the labor expended for their production. In short, they hold that prices 
are determined by objective conditions, e.g. the conditions of production. 
On the other hand, neo-classical economists deny that economic value inheres in 
goods. They also deny that the prices of goods are determined by the labor expended 
to produce them. According to the neo-classical school, an object has economic value 
insofar as it can be exchanged in a market, i.e. if it satisfies consumer demand or 
subjective human preferences. On that score, the economic value of a good is simply 
the exchange value or price of that good as this is formed in the marketplace by 
demand relative to supply.259 Since neo-classical economists identify economic value 
with utility (use-value), and hold that utility is a function of subjective preferences 
expressed in prices, they have no difficulty bridging the gap between use value and 
exchange value (price): a good’s use value really is the price of that good.260 
256 This very brief sketch is based on Sandelin (2008) chapters 2 and 3, and Wilson (1975). The two 
main paradigms about economic value are the labor theory of classical economists and the neo-
classical utility or marginalist theory of value.
257 Marx (1867:27) argues that use value is based on the objective properties of goods which satisfy 
human wants. Adam Smith holds that “[t]he real price of everything, what everything really costs to the 
man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it” (1776: Book I.5, p. 12).
258 They tend to identify the economic value of the good with its use value.
259 McConnell (2009:46-51). Demand reveals or expresses the willingness of a person to buy a 
commodity given a schedule of prices. Let x be a good or service. The value of x is determined by the 
demand for x’s utility in relation to x’s supply. On that score, demand for x, say water, expresses the 
utility or satisfaction one derives by quenching one’s thirst.
260 In this way, they resolve the difficulty of transforming utility to market price, as this is highlighted 
by the iron-gold paradox. According to this paradox, gold has high exchange value despite its low use 
value. Classical economists cannot resolve this paradox because they treat utility independently from 
demand, whereas neo-classical economists treat utility as a function of subjective valuations. 
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i. Objectivist Interpretations
Let us now turn to the objectivist interpretation of Aristotle’s formula ‘as builder is to 
shoemaker…’. The first objectivist interpretation consists of the ‘labor’ and the 
‘social-status’ readings. They claim that the ratio of products D:C is determined by 
the ratio of producers’ work A:B. On that score, justice is achieved when exchangers 
receive and transfer equal amounts of labor value (labor reading) or when they receive 
the value that accords with their social status (social status reading). The second 
objectivist reading explains the prices of products in terms of the ratio of exchangers’ 
objective need (χρεία).261 On that score, the product that satisfies a greater need 
should command a higher price. 
Let us start with the social-status reading.262 According to this reading, different 
producers have unequal value in virtue of their different social status. The just price is 
that which accords with the difference in status. This reading is based largely on an 
interpretation of the ancient economy as a primitive economy largely embedded in 
social institutions. Actually, in ancient economies, prices were not formed by the 
impersonal interplay of supply and demand; commercial justice was largely based on 
the social ‘weighing’ system of a community: 
The rate of exchange must be such as to maintain the community. Again, not 
the interests of the individuals, but those of the community were the governing 
principle. The skills of persons of different status had to be exchanged at a rate 
proportionate to the status of each: the builder's performance exchanged 
against many times the cobbler's performance; unless this was so, reciprocity 
was infringed and the community would not hold. [Polanyi (1975:88)]
The social-status reading provides an objective but non-quantitative way to explain 
how prices in D:C are formed by the producer ratio A:B.263 
On the other hand, the ‘labor’ reading offers an objective and quantitative way of 
measuring the relative value of producers. According to Joseph Schumpeter: 
As the farmer's labor compares with the shoemaker's labor, so the product of 
the farmer compares with the product of the shoemaker. At least, I cannot get 
any other sense out of this passage. If I am right, then Aristotle was groping 
261 Judson (1997:169).
262 The main proponent of this reading is Polanyi (1957:88).
263 It is objective because it registers a fact about social organization, not because it is quantitative.
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for some labor-cost theory of price which he was unable to state explicitly. 
[Schumpeter (1954a:60)]
For Schumpeter, the price of goods D:C is determined by the value of the labor 
expended or the cost of production A:B. Hence, the just price D:C—e.g. one house 
should equal one hundred shoes—is the proportion at which unequal amounts of labor 
or expenses are equated. In general, there is no agreed meaning of the labor factor but 
usually interpreters mean labor-time, cost-of-production or labor-skill. For example, 
Ross writes:
The working of ‘proportionate reciprocity’ is not very clearly described by 
Aristotle, but seems to be as follows. A and B are workers in different trades, 
and will normally be of different degrees of ‘worth’. Their products, therefore, 
will also have unequal worth, i.e. (though Aristotle does not expressly reduce 
the question to one of time), if A = nB,C (what A makes, say, in an hour) will 
be worth n times as much as D (what B makes in an hour). A fair exchange 
will then take place if A gets nD and B gets 1C; i.e., if A gives what it takes 
him an hour to make, in exchange for what it takes Bn hours to make.264
According to Ross’ proposal, the time expended and the skill employed to produce 
two products should determine their relative price. However, almost all proponents of 
the first objectivist strategy do not explain the role of need (χρεία) although it is the 
obvious determinant of exchange value according to Aristotle’s solution to the 
problem of commensurability. I will discuss this problem in section 4.3.
A notable interpretation of the second objectivist strategy is Lindsay Judson’s who 
argues that the two variables (producers and products) in the formula are linked 
through χρεία where this is objective need.265 In particular: 
Aristotle’s idea is that the ratio ‘as builder is to shoemaker’ is the ratio of the 
strength of their [i.e. the producers’] needs for the goods in question; if, in the 
relevant situation, the shoemaker needs a house more than the builder wants a 
pair of shoes, then the house is worth more than the shoes. [Judson (1997:168-
69)]
However, for Judson, ‘needs’ “are objective features of parties in an exchange, 
and…yield claims of justice which are objectively true”.266 In particular, he means 




that ‘needs’ are not ‘wants’ for Aristotle; needs are over things which are necessary 
for survival and happiness. Certain goods satisfy the requirements of survival and 
happiness in a species-wide way and, hence, they tend to satisfy greater needs. Hence, 
the need for these things will be stronger. One house satisfies a greater objective need 
than one bed and commands a higher price per unit—e.g. a house equals five beds. 
For Judson, the just price is the proportion of quantities at which there is equality of 
need-satisfaction. 
ii. Subjectivist Interpretations
Subjectivist interpretations of Aristotle’s formula focus on one ratio and treat the 
other as either dependent on, or explicable by, the other ratio. For example, Hardie 
focuses on the producer ratio and cashes it out in terms of ‘demand’:
 
…[S]ince prices are fixed by the market, the value of the producer is only a 
disguised form of the demand for his product. [Hardie (1980:196-7)]
While Hardie proposes that A:B represents labor time, his reading is subjectivist 
because he cashes out labor time in terms of subjective demand, viz. the prices that 
producers’ labor command in the marketplace. However, he does not explain exactly 
how prices are formed and how justice is achieved in Aristotle’s formula. Presumably, 
he thought that the just proportion is that which satisfies the buyers’ demand equally.
A thorough subjectivist reading of Aristotle’s formula of just price is Josef Soudek’s 
‘bargain’ reading: prices are formed by bargain and the just price is the intermediate 
between the price set by the seller and the price offered by the buyer in a bargain. The 
proportion at which there is equal return of goods is that at which the utilities or want-
satisfactions of exchangers are equally satisfied: 
…The want-satisfaction derived from the possession of one house must be 
equal to that derived from 100 pairs of shoes. [Soudek (1952: 61)]
Unlike Judson’s, Soudek’s gloss of χρεία is want-satisfaction, not objective need. For 
Soudek the ratio of producers A:B represents ‘labor-skill’ while the ratio of products 
D:C represents ‘utility’ or ‘want-satisfaction’. Each exchanger is a buyer who seeks 
want-satisfaction from a product. He is also a seller whose product commands a price 
in the marketplace: 
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The ratio of exchange of two products is the reciprocal of the ratio of the 
utilities of what A gives away to what he receives and conversely to what B 
gives away to what he receives. [Soudek (1952:74)]
The labor element enters in the determination of exchange value because, for Soudek, 
Aristotle recognizes that producers are not equal;267 the source of producer inequality 
is a difference in the value of their skills: “skill is what creates inequality among 
people”.268 However, Soudek thinks that in Aristotle’s formula the value of one’s 
labor-skill is the utility that one gives away. Soudek argues that bargain secures 
equality of return because it “prevents a violation of the arithmetic proportion” of 
want-satisfactions.269 Each exchanger assigns a higher price to his/her product than 
the other exchanger does. Also, each exchanger tends to value the other exchanger’s 
product higher when he/she needs it. When their need is mutual, other things being 
equal, both exchangers will tend to settle for a mutually satisfactory price: the utility 
that A receives (A:D) will tend to equal the utility of the labor (A:C) that A gives 
away. Likewise, the utility that B receives (B:C) will tend to equal the utility of the 
labor (B:D) that B gives away.270 Hence, while Soudek recognizes the labor element 
in Aristotle’s formula, he argues that, for Aristotle, utility is the ultimate determinant 
of exchange value and, hence, the just price is the proportion at which exchangers 
achieve equality of utilities by bargaining.
iii. Mixed Views
Barry Gordon offers a reading which combines both utility and labor.271 However, 
unlike Soudek, he argues that the labor element is a necessary and irreducible 
determinant of exchange value alongside the utility element: 
Exchange ratios are determined by the interaction of two, independent 
hierarchies of worth—the order of utility and the order of labor-skill. [Gordon 
(1964:128)]
267 Hence, his reading is contrary to Meikle’s who argues that Aristotle assumes that the exchangers are 
equal, viz. A:B = 1.
268 Soudek (1952:60).
269 Ibid. 64. 
270 According to Soudek, the four terms of Aristotle’s formula (A:B::D:C) are actually four ratios: 
A=A:C; B=B:D; C=B:C; D=A:D. The ratios A:C and B:D represent the estimates of utility of their 
products (i.e. their labor-skill). The ratios B:C and A:D represent the estimates of utility of the goods 
they want to get.  
271 Gordon’s interpretation is based on Gordon (1964:115-28).
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Let me present his reading in outline. According to Gordon, the formula ‘as builder is 
to shoemaker…’ contains two independent ratios: the producer ratio A:B, which is 
their labor-skill and/or cost of production, and the product ratio D:C, which is the 
utility of products. He agrees with Soudek that prices are formed via bargain and that 
χρεία is ‘want-satisfaction’ or subjective utility. However, each exchanger assesses 
the value of his/her product in terms of the costs expended and their labor-skill, not 
utility. Hence, for Gordon:
Justice is done and hence exchange will occur where the ratio of exchange 
between the two goods concerned is such as to equate the two persons both as 
sellers (hence the cost factor) and as buyers (hence the utility element). 
[Gordon (1964:123)] 
Exchangers finalize a trade when they think that it is to their interest to exchange or 
buy a product, viz. the cost of what they give away does not exceed the utility they 
will receive. In other words, the just price is the proportion at which each exchanger 
equalizes his/her costs and utilities. Gordon supports his reading that labor is 
irreducible to utility by citing textual evidence where Aristotle appears to hold that 
labor-skill should be evaluated by non-economic criteria.272 For example, he cites the 
passage Pol. 1258b37-40 where Aristotle censures the lower occupations 
independently from their market valuations. However, Aristotle does not discuss 
further how to measure the labor of producers or whether the occupational rankings 
have an “autonomous impact on the formation of market price”, as Gordon claims.273 
Also, Gordon does not explain how the two determinants of value combine in the 
formula so that A:B::D:C=1, given that in his reading they are two independent and 
incommensurate standards of value.
272 Gordon (1964:125) argues that skills cannot be evaluated by the want-satisfaction (or pleasure) they 
are supposed to produce because he thinks that for Aristotle “[t]he end of art is not pleasure, so that 
skills cannot be evaluated by a subjective and ever-varying property of products like want-satisfaction, 
since there is no necessary connection involved.” He cites evidence from NE 1153a24-5, Rhet. 1355b8-
14, the rankings of occupations from Pol. 1258b33-40, and the non-economic judgments of medicine, 
see e.g. Pol. 1281b40-1282a5.
273 Ibid. 127.
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iv. Scott Meikle 
According to Scott Meikle,274 the ratio of just exchange must be such that both the 
producers and their products are equal, viz. A:B=1 and D:C=1. His solution is that, 
first, different and unequal producers are equal, viz. the ratio of producers is A:B=1, 
by assumption.275 He thinks that this assumption is necessary for the following 
reasons. First, he argues that Aristotle’s concern is not the equality of the producers 
but the equality of their products. Second, he thinks that if the worth of the producers 
determined the price of products, and the builder’s worth were twice the worth of the 
shoemaker, then the ratio of exchange between shoes and houses should be the 
implausible ratio of two shoes for one house. Hence, third, the just price is D=C (or 
D:C=1) only when D is multiplied by some standard of value (x) (xD=C or xD:C=1) 
in order to calculate how many shoes (D) equal one house (C). 
However, Meikle argues that χρεία is not this standard because of the metaphysical 
gap between quality and quantity—or use value and exchange value respectively. He 
rejects the interpretation that ‘with reference to χρεία products may become 
commensurate sufficiently’ is Aristotle’s solution to the problem of 
commensurability.276 He argues that while χρεία is objective ‘need’, χρεία cannot be 
the standard that equates incommensurable goods because need pertains to humans, 
whereas the problem of commensurability pertains to goods.277 For Meikle, economic 
value is “a matter of the natural properties of the artefact or product. Objects such as 
hammers, grain, loaves, or houses, are useful for particular purposes, and they are 
designed and made in order to meet particular needs”.278 On that score, commercial 
justice would require that objects be commensurate in terms of a common property 
that Aristotle fails to discover. In addition, Meikle rejects the labor reading because it 
assumes that A:B≠1, whereas Meikle claims that A:B=1 by assumption. Moreover, he 
argues that the slave-based economy of Aristotle’s time obscured from him the fact 
274 His interpretation is based on Meikle (1991a) and (1995) chapter 7. 
275 Hence, Meikle (1991a:194) and (1995) chap.7 is in agreement with Van Johnson (1939:451) who 
argues that “[w]hen Aristotle says that the persons must be equated, he means only that for purposes of 
exchange no account is to be taken of any inequality of status; they stand as equals in exchange as soon 
as their commodities are equalized”.
276 Meikle (1995:25-26).
277 Ibid. 25. 
278 Ibid. 9.
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that the economic value of a good consists of the labor expended for producing it.279 
He also rejects the social-status reading because social status cannot be quantified.280 
4.3 Critical Discussion
Subjectivist interpretations hold that prices are determined in the marketplace by 
bargain on the basis of utility and the just price is the proportion of quantities at which 
the utility of exchangers is equally satisfied. On the other hand, objectivist 
interpretations contend that the just price is the proportion of quantities at which the 
value of producers is equalized.
4.3.1 As Builder is to Shoemaker 
i. The Objectivist Interpretation
Critics of the social-status reading rightly complain that it is a non-quantitative gloss 
of the ratio A:B because the purpose of the formula is to represent the quantities of 
products numerically.281 Even if we managed to quantify social-status, for instance, 
even if we said that the builder somehow ranked thrice above the shoemaker, i.e. 3:1, 
as Meikle says, it would be implausible to claim that the builder should receive three 
pairs of shoes in return for one house.282 In this respect, labor-time is a more plausible 
suggestion. In NE 1133b23-27 Aristotle says that one house equals five beds.283 In 
this illustration, Aristotle may reasonably register the ratio between builder and 
shoemaker—i.e. A:B=1:5 could represent the quantities produced in a certain period 
of labor-time.284 A plausible alternative is to combine the ‘socially determined’ ratio 
of products with labor- time: 
For each occupation (or even individual) there is a “socially determined” 
ranking so that if, let us say, a builder is “worth” or “esteemed” or “needs” 
twice as much as a cobbler, then, on the average over a period of time, the 
value created by the builder must be twice the value created by the cobbler. If 
279 Meikle (1995:133) is based on Marx (1867):“There was, however, an important fact which 
prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing 
all labour as equal human labour, and consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was 




282 This is a problem recognized by Meikle (1991a) and (1995:137).
283 Aristotle does not say whether his example registers the going market price at the time or whether it 
is hypothetical.
284 The proposed standard here is quantity of products per labor-time.
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on the average the builder constructs one house during a time period while the 
cobbler makes 500 pairs of shoes during a similar time period, then one house 
equals 1,000 pairs of shoes. Thus, if one house is valued at $10,000, one pair 
of shoes will be worth $10. [Wilson (1975:65)]
In this arrangement, if society ranks the work of builder twice as high as the work of 
the shoemaker (viz. A:B=2:1) and the shoemaker produced 100 shoes during the time 
needed to build one house, then one house should cost 2*100 shoes, namely, 200 
shoes. This would be a quantitative way to calculate the proportion of house to shoes 
but it is not clear that Aristotle has a social weighing system of different kinds of 
work in mind. 
While it is very difficult to find direct evidence basis for the work factor in Aristotle’s 
text,285 there is some contrary evidence in the Rhetoric (1363a3-4), the Politics 
(1258b36-39), and the Magna Moralia (1193b38-1194a25) which suggests that 
economic value also depends on non-utility factors.286 Although the Rhetoric and the 
Topics are not economic writings per se, they provide evidence that Aristotle was 
aware of basic economic regularities. For example, in a neglected passage from the 
Rhetoric he holds:
… That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere 
fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end... 
(Rhet. 1363a3-4)
In this passage, Aristotle says that labor imparts use value (viz. good qua utility) in an 
object and makes it desirable.287 Hence, the labor expended to produce a good might 
create demand and, hence, affect the price of a good. Aristotle traces the relationship 
between production/labor and demand further in passages like the following:
What is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful. Thus, gold is a better 
thing than iron, though less useful: it is harder to get, and therefore more worth 
getting. (Rhet. 1365b19-20)
…[We] appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily 
acquired. (Top. 117b29-30) 
285 Finley (1970:10), Meikle (1991a:193-5), Judson (1997:170), Miller (1995:392-93).
286 The Magna Moralia passage makes a clear case about a labor-based theory of justice but this 
evidence is not conclusive because the Magna Moralia is not considered an authentic work of 
Aristotle’s or it is considered as a post-Aristotelian treatise. 
287 Aristotle here recognizes a connection between labor and utility. 
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Here the rarity of a good and the difficulty—or the effort/toil—of acquiring it increase 
its appeal, viz. other things being equal, these factors increase the demand for that 
good.288 It appears that Aristotle was aware that labor co-determines the price of 
things that have exchange value.289 As he says above, there might be high demand for 
rare goods, like gold, and low demand for plentiful goods, like iron or water. Also, 
there is good reason to think that the labor factor is indispensable in the interpretation 
of the formula of just price. For if the value of exchangers’ work is not compensated 
properly—e.g. due to exploitation—the institution of exchange which binds citizens 
together (NE 1132b34) would fall apart. In my view, then, the fact that χρεία is the 
factor that brings different producers into proportion does not rule out that Aristotle 
groped for a second determinant of value, that is, their work (the ratio A:B).
But what would be the relationship of A:B to D:C in the formula of just price? The 
first possibility is that A:B should determine the price of goods D:C. The second is 
that labor-skill/cost A:B and utility D:C are independent variables that need to be 
equalized (Gordon’s proposal). Third, the value (χρεία; utility) of products D:C 
should determine the value of work A:B (Soudek, Hardie, Scaltsas). Fourth, A:B is 
1:1 by assumption (Meikle). Let me discuss these glosses in order. 
Aristotle warns that the price of products must be set when exchangers are in equal 
position to bargain, not on the basis of the value of labor: 
…[W]e must not bring them into a figure of proportion when they have 
already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both excesses), but when 
they still have their own goods. (NE 1133b1-3)
Producers, Aristotle says, are not only different qualitatively—since farmers, doctors, 
carpenters, shoemakers perform different functions—but also unequal quantitatively 
(καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων; NE 1133a17). Then, Aristotle argues that unequal and 
different producers should be equated (ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι; NE 1133a17) 
288 ‘Useful’ here refers to whatever provides utility including such things as prestige. See Gordon 
(1965) for passages that link use value with demand. 
289 It stands to reason to assume that for Aristotle a useless device, like a DVD rewinder, has no 
exchange value, no matter the labor and technology expended for its production. Nonetheless, labor is a 
necessary determinant of value in the sense that all goods with exchange value are also products of 
human labor.
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when they still have their own goods (ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν). That is, producers 
should be equated when they have their own goods and when they need one another’s 
product equally (NE 1133a26-28). Hence, the equality between producers has to be 
effected by bargain when each exchanger has one’s own goods; it would not matter 
whether exchangers have their own goods unless they would have to bargain. 
Aristotle insists that the relative value of different works should not be taken into 
account after the bargain probably because the higher-ranking work (ἔργον) already 
commands a higher price.290 So, using this inequality to determine the price D:C 
independently of the bargain process would benefit the superior producer. 291  Hence, 
while the value of work should be compensated, the just price should not be based on 
their labor/costs. Hence, (1) and (2) are not plausible readings of the labor/cost 
factor.292 
Also, Aristotle does not seem to think, as Meikle proposes, that A:B equals 1:1 by 
assumption. Meikle argues that only the products (or έργα) should be equated (δεῖ οὖν 
ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι). But Aristotle says that producers should be equated by their mutual 
need for the purpose of exchange (ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι refers to producers). I 
agree with Finley that Aristotle would not assume that producers are “equal as 
persons but different (only) in their products” just to conclude that “one pair of ratios 
[the ratio of producers] does not in fact exist”.293 Hence, reading (4) should be 
rejected, too. 
In sum, the bargain reading receives support from the following considerations: (a) 
Aristotle’s prerequisite that exchangers have equal need for one another’s product; (b) 
290 Different works (ἔργα) are unequal in the sense of being better or superior (οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει 
κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου). The passage is the following: “If, then, first there is 
proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention will be 
effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work of 
the one being better than that of the other; they must therefore be equated” (NE 1133a10-14). For 
discussion see Danzig (2000:415-21).
291 Ross (1925:114n3) interpretation of NE 1133b1-3 adopts the bargain reading: “One party will have 
both ‘excesses’ over the other, since what he gets will exceed the mean and what the other man gets 
will fall short of it. The only fair method is for each to set a value of his own and on the other’s goods 
before they exchange, and come to an agreement if they can”. The ‘mean’ is the price that reflects the 
value of the superior product. 
292 Gordon’s gloss (2) takes labor-skill/cost to be an irreducible factor. But how could we equalize two 
different variables (the costs and utilities of exchangers as Gordon suggests) unless they are 
commensurate? There has to be a third, common standard or to reduce utility into labor and vice versa.  
293 Finley (1970:9).
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Aristotle’s prerequisite that exchangers negotiate the proportion before the exchange, 
when they both have their own goods; (c) the fact that things are not strictly 
commensurable but only relative to the need (χρεία) of exchangers (NE 1133b18-20). 
Hence, what is the role of the producer ratio A:B in the formula? Should the work of 
producers be measured by the utility they command in the marketplace alone? I 
examine the third gloss in 4.3.2.
ii. The Utility Reading
According to the utility reading, reciprocity is equality of want-satisfactions and this 
can be achieved only by bargain when no exchanger is a price-maker. In this respect, 
if the wants or utilities of exchangers are satisfied at a proportion of, say, 100 pairs of 
shoes = 1 house, then that proportion is just. However, the bargain reading implies 
that a variety of other prices (e.g. 1 house = 80 shoes or 120 shoes, etc.) would be just 
too as far as the exchangers are, first, equally satisfied by the price and, second, 
agreed on it voluntarily. 
Let us see some implications of this interpretation. Suppose that the just price is 
equality of want-satisfactions. Would, then, unequal satisfaction be a sign that the 
price is not just? It would not be surprising if greedy exchangers were dissatisfied 
with a fair price because they usually want to grasp more than their due share. Since 
the greedy person will hardly be satisfied with a fair price—for greed, as Aristotle 
analyzes it, is the disposition to gain what is not one’s own (NE 1130a32-b5)—, how 
could we say that such a person gained justly/unjustly? The utility reading offers no 
clear baseline for distinguishing profiteering and extortion from fair exchange.294 If 
the equality of want-satisfactions and agreement to pay a price were the sole arbiters 
of justice, Aristotle’s analysis of undue gain/loss (NE 1133a18-20) would not make 
much sense. Let us see an example: 
If Croesus has been able to buy all the corn and will sell it to me only at 
exorbitant rates that will reduce me nearly to destitution, I may be willing to 
pay a huge price for corn because I correctly judge that I need it to stay alive; 
but does that make it a just transaction with Croesus? These problems would 
be solved if Aristotle could show how degree of need can be determined 
294 Some exchangers may also be unable to calculate the utility they command in the marketplace or be 
tricked by other exchangers about the value of their own product.
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without reference to the conditions of supply and demand. [Irwin 
(19988:626n11)]
In this example the buyers of corn will have satisfied their need to an equal extent 
with the corn-dealer’s utility but we want to say that the monopolist cornered the 
market and took advantage of buyers. Aristotle seems to be prepared for more than 
one just price since he says that exchangers construct the price by bargain on the basis 
of their need (χρεία). But the utility interpretation offers no ground to complain for 
profiteering. 295 If Aristotle thought that the equality of subjective utilities is the only 
arbiter of just price, the ratio of producers A:B would be redundant. The fact that he 
insists on equating the producers suggests that their equality is neither assumed nor 
unimportant. Even if the equality of their work is cashed in terms of the utility they 
offer, the crucial question is whether this is subjective utility because Aristotle knew 
that the market prices are often formed by price-makers and, most importantly, 
markets do not compensate one’s work consistently. In my view, Aristotle insists on 
equating the producers qua their work (labor time, cost of production or skill) too 
because he thinks that the work of producers must be compensated. So, the question is 
how the producer ratio A:B should be interpreted if: first, the work factor has a role in 
the formula of just price; second, the producers should be equated by bargain on the 
basis of the utility they offer; third, the work of producers must be compensated in the 
marketplace but not solely by reference to subjective ‘utility’ (or supply and demand). 
Judson’s gloss of χρεία αs ‘objective need’ seems to offer an objective way to 
compensate the toil-based deserts of producers—without reference to the forces of 
supply and demand. For Judson, certain goods command a higher price than others 
because they satisfy objectively stronger needs. So, the just price is the proportion that 
satisfies the objectively ranked utilities equally; the value of one’s work A:B should 
be compensated according to the strength of need that one’s product satisfies. 
However, in the Rhetoric Aristotle offers an analysis of comparisons of utility which 
shows that χρεία is not about objective needs only. For example, he traces a 
relationship between the utility of a good with conspicuous consumption, i.e. with 
what seems to be good: “Again, those things which we are seen to possess are better 
295 Irwin (1988:626n11) explains this implication of the subjectivist interpretation of χρεία: if χρεία “is 
understood conatively”,…then “if X is willing to pay the price Y asks, he has no ground for complaint 
of unfairness or injustice”.
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than those which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the air of reality” 
(Rhet. 1365b14-15). Also, in the Topics he says “Another rule is that the more 
conspicuous good is more desirable than the less conspicuous...” (Top. 117b28). That 
is, the more conspicuous the consumption of a good, the higher the demand for that 
good. It is implausible to think that Aristotle’s analysis of just price would depart 
from the actual workings of price formation. Nor do we find evidence for Judson’s 
idea that things of high use value command higher prices. In fact, Aristotle is aware 
that, other things being equal, there is lower demand for plentiful things, like water, 
with high use value. That is, for Aristotle, prices vary with scarcity. Also, in a much-
neglected passage, Aristotle argues that demand (the expression of χρεία) is not over 
necessities alone and, as a matter of fact, there might be higher demand for 
superfluous goods:
Also, superfluities are better than necessities, and are sometimes more 
desirable as well; for the good life is better than mere life, and good life is a 
superfluity, whereas mere life itself is a necessity. Sometimes, though, what is 
better is not also more desirable; for there is no necessity that because it is 
better it should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is better 
than to make money, but it is not more desirable for a man who lacks the 
necessities of life. (Top. 118a6-10)
Hence, the superfluous goods may command a higher price. Like in the gold/iron 
paradox, Aristotle here recognizes that there must be ‘felt’ demand for the utility of a 
good, including both superfluities and necessities. If this interpretation is correct, then 
Judson’s ‘objectively-ranked’ need is not a plausible interpretation of A:B in 
Aristotle’s formula. 
Χρεία most likely means both ‘need’ and ‘want’. Aristotle thought that there is an 
objective ranking of χρεία for some goods based on what is ‘necessary’ (see Met. 
1015a20). On the other hand, he uses χρεία as ‘felt’ desire in the context of NE 
1133b18-20 because his analysis of just price is concerned with all exchangeable 
goods for which there is demand.296 It is highly unlikely that Aristotle’s analysis of 
just price is limited to the exchange of necessities alone. Rather, χρεία represents 
demand based on all types of desire, viz. wants and needs. Hence, it is implausible to 
296 However, the thirsty person’s need for water is stronger than the person who is not thirsty. Hence, I 
disagree with Judson (1997) who argues that χρεία is not about felt demand but about needs only and 
that prices are determined by a ranking of the strength of needs. 
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say that, for Aristotle, χρεία is ‘market demand’. This is a technical term of modern 
economic theory which refers to subjective utility (or wants) alone.
In sum, I have rejected the following readings of Aristotle’s formula (a) commercial 
justice as equality of want-satisfactions alone, (b) commercial justice as equality of 
labor/costs alone, and (c) commercial justice as equality of objective need-satisfaction. 
Also, I have rejected the reading (d) that the ratio A:B should be reducible to 
subjective utility. In the following section, I will present an alternative interpretation 
of Aristotle’s formula which is partly based on Gordon’s and Judson’s readings and 
explains the role of (A:B) in the formula. 
4.3.2 A Proposal
As I have analyzed it, equality of want-satisfactions is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of commercial justice unless we accept that for Aristotle there is a wide 
range of ‘just’ prices constructed by exchangers on the basis of their subjective utility 
alone.297 The possibility of a narrow range of just prices has not been examined by 
scholars so far who usually understand Aristotle’s formula as an algorithm for finding 
the mean in a transaction. But where would the limit of this range lie? We may turn to 
Adam Smith’s theory of natural price for help in order to explain the role of ratio 
(A:B) in Aristotle’s formula:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices 
of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may 
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force 
them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which 
hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continuance, they are 
constantly tending towards it. [WN (I.vii.15)]
297 Soudek’s interpretation implies a wide variety of ‘just’ prices constructed by exchangers in a variety 
of circumstances, whereas Aristotle should assume that there is only a limited range of fair prices for 
every product; this is the only way he could object to undue gains from profiteering, artificial 
monopolies, etc., and, most importantly, the vice of greed (particular injustice). Judson (1997:160) 
notes this implication of Soudek’s interpretation. However, he does not explain why this is at odds with 
Aristotle’s theory of justice. In my view, without a limited range of long-run prices, how could the 
analyst of commercial justice determine whether the greedy exchanger received and transferred 
unequal amounts of value to the other exchanger? In principle, there could be equality of want-
satisfaction at an unfair price and inequality of want-satisfaction at a fair price. 
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In a general way, the natural price is the price toward which market prices converge in 
the long-run when left unsuspended by accidents. But how does Smith describe 
natural price and why does he call it ‘natural’? 
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is 
sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of 
the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according 
to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its 
natural price. The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for 
what it really costs the person who brings it to market… Though the price, 
therefore, which leaves him this profit [i.e. his revenue, the proper fund of his 
subsistence] is not always the lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his 
goods, it is the lowest at which he is likely to sell them for any considerable 
time; at least where there is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade 
as often as he pleases. (WN I.vii.4-6)
Smith says here that the natural price is the real cost of bringing a product to the 
market. It is also the lowest price that the seller could keep on charging for any 
considerable time and includes revenue at the level of subsistence. Any cause due to 
which market prices would deviate from this baseline can be considered as accidental 
and temporary. Smith does not explain why he uses the term ‘natural’. One possibility 
is that he contrasts ‘natural’ with ‘artificial’. In this respect, the natural price results 
when competition between buyers and sellers is unobstructed or unrestrained by 
profiteers or governments. Occasional fluctuations of prices are deviations from the 
natural price but prices tend towards the natural price in the long-run.298 The notion of 
‘natural’ price is also tied to Smith’s view of natural teleology—the purposes of 
nature: 
…[T]he goals of nature are the self-preservation of individuals and the 
propagation of species, goals humans pursue with divided labor under bonds 
of mutual dependence, facilitated by exchange and hence prices. The natural 
price of a commodity is the price that supports nature’s goals by providing for 
the maintenance of those who participate in production and supply in a manner 
that is just sufficient for these activities to continue indefinitely. [Andrews 
(2014:3)] 
298Variations in supply (e.g. shortages), artificial or coercive monopolies, government intervention, etc., 
distort competition. The natural price is the price that results from perfect competition in the 
marketplace undistorted by accidents or coercion. We may understand the concept of natural price by 
recalling the modern idea of perfect competition and equilibrium price: when supply equals demand the 
price is the equilibrium point where the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. 
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For Smith, commercial exchange and the division of labor are necessary for the 
fulfillment of the human ends of survival, social cohesion and the propagation of 
species. The natural price allows producers to continue production and customers to 
purchase goods. As a whole, the natural price allows the system of exchange to 
continue and fulfill the natural ends of humans. 
There is no evidence that Aristotle holds a theory of natural price like Smith’s but his 
analysis of just price bears a striking resemblance with it. First, for Aristotle, too, the 
just prices of goods seem to be the prices formed by a system of market exchange 
which aims at true wealth; it closes the gaps in natural self-sufficiency and holds a 
community together. Presumably, if there is no commercial justice, the system of 
exchange in Aristotle’s natural economy may eventually collapse, thus threatening the 
cohesion of the city. Second, Aristotle’s just price is the price at which each 
exchanger equalizes the amount of value he/she transfers through his/her work with 
the amount of value he/she receives as utility. Smith’s natural price consists of the 
value of one’s work (e.g. the labor-time or cost-of-production plus revenue for 
subsistence), too. A third similarity is that the just price, like the natural price, results 
from undistorted competition. Smith’s natural price results from a competitive market 
undistorted from accidents or interventions that affect supply and demand. In 
Aristotle’s barter examples, when the need of exchangers is mutual, no exchanger is a 
price-maker. In this respect, bargain resembles to perfectly competitive markets. 
Lastly, the just price is the price at which exchangers receive and transfer equivalent 
amounts of value; the natural price is the equilibrium point where the quantity 
demanded equals the quantity supplied—there is no waste or shortage of money and 
goods.
Smith’s notion of natural price offers a neat way to interpret Aristotle’s formula 
without ignoring the work factor. We saw that the ratio A:B represents the relative 
value of producers and the ratio D:C represents the price of products. In my reading, 
the ratio A:B should not determine the price of goods D:C because exchangers need to 
bargain in order to achieve equality of need-satisfaction. On the other hand, Aristotle 
needs a limit on agreed prices because the ‘market’ may not compensate the costs, toil 
or skill-based deserts of exchangers, at least, at the level of subsistence. I propose that 
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the ratio A:B expresses the natural prices of products and its role is to offer the limit 
on the market prices expressed by D:C. Since the natural price contains the value of 
producers’ work and expenses, Aristotle’s ratio A:B could be an analogue to Smith’s 
natural price. It could be the central price around which ‘agreed’ market prices should 
oscillate in order to be fair. Hence, the meaning of the formula ‘as builder is to 
shoemaker, so many shoes for one house’ of NE 1133a22-23 is that market prices D:C 
should oscillate as close to the natural price of products A:B as possible. This price 
secures the transfer of equivalent amounts of value, that is, the utility of what each 
one receives and offers. Hence, the labor/cost/skill of producers is compensated. The 
ratio A:B is the utility of each producer’s work in the long-run.
One may object that it is not clear from Aristotle’s corpus that the ratio A:B is 
reducible to utility. As Gordon points out, there is contrary evidence which shows that 
products and services are evaluated by non-economic standards, not by their utility. 
As we saw in chapter three, Aristotle ranks the practical and productive arts in accord 
with their contribution to the natural ends of survival, happiness and leisure299 and 
with their being necessary or noble occupations. Since servile and manual occupations 
do not involve advanced cognitive skills, they could not be compensated equally with 
noble occupations which require advanced cognitive skills. However, Aristotle’s 
solution to the problem of commensurability shows that producers are equated qua the 
χρεία they satisfy. Yet, I depart from the utility reading because I suggest that χρεία is 
not the whimsical, subjective utility of the individual exchanger; nor is it the utility of 
objective needs as Judson suggests. It is the utility of the labor of producers reflecting 
a society’s stronger wants and needs in the long-run. This should be the total utility 
expressing a society’s needs and wants, neither in the objective sense of necessities, 
nor in the subjective sense of the marginal utility of the individual person. In a general 
way, the total utility of a good is registered in its long-term market price, viz. the price 
that is free from accidents in supply and demand, interventions and monopolies.
Another objection is that the use value or utility of a good should not be relative to the 
preferences of exchangers, as the bargain reading suggests. According to Meikle, the 
299 The non-utilitarian character of some of Aristotle’s evaluative criteria of the arts is evident in 
passages as that of Metaphysics 981b14-24.
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use value of a good is a function of the nature of the good as substance qua 
substance.300  If the use value of a good is a function of its nature—not a function of 
preferences—, then different things like shoes and houses have different use values in 
virtue of their having different proper uses. For Meikle, Aristotle’s view of use value 
rests on his metaphysics of the Categories: the use value of goods belongs to the 
category of quality and is not quantifiable. Obviously, Meikle’s reading is in stark 
contrast with the neoclassical rendering of use value as utility subjectively construed. 
Unsurprisingly, he finds fault with the gloss of χρεία as ‘demand’ and argues that by 
χρεία Aristotle means ‘need’ not ‘want’.301 In addition, exchange value, according to 
Meikle’s reading, belongs to the category of quantity. He thinks that since use value 
and exchange value belong to distinct categories (the first belongs to the category of 
quality and exchange value belongs to the category of quantity), he infers that there is 
an unbridgeable gap between use value and prices.302 The upshot of Meikle’s reading 
is that use values cannot determine the prices of goods—because they are qualities 
and, hence, non-quantitative. Hence, for Meikle, Aristotle fails to solve the problem 
of commensurability. He thinks that Aristotle admits his failure when he says that “it 
is impossible for such different things to become commensurable” (NE 1133b18-19). 
In other words, Meikle argues, Aristotle fails to explain exchange value in terms of 
use value. 
Meikle downplays Aristotle’s solution because he thinks that χρεία is strictly speaking 
not a solution to the metaphysical problem of commensurability. In my view, his 
reading cannot be correct because Aristotle is interested in commensurability in 
relation to persons, not in the abstract; he seeks an answer to how strictly 
incommensurable things could be comparable qua human need. Meikle’s formulation 
of the problem of incommensurability makes it intractable. He asks (A) “How 
different products can be strictly commensurable in the first place” instead of asking 
(B) “How, or from what point of view, products can be treated as commensurable 
enough to allow exchange” (1995:36-7). A commentator argues: 
300 The following sketch of Meikle’s interpretation is based on Meikle (1995) chapter 1. For a detailed 
discussion of Meikle’s interpretation see Miller (1998) esp. pp. 388-90 and Politis (1999). In Meikle’s 
reading, if the use value of a good is independent from the subjective preferences of exchangers, then it 
is objective and non-relational.
301 Meikle (1995:121).
302 For apt reviews of Meikle’s interpretation see Miller (1998) and Politis (1999). 
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If anything is characteristic of Aristotle's metaphysics, it is surely the 
invention of the logical qua and putting this to the use of reconciling identity 
and difference: X is different from Y qua R, but identical qua S. So Aristotle 
would be well equipped to deal with question (B), and he may have thought 
that question (A) was as misguided as he thought was Parmenides' question of 
how different things (e.g., shapes, colours, etc.) can strictly be the same (e.g., a 
man). In sum, I doubt whether things tout court can be commensurable or 
incommensurable; what is commensurable or incommensurable is rather 
things treated in a certain way or from a certain point of view. But to think this 
is quite compatible with thinking that things have a nature which is not 
relative to a point of view. [Politis (1999:281)]. 
Hence, if the question is (B), then the gap between use value and exchange value is 
not unbridgeable because strictly incommensurable things are commensurable qua 
human need. Aristotle does not wonder whether one house should equal five beds in 
some objective sense, that is, independently from the needs of exchangers. There is no 
evidence that he associated commercial justice with some inherent property of goods 
that can be quantified and used as the algorithm of fair exchange. The challenge for 
Aristotle was to find out how reciprocity could be achieved in a bargain since, in any 
bargain, one exchanger could be the price-maker. He seems to trust that a bargain 
based on mutual need is a form of bilateral monopoly which leads to the transfer of 
equivalent amounts of value—utility and work. 
4.4 Conclusion and Summary
While Aristotle may not have aimed at offering an analysis of price formation per se, 
he groped the origins of economic value and price in isolated, two-party exchanges 
due to his normative concerns. That is, he sought to explain what determines the price 
of products in order to answer the Just Price Question, i.e. when the transfer of value 
between two exchangers is equitable. I argued that the just price is the price at which 
the market price of a good D:C approximates its natural price A:B. This is Aristotle’s 
answer to Master Question (3). Commercial exchange is a fair mode of acquisition as 
long as the exchangers agree at a market price that is within the bounds of the natural 
prices of goods.
As we see in the next chapter, Aristotle’s analysis of economic value answers to the 
following ethical question: does business profit come at the expense of buyers? Most 
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commentators argue that Aristotle’s critique of business rests on the assumption that 
traders and middlemen must sell in excess of the just price in order to gain. However, 
the standard interpretation is at odds with my reading. I turn now to examine this 




The Ethics of Business Profit
Overview
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss Aristotle’s ethical critique of business 
(exchange for-profit) in order to understand his complete answer to the Master 
Question (2.a) with regard to the commercial modes of chrematistics. For most 
commentators, Aristotle maintains that trade is a zero-sum economic practice. Hence, 
one’s business profit can be had only at the expense of others. Despite the popularity 
of this reading, actually there is only one passage where Aristotle appears to link 
business with injustice directly:
…Trade [μεταβλητική] is not in accord with nature, but is from one another 
(Pol. 1258b2)303 
According to this reading, the ‘canonical’ interpretation hereafter, business is a 
structurally unjust mode of chrematistics because commercial profit violates the just 
price.304 It is surprising that this interpretation overlooks the strong contrary evidence 
in Aristotle’s writings where he appears to approve certain business practices, such as 
the trade of surpluses, foreign trade (ἐμπορία; empôria), manufacture for trade, 
commercial agriculture, and trade based on μεταλευτική and ύλοτομία, i.e. the third 
kind of chrematistics. Furthermore, his discussion of Thales’ monopolistic ploy is not 
clearly derogatory. Moreover, in Pol. II.11 he praises Carthage, a commercial 
economy, but not Sparta (Pol. II.9) which was an agrarian economy. Elsewhere, 
Aristotle also says: “public revenues should be distributed among the poor…as to 
enable them to make a beginning in commerce or farming” (Pol. 1320a35-38). Also, 
like his teacher Plato, nowhere does Aristotle suggest to prohibit commerce. 
303 See also: “Now in the course of nature the art of agriculture is prior, and next come those arts which 
extract the products of the earth, mining and the like. Agriculture ranks first because of its justice; for it 
does not take anything away from men, either with their consent, as do retail trading and the 
mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the warlike arts.” Econ. 1343a25-30. On the other hand, in 
Pol. I.9 and I.11 Aristotle does not classify barter, trade with money as a stand-in, and the third kind of 
chrematistics, in the class of unjust forms of chrematistics.
304 We saw that in reciprocal exchanges each exchanger should give away and receive the same amount 
of value (NE V.5).  
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To understand Aristotle’s answer to the Master Question (2.a) with regard to 
commercial chrematistics, I examine the argument about the injustice of business 
profit as the canonical interpretation of Pol. 1258a38-b2 forwards it. This reading is at 
odds with the pro-business evidence and I argue that it is not the correct rendering of 
Aristotle’s critique of business. In effect, I propose an alternative way to understand 
this passage. In section 5.1, I reconstruct and present the canonical interpretation 
which holds that business profit can be had only unfairly, viz. when the trader exceeds 
the just price. In section 5.2, I critically examine the canonical interpretation. I explain 
that this reading cannot square the Pol. 1258a38-b2 passage with the following: first, 
Aristotle’s conception of economic value; second, the fact that Aristotle does not 
censure all M-C-M trade; three, the pro-business evidence. In section 5.3, I propose a 
way to square these conditions. I argue that in this passage Aristotle objects to 
καπηλική because it is the parasitic kind of business that profits from the exchange 
itself, not from production. My interpretation helps explain why Aristotle allows that 
some forms of business profit are not contrary to justice: they are not parasitic. In 
addition, while he disapproves of the mercantile life for the citizens of the best city, 
he relaxes his strictures for citizens of less ideal regimes as long as their business 
practices are not parasitic. However, his main objection to business remains: the 
mercantile life is a life devoted to the increase of wealth; this is not the good life. 
5.1 The Canonical Interpretation
In this section I present the canonical interpretation of Pol. 1258a38-b2 which holds 
that, for Aristotle, business is a structurally unjust economic practice.305 
5.1.1. The Argument from the Injustice of Business Profit
For most commentators the passage 1258a38-b2 points out that business profit can be 
had only at the expense of others (the gain is άπ’ άλλήλων): 
But, as we said, there are two kinds of wealth acquisition [χρηματιστική]. One 
has to do with commerce [καπηλική], the other with household management. 
The latter is necessary and commendable, but the kind that has to do with 
305 We see this orthodox understanding of Aristotle on business in ages of anti-market thinking. 
Medieval church fathers, Karl Marx, Marxists, even communitarians, like Alasdair MacIntyre, all have 
denounced business profit as an exploitative practice, and all claim to draw inspiration from Aristotle. 
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exchange [μεταβλητική] is justly disparaged, since it is not natural but is from 
one another. (1258a38-b2)
…διπλῆς δ’ οὔσης αὐτῆς [i.e. χρηματιστική], ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν 
καπηλικῆς τῆς δ’ οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινουμένης, 
τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ 
ἀλλήλων ἐστίν)… 
Most interpreters combine (a) the zero-sum view of trade: one’s profit is another’s 
loss; (b) Aristotle’s Definition of Profit (ΝΕ 1132b11-17): profit is “having more than 
one’s own”; 306 (c) Aristotle’s Justice Principle: ‘the just is a mean between profit and 
loss’ (ΝΕ 1132b18-20); they infer that traders can only make money by taking from 
others—the buyers. This is a roughly the argument for the injustice of profit according 
to the canonical interpretation. I re-state it fully at 5.1.1. For the moment, let us start 
with some notable instances of this interpretation:
His [i.e. Aristotle’s] point seems to be that although trade 'produces' goods in 
the sense of providing them for the trader in the form of profit, the appearance 
that profit gives of being new wealth, generated over and above what is 
already in circulation, is an illusion. Trade is a zero-sum game of exchanges, 
in which the trader is parasitic: he does not produce goods 'in the full sense'; 
only (a) [i.e. natural κτητική] can do that. [Saunders (2002:94)]
Its end [i.e. καπηλική] is not the “natural requirements of self-sufficiency” but 
the acquisition of money without limit. Such acquisition—we should say 
‘profit’—is made “not according to nature but at the expense of others” a 
phrase that echoes in reverse that “each has his own” of the Ethics… [Finley 
(1970:17); emphasis in the original)
What is wrong with chrêmatistikê, in the bad sense of kapêlikê, is its aim: that 
the trader seeks to gain at another’s loss. [Meikle (1991b:164)]307
The idea here is that buying and selling goods for profit violates commercial justice 
(viz. proportionate equality) as Aristotle portrays it in NE 1132b32-34. In contrast, 
trade for-use does not violate the principle of justice. Meikle summarizes the 
differences between trade for-use and trade for-profit as follows:308
306 As Finley (1970) notes “Its end [i.e. καπηλική] is not the “natural requirements of self-sufficiency” 
but the acquisition of money without limit. Such acquisition—we should say ‘profit’—is made “not 
according to nature but at the expense of others” a phrase that echoes in reverse that “each has his own” 
of the Ethics…” (p.17); emphasis in the original).
307 See also Meikle (1996).  
308 The first mode is barter, exchanging goods directly, without money, for example, shoes for beds. 
The second mode appeared when money became the medium of exchange: a farmer sells his surplus of 
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I. Barter; viz. direct exchange of goods between two parties
a. Commodity1—Commodity2  (C1—C2)
b. Aims at use
II. As (I), but with money as a stand-in for goods 
a. Commodity1—Money—Commodity2 (C1—M—C2)
b. Aims at use 
III. Business commerce, especially, retail trade:
a. Money1—Commodity—Money2 (M1—C—M2)
b. Aims at profit
i. Profit = Money2 – Money1, where M1 < M2  
Business trade is (III), namely, the M1-C-M2 circuit, where profit is the margin from 
M2—M1. For Meikle, this notation refers to καπηλική, whereas (I) and (II) refer to 
good μεταβλητική (trade for-use). According to Saunders, the injustice of (III) results 
as follows: 
Trading, Aristotle seems to claim, requires men to regard each other in the 
same light, and to import non-equality, which he regards as exploitative and 
unjust, into their exchange-relationships. We no longer have plain exchange at 
agreed rate x, between A and B, because B, the eventual buyer from the trader, 
who had bought from A at x, has to pay price x plus profit-and the profit will 
typically be as large as the trader can make it. The proportionate equality 
between A and B has been unjustly distorted, at B's expense-albeit by 
agreement. [Saunders (2002:89)]
Saunders said before that trade is zero-sum. Here he says that the seller—e.g. the 
retail trader—buys, for example, shoes from a shoemaker at a low price and then 
resells them to customers as much as he can make it. In particular, the trader can 
generate his margin (a) by paying the shoemaker less than the just or agreed price and 
by selling the shoes at the just price, or (b) by paying the shoemaker the just/agreed 
price and selling the shoes in excess of the just price;309 (c) the trader can also buy 
olive oil in the market, gets money, and uses this money to buy shoes. Barter and inter-household 
commerce aim at consumption or use, not for profit; so they are part of the natural economy. The third 
mode is professional commerce or business: the merchant or the middleman buys shoes from the 
shoemaker and resells them, for instance, to the carpenter for profit. For Meikle, (III) aims at unlimited 
wealth which can be had only by taking from others. He is based, for example, on Pol. 1257b20-23.
309 The just price could be the agreed price had the bargain been based on bilateral monopoly. Saunders 
(2002:90) favors an objectivist reading of just price and argues that Aristotle did not recognize that 
traders and middlemen can add value on a product, viz. the objective just price does not include 
payment for the traders’ service.
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below the just/agreed price and then sell well above it. At all events, the trader makes 
a profit by taking advantage either of the producers or of the customer or both of them. 
Another way to explain the injustice of business as ‘gain ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων’ is the 
following:
The gain is ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων; the meaning of which seems to be that the 
middlemen or tradesmen, including usurers, are conceived as getting what 
they get from others, without giving any equivalent for it in the shape of a 
commodity (χρήσιμον). [Wilson (1896:186] 
Wilson does not clarify his point further but his reading seems to be that the trader’s 
gain comes from the exchange itself, hence, from the buyer, not from the product 
itself or from production (viz. from nature). Hence, the profit is the extra value which 
corresponds to nothing useful. The middleman’s profit must come from others. 
However, Wilson does not clarify where the injustice lies. Is it because he thinks that 
goods have an objective just price that the middleman violates? Or is it because the 
middleman preys on the needs of producers and customers? 
Barker explains the problem as follows:
As Aristotle himself tells us, value depends on demand, on felt utility; it is not 
determined simply by cost of production. If it [value] were [dependent on cost 
of production], there might be a justum pretium which alone could be asked 
and taken; and if that just price were not observed by the middleman, then he 
might be regarded as living parasitically on his fellows, in giving less and 
taking more. [Barker (1906:384)]
In brief, Barker rightly says that the charge of parasitism presupposes an objective 
justum pretium. Wilson and Saunders attribute to Aristotle the following: retail traders 
and middlemen gain because they violate the objective just price of goods; they do not 
deserve payment for bringing products to the market; commercial exchanges are 
barren.
Another commentator, Van Johnson, renders gain ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων as follows:
 
…[I]n chrematistic (2) [i.e. μεταβλητική καπηλική] and probably in (3) [i.e. 
the third kind, namely, μεταλευτική and ύλοτομία] there is no room, at least in 
160
some cases, for πόνος [i.e. labor] as a source of wealth, except as a commodity, 
for ‘trade’ (i.e. καπηλική) is based on mutual cheating (ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων). 
Aristotle objects to profit, not as unearned increment, but as double gain: 
firstly, in excess of the mean; and secondly, in excess of the loser's share. The 
wealth peculiar to these kinds of acquisition is a "quantity of money" (πλήθος 
νομισμάτων), and its source is neither φύσις nor πόνος, but simple injustice. 
[Van Johnson (1939:447)]
Here Van Johnson says that the source of profit is not nature or labor but cheating. It 
is not clear why he says that the one party gains twice. He probably means that gain 
from others is not gain from others’ labor.310 Yet, Van Johnson rejects the labor 
interpretation of Aristotle.311 He holds that the mean is the price that equalizes the 
utilities of exchangers.312 In that case, the injustice of profit from καπηλική should lie 
in the fact that one party is the price-maker, not in that καπηλική inherently violates 
an objective just price.
Let us take stock. The canonical interpretation presupposes that, for Aristotle, 
products have an objective just price.313 On the other hand, those, like Van Johnson 
and Soudek, who hold that Aristotle was a subjectivist about economic value think 
that business profit can be had unjustly by cheating or taking advantage of others. 
Unfortunately, the proponents of the canonical interpretation do not state the steps of 
Aristotle’s argument for the injustice of profit clearly and fully. So, we miss out the 
details of their reading, e.g. whether Aristotle considered all exchange for-profit as a 
structurally unjust practice.314 Let us try to state these steps and supply some missing 
assumptions.
1. Commerce is a zero-sum game (Pol. 1258a38-b2)
a. Because commercial exchange is barren.
310 Van Johnson (1939:450-51) does not find the labor factor in Aristotle’s account of Exchange Value 
and he offers a subjectivist interpretation of the question. He argues that Aristotle held the utility theory 
of value, not the labor theory of value. 
311 Ibid. 450.  
312 Van Johnson does not explain what the ‘mean’ price is. Hence, it is unclear in what sense the 
cheating party gains twice. 
313 Finley (1970) thinks that the injustice of business (καπηλική) lies in that it does not aim at natural 
self-sufficiency but at unlimited wealth; taking advantage of others is the only way to pursue unlimited 
wealth. 
314 Is commercial injustice a matter of the structure of retail trade or does its structure allow for the 
pursuit of a fair, moderate profit as payment for a service rendered to buyers?    
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2. Reciprocal justice requires that each exchanger receives and transfers equal 
amounts of value 
a. “The just price is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of 
loss...it consists in having an equal amount before and after the 
transaction” (NE 1132b18-20)
3. Commercial profit is having more than one’s own after the transaction [From 
1 and 2].315
4. Hence, commercial profit violates the just price.
The canonical reading must assume that all trade is a zero-sum game. However, 
business might be a zero-sum practice in two ways. First, as Saunders says above (p. 
94), Aristotle thought that business exchange is inherently barren. That is, trade does 
not create new value. According to this reading, value can be created only by the 
natural modes of acquisition and labor, independently of the need of exchangers. On 
that score, ‘gain is ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων’ might refer to an unearned increment on the just 
price of products. The second sense is the subjectivist: business exchange is a zero-
sum game only contingently, as when one party cheats the other or when the trader 
corners the market. This conception of zero-sum games does not presuppose that trade 
is barren. On that score, ‘gain is ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων’ might refer to cheating (for example, 
adulteration of products) or to profiteering, not to violation of an objective just price. 
As Irwin notes, if χρεία is subjective and if the buyer agrees to pay the price that the 
trader asks, then the price is fair.316The second premise is familiar: commercial justice 
requires proportionate equality. The ratio of exchange must be such that each 
exchanger transfers and receives an equal amount of value. So, if one bed should 
equal ten pairs of shoes (the just price is 1:10), the carpenter must get ten pairs of 
shoes in return for one bed. He should not end up getting more value (more shoes) 
than the value he gave away (one bed). This exchange would violate the just price. 
The third premise says that traders increase what they already have only when they 
exceed the just price in an exchange since commercial exchanges are barren. Hence, 




5.1.2 The Zero-sum Assumption 
What is a zero-sum game? It is a competitive game, like gambling, with two possible 
outcomes—win and loss—where the profit of one party equals the loss of the other 
party. That is, if we subtract the profit from the loss we get zero. This notion 
presupposes that a good is scarce and, hence, contested. Let us assume that there is a 
fixed amount of a good, e.g. a pie. And suppose that two persons must share the pie in 
equal portions, namely, one half each. By subtracting the one half from the other half 
the sum is zero. This is the zero-sum idea: there is no net change in value because the 
pie is fixed and, hence, the situation is ‘barren’. 
Let me explain how business might be a zero-sum game in an objective sense. First, if 
goods have an objective just price, then business exchange is barren or zero-sum.317 
As Barker explained, when the value of goods is formed solely by the labor of 
producers, commercial exchange is barren because it cannot create new value apart 
from the value created by the labor of producers.318 We may also understand the zero-
sum idea by thinking of commerce as gambling where one player wins the amount 
that the other player loses because the amount of money is fixed. This form of the 
zero-sum assumption is objectivist and holds that there is a single just price. Hence, 
business profit constitutes a wrongful gain because the price that yields profit exceeds 
the just price. This, of course, requires the further premise that traders and middlemen 
create no value; hence, they are parasitic upon exchange.
A second rendering of the zero-sum idea is found in contemporary economics and is 
subjectivist. It holds that market exchanges are not structurally zero-sum; trade is not 
like gambling where one’s gain must be another’s loss.319 For economists, trade 
317 Child (1998:267).
318 Barker (1906:384).The prototype zero-sum view is the Marxian; see, for example, Graafland 
(2007:51-52) and Child (1998:261-64). This is a theoretical umbrella which characterizes all forms of 
market exchange as inherently zero-sum and exploitative. The prototype case is the labor/capital 
transaction where employees exchange their labor for a wage. Marx assumes that the value of labor is 
fixed and objective: labor, as a commodity, has an objective price which includes the surplus value. 
Hence, the transaction between employer and employee is zero-sum; the capitalist employer can only 
earn by paying less than the objective price, that is, by expropriating the surplus value created by the 
employee. The Marxian view of exploitation extends to all forms of market exchange including 
commerce, the market for commodities. Hence, the prototype objectivist zero-sum view is the Marxian.
319 Consider, for example, stock markets where one’s loss due to a decrease in the value of a stock is 
not another’s gain.
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generates mutual gains, a transaction surplus, because “the buyer pays less than the 
good is worth to him, and the seller receives more than it is worth to him; otherwise 
there is no incentive to trade.”320 Hence, both exchangers are better off from the 
exchange than they would be without the exchange. As economists say, when parties 
in an exchange are not price-makers, then no party ends up worse-off. This is the idea 
of Pareto-optimality.321 For example, international trade creates mutual gains. The 
profit of traders comes from the value they add by solving a problem in the supply 
side, viz. availability and distribution.322 Hence, trade is not necessarily barren. For 
economists, a transaction is zero-sum only when one’s gain is another’s loss as a 
result of profiteering, price-gouging, coercive monopolies, fraud, etc.323 In these cases, 
even if the customer agreed to pay the price because that was the reasonable thing to 
do in the circumstances, the trader’s profit is extracted at the expense of the customer; 
the trader expropriates the whole transaction surplus. I should note here that welfare 
economics provides a defense for profit-making based on the unintended 
consequences of the market mechanism on the general welfare of a society.324 
Although the entrepreneur intends to serve his/her own interest, the outcome of 
his/her pursuit also serves the interests of customers and the community as a whole.325 
This is because opportunities for profit start from allocations that are not Pareto 
efficient—e.g. a shortage in a good or service. When a business introduces a useful 
product in the market or fills up a shortage it performs a Pareto improvement; profit is 
a sign of a Pareto-improvement.326 For the subjectivist, there is a variety of fair prices 
320 Cowan & Rizzo (1994:12). 
321 This idea draws from the notion of Pareto-optimality, that is, allocations of resources which are not 
zero-sum. In principle, no party in a commercial exchange becomes worse-off, except when one party 
is a price-taker or cheats. This idea draws from the notion of Pareto-optimality which holds that an 
allocation of resources is Pareto-optimal if it makes no one worse off. Pareto-optimality presupposes a 
perfectly competitive market or bilateral monopoly. See Hausman (2006:136-140) and Graafland 
(2007:31-42).    
322 In other words, traders are considered as agents of production: the cycle of production ends when 
the product reaches the buyer. In the Republic 371B-C, Plato acknowledges that “cities require petty 
traders who will give money for goods and goods for money because neither farmers nor artisans can 
count on finding someone with whom to exchange whenever they bring goods to the market”; quoted 
by Finley (1970:14).
323 Child (1998:278). These are cases of immoral profit: when traders gain by deceiving customers, e.g. 
they may adulterate their products or trick the customer into buying a fake Rolex watch; then, the 




326 See Cowan and Rizzo (1994:6).
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formed by the preferences of exchangers on the basis of mutual agreement. On that 
score, insofar as a voluntary exchange makes no party worse-off, the seller’s profit is 
fair. Since contemporary economics is subjectivist about value, then the price that 
satisfies the utility of both exchangers is fair.
Let us take stock. The argument for the injustice of profit can be understood either in 
objectivist or in subjectivist terms. Aristotle’s theory of value allows for fair profit 
from M-C-M exchanges as long as it is payment for the social service of bringing a 
product to the market. On the other hand, the passage Pol. 1258a38-b2 suggests that 
business exchange is barren and, hence, business profit is unfair. So, both renderings 
of the zero-sum premise face difficulties. I turn now to discuss the canonical 
interpretation in detail.   
5.2 Critical Discussion
Most interpreters overlook that Aristotle’s conception of economic value and the 
zero-sum passage raise an exegetical puzzle. This is the first difficulty. The second 
problem is that most interpreters adopt Marx’s and Meikle’s notation of business as 
M-C-M although this is not clearly Aristotle’s idea. Third, most commentators do not 
discuss the pro-business evidence from the Ethics and Politics where Aristotle relaxes 
his strictures on business. In short, both readings have difficulty squaring (a) their 
interpretations of Pol. 1258a38-b2 with (b) Aristotle’s conception of economic value, 
(c) the fact that he relaxes his strictures against business, and (d) the fact that M-C-M 
is not necessarily unjust. In section 5.3, I offer an alternative way of understanding 
Aristotle’s argument for the injustice of profit which squares these conditions. 
5.2.1 Criticism I: A Puzzle
The canonical interpretation generates the following puzzle. On the one hand, this 
reading presupposes the zero-sum view. This requires a unique just price determined 
by some objective standard of value; viz. if value is objective, then products have a 
fixed, consequent just price.327 On that score, business profit can be had only by 
exceeding the just price. Most interpreters think that, for Aristotle, traders do not 
327 Child (1998:264-67). For Barker (1906:386) if value is objective, then there should be an objective 
just price.
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deserve payment for the service that they render to their community and that value is 
fixed independently of the need of exchangers.328Yet, the objectivist gloss of the zero-
sum assumption conflicts with Aristotle’s non-objectivist theory of economic value: if 
prices are formed by bargain on the basis of mutual need (χρεία), a market price that 
includes profit can be fair as long as the transaction is neither coercive nor 
fraudulent.329 On the other hand, the purely subjectivist form of the zero-sum 
assumption conflicts with Aristotle’s requirements of commercial justice: there must 
be a boundary on prices in order to say when an exchange is coercive or fraudulent. I 
proposed in 4.3.2 that this boundary is set by the natural price of products. In retail 
trade, the market price of a good should approximate its natural price. That is, the 
buyer’s satisfaction of his/her need (χρεία) from a good should equal the toil saved 
from producing that good him/herself. 
This puzzle is instructive: commentators overlook that the purely objectivist and the 
purely subjectivist forms of the zero-sum assumption are less likely Aristotle’s. Those 
who interpret Aristotle as an objectivist about just price think that, for Aristotle, trade 
is barren and that all commercial profit is an unfair increment on the objective just 
price of goods. In contrast, those who interpret him as a subjectivist (e.g. Barker and 
Soudek) think that commercial profit can be fair. As I argue below, Aristotle’s main 
objection to business profit is gain from parasitic forms of business which I examine 
in the next section. I turn now to discuss the second difficulty of the canonical 
interpretation. 
5.2.2 Criticism 2
As we saw in 5.1.1, Meikle distinguishes between two different forms of μεταβλητική 
in terms of his Marxian interpretation of Aristotle, namely, the distinction between 
use value and exchange value. Meikle signifies exchange for-use as two circuits: C1-
C2 and C1-M-C2, that is, barter and plain exchange with money as a stand-in. These 
circuits, he argues, start and end with use values. On the other hand, business trade 
328 For example, Ross (2005:255); cf. Barker (1906:384) argues that Aristotle does not condemn all 
traders and middlemen, only those who “prey on the needs” of their fellow-citizens. Barker thinks that, 
for Aristotle, traders and middlemen may offer a service that must be compensated.
329 Barker (1906:383-85) points out that Aristotle objects to profit from predatory pricing, not to profit 
as a whole.
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and money-lending (M1-C-M2 and M1-M2) start and end with monetized exchange 
values. Meikle bases his notation of the two kinds of μεταβλητική on Pol. 1257b19-
23:
The natural form of the art of acquisition is connected with the management of 
the household; but the other form is a matter only of retail trade, and it is 
concerned only with getting a fund of money, and that only by the method of 
conducting the exchange of commodities. This latter form [i.e. καπηλική] may 
be held to turn on the power of currency; for currency is the starting-point 
[στοιχείον], as it is also the goal [πέρας], of exchange. (Pol. 1257b19-23)330
He holds that M1 is the starting-point of a commercial exchange towards the goal of 
exchange M2, namely, the increase of exchange value (monetary gain). While Meikle 
claims that C-M-C starts and ends with use values, we should note that C1 and C2 are 
exchange values, too, because Aristotle says that commodities have both a proper use 
(hence, use value) and a use for exchange (hence, exchange value). Yet, for Meikle, 
these circuits differ sharply in structure because he thinks they belong to different 
metaphysical categories: money/exchange value belongs to the category of quantity 
and is limitless. Hence, for Meikle, M-C-M necessitates the unlimited pursuit of 
monetized exchange value. In contrast, the use value of products belongs to the 
category of quality which is limited by self-sufficiency. Hence, for Meikle, C-M-C 
necessitates the pursuit of true wealth. In other words, he thinks that the structure of 
M-C-M necessitates profit-seeking which eventually leads to injustice. In contrast, the 
structure of C-C and C-M-C does not necessitate profit-seeking. 
While I agree with Meikle that Aristotle distinguishes between exchange for-use (e.g. 
exchange of household surpluses) and exchange for-profit (namely, business) in terms 
of the dual use of products, it is not clear that Aristotle would agree that C-M-C and 
M-C-M differ in structure on the basis of a metaphysical difference. This is a quite 
controversial reading of Aristotle that I discuss in 5.3.2. Also, Meikle’s notation of a 
structural difference between the two kinds rests on an incorrect rendition of 
330 This is Barker’s translation. Here is the passage in the original: “ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ 
ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλική, ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως ἀλλὰ 
διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας 
τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν.
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στοιχείον as ‘starting-point’ and πέρας as ‘goal’ in the passage Pol. 1257b19-23. The 
most plausible rendering of the passage is the following:
Natural wealth acquisition is a part of household management, whereas 
commerce has to do with the production of goods, not in the full sense, but 
through their exchange. It is held to be concerned with money, on the grounds 
that money is the unit and limit of exchange. [Reeve (1998:17)]
Here the meaning of στοιχείον is “the simplest thing into which a thing may be 
divided.”331 Hence, the term στοιχείον should read as ‘unit’ in which case the 
controversial phrase should read ‘currency is the unit of exchange’. Also, the correct 
translation of ‘πέρας’ is ‘limit’.332 So, the passage should not be read as ‘coined 
money is the starting-point and goal of exchange’, as Meikle suggests, but as ‘coined 
money is the unit and limit of exchange’. In other words, ‘money is the limit of 
exchange’ does not refer to καπηλική alone but to all forms of exchange (ἀλλαγῆ) 
based on money (τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν). As we saw 
in 2.3.1, money is the limit of exchange in the sense that money is the numerical 
expression of need (χρεία) in the form of price. Hence, price is the only limit of 
business exchange, whereas necessary μεταβλητική belongs to household 
management and is limited by self-sufficiency; καπηλική is limited only by the ability 
of the customer to pay a price. 
Of course, there is a general difference in aim between necessary exchange and 
business. But in the above passage the difference between C-M-C and M-C-M is not a 
difference in aim. In practice, there are C-M-C exchanges which may generate profit 
but do not involve the purchase and sale of goods as in M-C-M. For example, a 
producer or a householder may sell their products for profit as αὐτοπώλης. Also, a 
greedy producer could seek to sell dear in a C-M-C exchange.333 In contrast, a retail 
trader using M-C-M could pursue a fair price for subsistence from the purchase and 
331 Miller (1998:394) derives this translation from the Met. A.3. According to Miller, “[T]he plural 
stoicheia refers to the simplest elements out of which material substances are composed (e.g., earth, air, 
fire, and water). He [Aristotle] adds that the small and simple and indivisible is by extension called a 
stoicheion”.
332 Except for Reeve, Simpson (1998:54) and Saunders (2002:14) propose the same rendering of 
στοιχείον and πέρας. 
333 For example, a producer (αὐτοπώλης) may sell his product C1 dear and use this money (M) in order 
to buy another commodity C2 and, hence, increase one’s stock. Ross (2005:255) highlights this 
possibility.
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sale of goods by facilitating product distribution.334 In principle, both forms of trade 
may aim at spurious wealth or become a source of profiteering if the seller is greedy. 
In the above passage, their main structural difference lies in their limit: barter is 
limited by product-availability while καπηλική is limited by currency. Also, M-C-M 
and C-M-C, as such, do not represent an ethical difference between καπηλική and 
necessary exchange. For Aristotle, their ethical difference lies in that καπηλική is not 
part of household-management. It is not clear that his objection to καπηλική is 
concerned with the injustice of profit from M1-C-M2. Meikle should have to establish 
independently that, for Aristotle, M-C-M generates unfair gain as a matter of its 
structure since Aristotle does not censure the profit from foreign trade (ἐμπορία) 
which is M-C-M, too. I turn now to present the evidence where Aristotle approves of 
business and, consequently, business profit. 
5.2.3 Pro-Business Evidence 
In Politics I.11 Aristotle lists the main forms of μεταβλητική: foreign trade (ἐμπορία), 
money-lending and wage-labor: 
Exchange's [μεταβλητική] most important part, on the other hand, is trading 
[ἐμπορία], which has three parts: ship owning, transport, and marketing. These 
differ from one another in that some are safer, others more profitable 
[ἐπικαρπίαν]. The second part of exchange is money lending; the third is wage 
earning. As for wage earning, some wage earners are vulgar craftsmen, 
whereas others are unskilled, useful for manual labor only. (Pol. 1258b20-26)
It has escaped the consideration of commentators that Aristotle here only lists the 
main forms of μεταβλητική and does not say that foreign trade (ἐμπορία) is the 
unnecessary or unnatural kind of μεταβλητική.335 It appears though that ἐμπορία is a 
334 Simpson (1998:54) proposes this interpretation. Merchants buy and sell for gain but Aristotle does 
not censure them. In principle, anyone could seek a modest payment (revenue) from buying and selling 
because one brings a product to the market.
335 According to Hasebroek (1965:1-6), there were three types of traders at the time: κάπηλοι, 
ναύκληροι and ἐμποροι (merchants). He categorized them in accord with the market in which they 
traded, namely, local or overseas markets. The first kind operated in local markets either as retail 
traders who bought goods from the producers (farmers, craftsmen and manufacturers) and transported 
the merchandise to the marketplace where they sold them to consumers, or as wholesale traders who 
sold products to foreign traders and resellers. Ναύκληροι and ἐμποροι carried out long-distance and 
foreign trade with merchant ships which sailed in the Aegean, the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. 
Ναύκληροι owned the ships with which they transported the merchandise, whereas merchants were not 
ship-owners. Also, they rent cargo space from ship-owners. In most cases, merchants were resident 
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kind of μεταβλητική with a different ethical import from καπηλική (retail, local trade). 
The impression of an ethical difference between ἐμπορία and καπηλική is also 
witnessed in Pol. 1320a35-38: 
…Public revenues should be distributed among the poor…as to enable them to 
make a beginning in trade (ἐμπορία) or farming.  
Here Aristotle does not use the term καπηλική but ἐμπορία. Most commentators do 
not consider this passage and the difference between local trade (καπηλική) and 
foreign trade (ἐμπορία).336 Meikle, for instance, holds that the margin from buying 
and selling (M-C-M) can only be extracted unfairly. However, since Aristotle does 
not censure ἐμπορία, which is an instance of M-C-M, we should expect that his 
argument for the injustice of profit does not apply to all kinds of M-C-M exchange. 
Also, it has escaped the attention of commentators that in Pol. 1258b22 Aristotle uses 
the term ἐπικαρπίαν to denote ‘revenue (or profit) from foreign trade’ (ἐμπορία), 
instead of the term ‘profit’ (κέρδος). Aristotle does not say that revenue from foreign 
trade is unfair gain (ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων). He only says that the riskier forms of trade 
maximize revenue (τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν): “some [parts of commerce] 
are safer, others more profitable” (Pol. 1258b21). Business enterprises involve 
expenses, risk and solve problems of supply, hence, generate value for buyers on top 
of a product’s utility.337 Commentators also ignore that Aristotle’s definition of profit 
(κέρδος) in NE 1132b11-12 has the pejorative sense of unfair gain because it exceeds 
the intermediate between gain and loss (the ‘just’; NE 1132b18-20). However, this is 
not the contemporary sense of ‘profit’ which refers to accounting profit: the margin 
that results from subtracting one’s input (or expenses) from the market price.338 Hence, 
aliens (metics) who financed their trading ventures by borrowing from lenders who usually were 
citizens.
336 Finley (1970:17) recognizes that in Pol. 1327a25-31 Aristotle “switches from καπηλική to the 
commonest word for foreign trade, emporike [ἐμπορία]”. However, Finley does not mention the fact 
that merchants were also involved in local trade in-between trade expeditions. 
337 Merchants transported merchandise and set up stalls to sell the products of manufacturers and 
farmers. Hence, they were, in a general sense, agents of production by expending labor and costs that 
should be compensated. As Child (1998:266) says “…if merchant A has expended labor to acquire the 
cheeses and transport them to the marketplace, if he takes his own time and energy to work the stall 
during the fair, he is entitled to payment for that service, but not to anything more.” Hasebroek 




‘profit’, in the modern sense, is the margin that results from the sale of one’s own 
products or products which one bought in wholesale. Unlike Aristotle’s use of ‘profit’, 
for economists ‘profit’ is ethically neutral; it may be either fair or unfair. In contrast, 
the term ἐπικαρπίαν, which Aristotle uses non-pejoratively, probably refers to profit 
that is fair or ethically neutral. 
We should also take into account that nowhere does Aristotle censure trade based on 
one’s own production (αὐτοπώλης), including products of μεταλευτική and ύλοτομία 
(Pol. 1258b25-31). This form of trade also includes commercial agriculture and 
commercial manufacture. As a matter of fact, farmers and manufacturers produced 
and bartered/sold their products either in retail or wholesale to middlemen and 
merchants and gained from accounting profit. Strictly speaking, the αὐτοπώλης was 
not a professional trader, like the local dealer and the merchant. However, Aristotle 
does not claim that the profit of self-sellers is at the expense of others although the 
source of their profit is others and they could possibly corner the market. Likewise, he 
does not censure the merchants although they use M-C-M, like the κάπηλοι.  
Another category of ethically neutral gain is gain from ‘rents’, i.e. “the price paid for 
the use of land and other natural resources that are completely fixed in total 
supply.”339 In particular, a rent is income made from invariable factors of production 
that are fixed in supply, like the location of a landed property, which is a non-
produced input, or income made as a result of scarcity. High rents may sometimes 
result because one has exclusive possession of natural resources and a monopoly of 
trade. The wealthy landowning citizens of Aristotle’s time were basically rentiers. We 
should keep in mind that Aristotle’s theory of leisure presupposes an agrarian 
aristocracy of citizens whose revenue was often based on rents. In particular, some 
well-off citizens leased land or acted as proto-capitalists who funded or invested in 
commercial ventures and, sometimes, lent capital to merchants.340 There is no 
evidence that Aristotle censures rents.
339 McConnell (2009:297).
340 Hasebroek (1965:9-10). The owners of capital did not take part in commerce.
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Even if Aristotle thought that business is a zero-sum game, the ethical question is 
whether profit is had fairly or not. In general, the size of one’s ἐπικαρπία (revenue) 
often varies with the size of the market and one’s place in the competition with other 
producers-sellers. Aristotle’s non-objectivist conception of value allows for fair profit 
from superior product quality, efficient transportation, innovation, efficient use of 
factors of production, cost-reduction, etc. Even state monopolies of natural resources, 
like metals, are morally acceptable. As his example of King Dionysius suggests (Pol. 
1259a23-36), monopolies should be regulated by the state when they harm the 
interests of a city.341 Also, monopolies based on scientific acumen or inventions that 
solve a problem, such as a ground-breaking drug, could be defensible forms of profit-
making within the bounds of natural price.
Aristotle relaxed his strictures on commerce as far as to suggest that a commercial 
economy is the preferred solution to the economizing problem of states, at least for 
the practicable best state.342 This comes out from his discussion of existing regimes in 
the second book of Politics (II.9-11). According to Aristotle, Carthage, an openly 
commercial economy, is better governed and more peaceful than Sparta and Crete 
partly due to its market-oriented economic arrangements. It would be a serious 
oversight on the part of Aristotle to praise an economy which is based on systematic 
economic injustice. 
We see, then, that several of Aristotle’s economic writings conflict with the canonical 
reading of Pol. 1258a38-b2. How could we possibly explain away this conflict? In the 
next section I propose an alternative interpretation of this passage. This discussion 
completes Aristotle’s answer to the Master Question (2.a) about the just forms of 
commercial chrematistics.
5.3 Alternative Interpretations
The canonical reading—viz. the objectivist and the subjectivist versions—cannot 
square Aristotle’s conception of economic value with the pro-business evidence. In 
this section I propose a way to square these two conditions. 
341 Reeve (1998:21n71) suggests that Aristotle refers to Dionysius I of Syracuse. 
342 Chan  (2006:43-53).
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5.3.1 A Proposal
The pro-business passages show that Aristotle did not regard revenue from commerce 
as ‘profit’ in the pejorative sense of ‘unfair gain’ (NE 1132b10-20). As I have shown 
in 5.2.3, various commercial practices generate accounting profit without making 
others worse-off. Aristotle approves of commercial agriculture, foreign trade 
(ἐμπορία), shipping (ναυκληρία), transport (φορτηγία), marketing (παράστασις) and 
selling one’s own manufactured products (αύτοπώλης). In fact, the gains of 
producers-traders were usually not above the level of subsistence. Merchants 
(ναύκληροι and ἔμποροι) discovered markets overseas in order to distribute local 
products and paid taxes to the state. Perhaps, Aristotle considered accounting profit 
from ἐμπορία acceptable because the merchants had expenses, such as the lease of the 
ships or the loan, and offered a service, that is, they exported the products of local 
producers and imported necessary goods from abroad.343 In general, it was difficult 
for merchants to become rich because their high expenses limited their margin 
significantly.344 Most possibly, then, the passage of Pol. 1258a38-b2 is concerned 
with καπηλική, viz. local trade, because the retail prices were as high as κάπηλοι 
could make them—hence, often exceeded the natural price of goods—without facing 
the expenses and risks of merchants. 
We should note, though, that while Aristotle was more wary of local trade than Plato, 
he does not call for a ban on any form of commerce. According to Saunders: 
Plato admired trade within a state (not foreign trade) in principle, as ensuring 
the proper distribution of goods, but disliked the greed and trickiness with 
which it was carried on. He proposed in the Laws to permit it only to non-
citizens, and to allow them their profit, but to restrict their margins to specified 
levels. Aristotle seems committed to eliminating trade altogether; yet in all 
realism he knows his ideal state cannot do without it… He says that buying 
and selling 'for essential needs' is beneficial to a state's self-sufficiency and 
constitutional cohesion. [Saunders (2002:90)]
343 Producers often exchanged or sold their products in wholesale to merchants. 
344 As a general rule, merchants rarely could become rich from trade. Usually, their gains did not 
exceed the level of subsistence. Since merchants usually were not ship-owners (they were not 
ναύκληροι), they either leased a ship to carry out their trade or worked for wealthy ship-owners. In the 
latter case they might have to split their returns with the ship-owners. They were not ship-owners and, 
hence, they had to borrow from individual creditors (money-lenders) in order to lease a ship or split 
their profits with wealthy citizens (rentiers) who funded their trade expeditions. In addition, the profits 
of merchants were not stable but varied with the hazards and difficulties involved in sea-trade. See 
Hasebroek (1965) chapter 1.
173
Aristotle, like Plato, was aware that the city needs local traders as much as it needs 
importers/exporters.345 For Plato, retail traders offered a service to the producers (Rep. 
371c): “cities require petty traders who will give money for goods and goods for 
money because neither farmers nor artisans can count on finding someone with whom 
to exchange whenever they bring goods to the market”.346 If Aristotle believed that 
local trade is totally parasitic he would have recommended a ban on it but there is no 
such evidence. Also, the example of Solon, who sometimes combined business and 
education (ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσατο κατ´ ἐμπορίαν ἅμα καὶ θεωρίαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον; Ath. 
Const. XI), points out that Aristotle approved of foreign trade as a way of supporting 
oneself.  
How can we square this evidence with the Pol. 1258a38-b2 passage then? The 
passage says that trade is justly censured because wealth comes from others. First, we 
should note that the passage follows on the heels of his analysis about the pursuit of 
unlimited wealth in Pol. 1257b21-1258a14. The pursuit of unlimited wealth is 
unnatural and, hence, not part of household-management. Then, Aristotle says that 
τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν). 
We should not overlook that here he uses the term μεταβλητική instead of the term 
καπηλική. Certainly, he does not refer to necessary μεταβλητική for this is a natural 
mode of acquisition and cannot be censured. Hence, here Aristotle may contrast 
necessary μεταβλητική with all forms of commerce, not καπηλική alone. Why would 
he have this contrast in mind? For Aristotle there is something inherently precarious 
about μεταβλητική since this gave rise to the parasitic forms of trade. The problem is 
that, in principle, μεταβλητική lacks a natural limit on profit.347 The limit on profit 
from exchange depends on whether sellers seek self-sufficiency or unlimited wealth 
through exchange. When sellers aim at revenue for subsistence, the satisfaction of 
their needs as such is the natural limit on profit.348 The limit on profit also depends on 
345 Laws 918b; cited by Newman (1887:108).
346 Quoted by Finley (1970:14).
347 For Aristotle, the only natural limit on wealth-acquisition and profit could lie in one’s desires. But it 
is reasonable to think that in barter exchanges producers cannot seek unlimited profit since products 
themselves are no facile storage of value, as coined money is. 
348 I owe this reading to Lowry (1974). In barter, one’s utility diminishes with each extra unit of the 
goods he/she acquires and consumes. This is a natural satisfaction condition. The amount of profit that 
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buyers’ willingness to pay the price that includes it. In short, there is no natural 
satisfaction condition that limits one’s profit other than the aim of the trader and the 
prices themselves. The fault with μεταβλητική is that it may facilitate—although not 
necessitate—the pursuit of unlimited wealth and, hence, lead to parasitism and 
injustice. Hence, Aristotle may object to business in Pol. 1258a38-b2 because he 
thinks that the pursuit of unlimited wealth often leads one to gain at the expense of 
others. While Aristotle’s analysis of just price allows for moderate profit as payment 
for traders who facilitate distribution, it does not allow for profit outside the bounds of 
the natural price as the pursuit of unlimited wealth requires. In short, one possibility is 
that Aristotle uses his Natural Standard to show that business is an unnatural mode of 
acquisition and potentially unjust because there is no natural limit on acquisition from 
trade.
Second, it is also possible that in the Pol. 1258a38-b2 passage Aristotle uses his 
Natural Standard1 in order to contrast nature and humans as sources of wealth. His 
target is the forms of μεταβλητική whose source of wealth is neither nature nor 
production, but others. The trader can only get wealth “from the exchange itself, that 
is, from the other exchangers.”349 The ethical stake of using others as a source of 
wealth is not clearly about the just price alone. Aristotle seems to argue here also the 
point that καπηλική is a form of injustice because it violates the Natural Standard. In 
this respect, the injustice of καπηλική implicated in Pol. 1258a38-b2 is a consequence 
of the fact that it is an unnatural kind of acquisition:350
And to just men—the just we consider to be those who do not live on others; 
which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others 
who work with their own hands. (Rhet. 1381a24-25)
exchangers seek depends on whether their desires for bodily gratification are excessive. For Aristotle, 
the pursuit of unlimited wealth results from the fact that desires are insatiable.
349 Simpson (1998:58). 
350 See also Econ. 1343a25-30: “Now in the course of nature the art of agriculture is prior, and next 
come those arts which extract the products of the earth, mining and the like. Agriculture ranks first 
because of its justice; for it does not take anything away from men, either with their consent, as do 
retail trading and the mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the warlike arts. Further, agriculture is 
natural; for by nature all derive their sustenance from their mother, and so men derive it from the earth”. 
As the passage suggests the customer’s consent is not enough to establish the justice of commerce.
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In other words, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν also means that καπηλική 
is an unnatural and unjust mode since it is not based on self-engendered work (given 
the Natural Standard3) and creates wealth from others. As we saw in 2.2.1, the natural 
modes of acquisition are based on self-engendered toil (αὐτόφυτον; autophyton; Pol. 
1256a41); this involves either the collection or the production of goods. However, 
NS3 allows that trade based on production, like barter, is natural because it is based on 
exchanging or selling one’s own goods. Given NS1, business is not a natural source of 
wealth. Given, NS3 trade based on production, like commercial agriculture, 
manufacture, and the extractive industries, is more natural than forms of trade which 
profit from the exchange itself, like καπηλική. The latter forms of trade may also lead 
to injustice.
My interpretation steers between the subjectivist and objectivist versions of the 
canonical reading. The objectivist form of this reading holds that business profit is an 
unfair increment on the just price. It assumes that trade is a zero-sum game because 
the amount of value of contested goods is fixed and the just price does not include 
payment for the trader’s services. According to my reading, Aristotle’s critique of 
business profit does not rest on the zero-sum premise (1). I do not rule out that he 
viewed trade as a zero-sum game—for he thinks that commodities and money are 
contested goods—but I disagree that the passage of Pol. 1258a38-b2 argues for this 
point. As I argued above, Aristotle’s main point here is that καπηλική makes profit 
from others, not from production or nature. It is also potentially unjust since there is 
no natural limit on the desire for unlimited wealth and profit. Although καπηλική was 
considered parasitic, in principle, all μεταβλητική is potentially unjust, too for the 
same reason; the lack of a natural limit.
The second premise of the canonical reading is too narrow and cannot accommodate 
the pro-business evidence. Aristotle’s analysis of just price and value allows for fair 
profit from local and international trade as payment for the traders’ services and risks. 
The M-C-M cycle as such is no evidence of injustice.351 Profit from local trade can 
really be accounting profit from the sale of goods bought in wholesale—as in foreign 
351 Barker (1906:384).
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trade. Their main ethical difference is that local traders often preyed on the needs of 
customers who visited the city.352 Hence, Aristotle did not opt for a purely subjectivist 
conception of just price because, then, he should accept traders making unfair profit 
from consenting customers. Local retail trade was often parasitic and Aristotle was 
quick to condemn it in Pol. 1258a38-b2.
In sum, I reject the conclusion of the canonical interpretation: business profit does not 
necessarily violate commercial justice. The zero-sum assumption is not Aristotle’s 
assumptions in Pol. 1258a38-b2. Also, their reading of the just price assumption (i.e. 
the second premise) is not correct. Hence, the conclusion does not follow. In my 
reading, Aristotle’s view of business profit is the following: 
1) Reciprocal justice requires that traders transfer as much value to customers 
(product) as they receive (money). 
2) Business profit is just 
a. When it is accounting profit: 
i) Profit from production  
ii) Profit as payment for the trader’s service.
b. When the market price that includes one’s accounting profit approximates 
its natural price.
3) There are kinds of business (e.g. commercial agriculture) which profit from 
production within the limits of the natural price.
4) Hence, business profit is not necessarily unjust.
I finally suggested that in Pol. 1258a38-b2 Aristotle objects to trade because it 
violates the teleological standards of his natural economy. He says that καπηλική is 
rightly disparaged perhaps because he expresses the sentiments of the time about petty 
traders and middlemen who often were parasitic. Farming was considered a just mode 
of acquisition because it was based on production in accord with natural providence. 
The injustice of καπηλική is a derivative point: business lacks a natural limit on profit; 
hence, it facilitates injustice because it allows for profit outside the limits of the 
natural price. However, the passage of Pol. 1258a38-b2 does not intend to establish 
352 Hasebroek (1965:1-6). See also Econ. 1343a25-30. 
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the injustice of business profit as much as to show that business, especially καπηλική, 
is an unnatural mode of acquisition that may lead to injustice because it pursues 
unlimited wealth from others in the absence of a natural limit on profit. My reading 
squares τthe passage of Politics with the requirement of the just price, the pro-
business evidence and the precariousness of business.
5.4 Conclusion and Summary
For Aristotle the problem of business and commercial economies is their lack of a 
natural limit, like the natural price, on profit. Yet, his answer to the Master Question 
(2.a) is that business, especially the kinds that are not based on production, is an 
unnatural mode of acquisition. However, he does not say that business is necessarily 
an unjust mode of acquisition. Business profit can be had fairly as long as the market 
price of goods approximates their natural price. As we saw in chapter four, his answer 
to question (3) about just price requires the limit of natural price. However, he thinks 
that the pursuit of unlimited wealth in the absence of a natural limit on profit may lead 
to injustice. That is why he censured profit-maximizing and parasitic enterprises. His 
advice is that commercial exchanges should either be subsumed under household-
management or be regulated by the state when the terms of an agreement are violated. 
Aristotle’s answer to (2.a) informs also the Master Question (1.a). Householders 
should not live the mercantile life. Nor should they pursue such an irrational end as 
unlimited wealth. Yet, they should have basic knowledge of trade in order to be able 
to manage the sale of their surpluses.353 Also, householders should know how to 
recognize profitable crops and, perhaps, how to invest in profitable business ventures 





Markets, Business and Virtue
Overview 
In this chapter I examine whether Aristotle held that business and, more broadly, 
commercial economies, undermine moral virtue and foster such vices as injustice. In 
particular, I seek to reconstruct his answer to the Master Question (2.b). In effect, I 
examine the reading, most prominently proposed by Scott Meikle, which holds that 
business is inimical to virtue. For Meikle, Aristotle’s favorite arrangement is a use-
based economy, characteristic of pre-capitalist societies, because he realized that 
commercial economies nurture greed: 
[Aristotle] argues that there is an end built into the circuits of exchange value, 
partly present perhaps in C-M-C' and fully fledged in M-C-M', to which 
people adapt themselves and their behaviour. He does not think money and 
monetary exchange are neutral devices which human wickedness abuses by 
putting them to vicious ends. He thinks the vicious end is inherent in the 
institution itself.355 
It is in the nature of M-C-M that it has no limit built into its form. For that 
reason, those who pursue it are engaged in a form of activity whose end is of 
such a kind that it has no limit. Whatever the degree of their personal 
propensity to greed may be, the nature of the end of the activity they are 
engaged in will usually ensure that their behaviour is greedy.356
On the one hand, Aristotle says that the mercantile life is inimical to virtue (Pol. 
1328b34-1329a1). On the other hand, Pol. 1257b40-1258a7 implies that market 
exchange is a neutral device which non-virtuous agents—e.g. those attached to the life 
of physical gratification—misuse in order to maximize their wealth. He points out that 
the greedy person may use virtually everything, even noble vocations, as a source of 
profit (Pol. 1258a10-14). 
The main question of the chapter is whether Aristotle thinks that business fosters the 
vices of illiberality and injustice or whether these arise independently from the 
355 Meikle (1995:76). 
356 Ibid. 78. See also p. 99 and Meikle (1996:46).
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practice of business. If the practice of commerce necessitates greedy and avaricious 
behavior, then we want to say that it fosters such vices as injustice because greed 
motivates injustice. Aristotle’s answer to this question will help us understand in what 
way he thinks that commercial economies are inimical to moral virtue (Pol. 1328b39-
40). This is the Master Question (2.b). 
In section 6.1, I present the two competing interpretations regarding Aristotle’s 
answer to the main question of this chapter: the structuralist and the agential readings. 
According to the structuralist reading, business nurtures acquisitive desires and vices. 
On the other hand, the agential reading is based on the passage Pol. 1257b40-1258a14. 
It puts weight on Aristotle’s agential explanation: acquisitive desires are inborn in the 
agent; they do not originate from the institutions of a commercial economy. Also, the 
agential reading stresses that it is up to agents to manage the effects of business on 
their desires and characters.  
In section 6.2, I present Aristotle’s moral psychology of acquisition, viz. the virtues 
and vices related to wealth-acquisition, in order to examine how they arise. On the 
one hand, passages like Pol. 1257b40-1258a7 imply that the motives of greed and 
avarice characteristic of injustice and illiberality are inborn tendencies and, hence, 
independent from the institutions of money and business. However, Aristotle’s moral 
psychology implies that these institutions could generate greed and avarice given that 
they operate on the basis of material self-interest and economic competition. 
In the third section, I argue that the structuralist reading is not the correct reading of 
Pol. 1257b40-1258a14 because the vices of illiberality and injustice may arise in pre-
market economies, too. However, the agential reading cannot explain away Aristotle’s 
claim that the mercantile life is inimical to virtue. While his moral psychology implies 
that the virtues of liberality, justice, and temperance may offset the effects of the 
mercantile life on moral character, I argue that a city-state which prioritizes the 
pursuit of unlimited wealth above everything undermines virtue and happiness. 
According to the perfective sense of the priority of the city, citizens depend upon the 
end of the city for their full development and flourishing. Hence, a commercial city-
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state is inimical to virtue, political life, and civic friendship. It is not up to agents to 
flourish ethically in such a city.
6.1. Agents vs. Structures: Interpretations
In this section I present Aristotle’s views on the relationship between the life of 
money-making and the moral psychology of wealth-acquisition. Here is the question 
to be examined: 
Does Aristotle think that greed and avarice arise as a result of the practice of 
business? Or is business a neutral device that serves to satisfy the desire of 
agents for excessive acquisition?
6.2.1 Structures or Agents?
This question can be formulated as a general question about agency vs. structure: do 
the economic structures explain individual traits and human agency? Or does human 
agency and individual traits explain the economic structures of a society? There is no 
doubt that both agency and structure should be cited in the explanation of the 
formation of character and structures. Yet, the controversy is concerned with the 
primacy of the one explanans over the other. For example, a structuralist approach 
would explain unjust behavior by the social structures that foster greed, not the other 
way around. Meikle, for example, seeks to show that commercial economies foster 
human vices, like greed. On the other hand, the agential approach is based on the idea 
that agents are free to shape their individual behavior independently from the social 
structures. On that score, acts of injustice and character traits, like greed, could be 
explained as the result of the autonomous actions or human nature. For example, the 
inborn propensity for excessive gain may explain the emergence of profit-seeking.
Aristotle’s moral psychology is indeterminate in regards to these two paradigms. On 
the one hand, his theory of character formation holds that agents develop their 
dispositions and characters through habituation, which is a social process: character 
traits are not inborn but result from doing like acts— ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ 
ἕξεις γίνονται (NE 1103b22-3). For example:  
…[B]y doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we 
become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of 
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danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or 
cowardly. (NE 1003b18-20)
On the other hand, his moral psychology is rich in agential concepts like φρόνησις 
(practical wisdom) and προαίρεσις (rational desire/choice). These psychological 
resources shape institutions and enable agents to act autonomously. While one’s 
character is shaped by habituation under the guidance of the various agents of 
socialization, one’s actions and character are ultimately formed by one’s free actions: 
our virtues and vices are up to us (NE 1113b6-7). While moral character is the product 
of habituation, this process is up to us: 
But we are ourselves responsible for having become this sort of person, by 
living slackly, and for being unjust or self-indulgent, in the first case by treating 
people badly, in the second by passing our time in drinking and that sort of 
thing; for it is the sort of activity we display in each kind of thing that gives us 
the corresponding character. (NE 1114a5-9)
What if one is not aware that qualities of character result from doing like acts? 
Aristotle argues, rather unpersuasively, that to ignore this is a sign of a thoroughly 
senseless person (NE 1114a9). Also, in an extended discussion (NE III.2-4), Aristotle 
argues that the object of decision (προαίρεσις) is the same with the object of 
deliberation; they are both about things that are up to us (NE 1111b30). For example, 
we do neither deliberate about nor choose to find ‘a cache of treasure’ (NE 1112a28) 
although we may wish we found one. Furthermore, an ethical virtue is a ‘disposition 
that issues in decisions’ and our dispositions embody a view of the good (NE 
1106b36).
Surely, there is circularity in Aristotle’s theories of character formation and moral 
responsibility. If the social environment shapes the character of agents, how could 
agents be responsible for their characters and for the actions that stem from these 
dispositions since agents cannot elect their dispositions at an early age? Aristotle 
insists on that agents are responsible for their voluntary acts and that their characters 
are of their own, voluntary, making but does not explain how this could be possible. 
Since it is not my purpose to discuss further this difficulty, I will proceed to present 
the two main readings, the structuralist and the agential. 
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6.1.2 The Structuralist Reading
i. Meikle
According to Scott Meikle, Aristotle contends that greed (πλεονεξία) arises from all 
modes of chrematistics which aim at the maximization of exchange value, not from 
business alone. For Meikle, Aristotle’s objection to business is that it aims at the 
accumulation of unlimited wealth through the maximization of exchange value:
Trade by its nature does not belong to the art of acquiring true wealth, because 
its aim is wealth as a quantity of exchange value in the form of money, or 
wealth 'of the spurious kind'. [Meikle (1996:139)]
That is, the pursuit of spurious wealth is built in the institutions of money and 
business. His reading is based on Aristotle’s account of the confusion between natural 
and unnatural chrematistics in Pol. 1257b33-1258a7. Aristotle says that both kinds 
use the same instrument, viz. money. For Meikle, Aristotle implies that the institutions 
of money and business are not neutral devices which agents misuse to satisfy their 
predisposition to excessive acquisition: 
He [i.e. Aristotle] argues that the end of exchange value, built into M-C-M, is 
something to which people adapt themselves and their behaviour. He does not 
think money and monetary exchange are neutral devices which human 
wickedness abuses by putting them to vicious ends. He thinks the vicious end 
is implicit in the institution itself. He does not explain the origin of the 
erroneous idea that wealth is unlimited as lying in vicious human propensities, 
as we might have expected perhaps, but in the existence of the form of 
exchange value itself; it is this that 'has in fact suggested the notion that wealth 
and property have no limit' [Meikle (1996:146)]
Meikle explains that agents pursue spurious wealth because they have to adapt to the 
behavioral demands of the institutions of money and business. While he agrees with 
Ross and Barker, who point out that greedy people might misuse all forms of 
exchange in order to acquire spurious wealth, he insists that Aristotle’s point is 
different. It is not that greed urges maximizing behavior, although it often does so 
indiscriminately, but the other way around: 
Pleonexia [i.e. greed], simply wanting too much, is a human failing, and 
human failings are not Aristotle's theme here. He is discussing a particular 
form of wealth, the money form, which is in its nature without a limit, so that 
those engaged in it pursue an unlimited end, with the result that their 
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behaviour is systematically made into something indistinguishable from 
pleonexia even though they might not themselves be greedy people. The desire 
for too much is always there to cause bad behaviour, and Aristotle is not one 
to forget it. But this is not what he has in mind. His point is that C-M-C, as an 
institution or form of behaviour, has a limit built into its form: exchange 
comes to an end with the acquisition of a use value that is needed… His point 
is about the nature of the activity of M-C-M and the end it embodies. It is in 
the nature of M-C-M that it has no limit built into its form... Whatever the 
degree of their personal propensity to greed may be, the nature of the end of 
the activity they are engaged in will ensure that their behaviour is greedy.357 
For Meikle, Aristotle’s foremost concern is to show that the M-C-M cycle generates 
greedy behavior necessarily because it lacks a natural terminus and, hence, it leads to 
perpetual accumulation. In contrast, C-M-C exchange does not necessarily generate 
greedy behavior because it is limited by its purpose; the natural terminus of C-M-C 
cycle is use. Shortly afterwards, Meikle concedes that Aristotle’s psychological 
explanation of business in Pol. 1257b40-1258a7 cites the natural propensity towards 
pleasure as the reason that explains maximizing behavior:
Aristotle stresses that human propensities have a share for the evils of 
exchange value...The forms of exchange value, which are socially devised, 
exacerbate what are already human propensities for seeking pleasure and 
acting on shallow ideas of human wellbeing, and those natural propensities in 
turn reinforce the social forms.358
Actually, Aristotle argues that agents, driven by the propensities for pleasure and a 
false conception of the good life, use exchange for-profit in order to satisfy their 
insatiable desire for pleasure. Meikle stresses that the institution of exchange recycles 
the maximizing behavior of agents by compelling it. However, this is different from 
what Meikle says above. He said above that the institutions of money and business 
necessitate greedy behavior. Here he admits that there is a natural propensity for greed 
that the institutions intensify. Perhaps, Meikle is not careful enough to distinguish the 
structuralist from the agential explanation. Or he thinks that Aristotle recognizes both 
elements but gives priority to the effect of structure on agents. In any case, for Meikle, 




a whole because it creates the maximizing behavior of all professionals.359 However, 
his reading is not the strong structuralist claim that economic institutions create or 
necessitate greedy desires that had never existed before but rather that the institution 
intensifies the propensity to greed necessarily. As we saw in chapter 5.2, Meikle does 
not explain where Aristotle says that the M-C-M cycle necessitates greedy behavior. 
Yet, this is the core idea of his reading: agents pursue unlimited wealth and become 
greedy because M-C-M commercial exchanges lack a natural terminus. The further, 
missing, assumption here is that agents are not able to limit their inclination towards 
unlimited wealth themselves or that agents cannot resist the influence of institutions 
on their character. I critically discuss Meikle’s reading in section 6.2.
ii. Aristotelian Critics of the Market System
Apart from Meikle, Aristotle’s critique of business has inspired a number of critics of 
the market system who argue that he rejects the principles that drive commercial 
economies, such as the principle of profit-maximization. These critics admit that 
Aristotle’s critique does not target the market system as we know it—viz. 
interconnected markets operating on aggregate supply and demand—but with the 
emerging market economy of his time, especially for its crowding out effects on 
virtue. In other words, these commentators think that Aristotle’s critique rests on the 
structuralist assumption that the market system either necessitates greed or crowds out 
the virtues, like justice. Let us see three notable structuralist readings of Aristotle. 
Spencer Pack argues that “Aristotle would say that our current problem [i.e. of 
insatiable desires and greed] largely results from our method of acquisition.”360 Like 
Meikle’s, Pack’s reading stresses that M-C-M and M-M compel economic agents to 
profit-maximization because of the competitive nature of the market economy. Pack 
does not offer a full reading of Aristotle but seeks to understand the implications of 
his critique of business for modern market economies. In particular:
359 For Meikle (1995:125) Aristotle’s criticism targets the institution of exchange value because it 
compels all professionals—traders, doctors, teachers, sophists, generals, etc.—to maximizing behavior, 
not tradesmen in particular.
360 Pack (1985:392).
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This second form of acquisition, the use of money to make more money, is 
much more prevalent in the twentieth century than it was in Aristotle’s time. 
Pack (1985:392)]
For Pack, the modern problem is the following:
Indeed, the economists’ hypothesis that firms are more or less forced by 
competition to maximize profits under threat of extinction seems to be largely 
a reflection of the fact that firms do indeed use money to make more money. 
Given that our society is largely based upon the form of acquisition where 
money is used to make more money, and that this form of acquisition knows 
no limits, then it seems very unlikely that our wants (in this form of society) 
will ever be satiated.361 
Pack thinks that the pursuit of exchange value built in the market economy causes 
intense competition and the insatiable desire for more exchange value. Our desires 
can never be satiated because the system of exchange value itself is unlimited and 
competitive. It is not clear what Pack means by ‘insatiable’ desires. He probably 
refers to Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of sensual desires in Pol. 1257b40-1258a7: 
they are insatiable because the desire for physical gratification itself is unlimited and 
insatiable. The upshot of Pack’s interpretation is that Aristotle’s solution to the 
problem of acquisitiveness “would probably involve nothing less than a change in our 
entire socio-economic system.”362 We may summarize his reading as follows: if 
profit-maximization is the modus operandi of economies of exchange value, then this 
pursuit crowds out other motives. 
In a similar vein, Thomas Lewis reconstructs the psychology of acquisitiveness of 
Pol. I.9 on the basis of the emotion of anxiety.363 Lewis argues that Aristotle was 
aware that commercial economies incite the pursuit of ever-increasing wealth and 
rivalry among citizens. For Lewis, Aristotle thinks that business is unnatural because 
it seeks unlimited wealth. That is, unnatural acquisition means also excessive or 
unlimited acquisition: 
 
His [i.e. Aristotle’s] distinction between natural and unnatural acquisition is 
directed at the problem of excess property. Acquisition beyond the necessary 
amount is a diversion of the citizen's capacities from the sphere of polis life, 
361 Pack (1985:392.
362 Ibid. 391. 
363 Lewis (1978:69-90).
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and these goods (by definition) cannot be put to proper use. Such acquisition is 
therefore unnatural. Aristotle's condemnation of excess acquisition is not a 
condemnation of acquisition per se; the mode of acquisition may well be 
natural, but if the resulting product is excessive it then is unnatural.364
According to Lewis’ reading, acquisitiveness rests on the “anxiety about livelihood”, 
viz. about the sufficiency of property. 
Both health and wealth are necessary components of livelihood, and it is 
anxiety about livelihood that induces men to secure livelihood by seeking both 
to excess.365
Lewis thinks that the anxiety of economic survival is most intense in the mercantile 
life because trade is precarious and complex. 
The relatively precarious position of the household dependent on foreign trade 
can be rectified only by a greater attention to acquisition. Simply to be able to 
count on adequate property the household head is obliged to enlarge his fleet 
and ensure that it is widely dispersed. He must seek out new markets and a 
wider variety of products to transport. He may find it necessary to arm his 
ships and see to the outfitting of warships for protection. He may also find it 
necessary to move from shipping per se into related activities such as ware- 
housing and marketing of his cargoes. To meet the need of ensuring adequate 
property he must expand and diversify to compensate for the uncertainties 
arising from his mode of acquisition, and by so doing he becomes locked into 
the problem of acquisition, thereby diminishing the opportunity for turning 
away from concern with the household and using property as a basis for polis 
life.366 
According to Lewis, securing a sufficient amount of wealth through commerce 
requires increased acquisitiveness and full engagement with the intricacies of trade, 
especially of foreign trade which was affected by the precariousness of weather, 
piracy, currency, etc. For Lewis, Aristotle realized that the anxiety-ridden life of 
commercial societies tends to crowd out justice and civic friendship. His 
interpretation emphasizes the contrast between anxiety and reciprocity: “Only if both 
parties are satisfied with the exchange can the exchange process serve to minimize 
anxiety about future deficiencies being adequately met.”367 Lewis thinks that, for 
364 Lewis (1978:73).




Aristotle, friendship is a necessary condition for reciprocal, hence, just exchanges and 
argues that reciprocal exchange can “take place with someone who can be counted on 
not to attempt to take advantage of a deficiency.”368 However, market economies 
undermine reciprocity because they intensify economic rivalry among citizens, thus 
undermining civic friendship which is essential for socio-political stability. Lewis’ 
reading assumes that, for Aristotle, commercial exchange is a zero-sum practice: one 
exchanger exacts from the other the highest price “by hard bargaining backed by the 
threat of no exchange.”369 According to Lewis, the anxiety-driven acquisitiveness may 
also obliterate the political mission of the city turning the attention of citizens towards 
economic pursuits either through commerce or warfare:
The necessity of continuously increasing acquisition is a perversion which 
obliterates the proper end of acquisition and converts the means into a pseudo 
end. Indeed the household head may be driven to subvert the polis life of 
others by persuading his fellow citizens to commit their resources to 
commercial and military enterprises designed to further secure and enhance 
his mode of acquisition. A number of such households threaten the corruption 
of the polis itself, by converting it to an essentially economic and military 
institution devoted to acquisition and the maintenance of livelihood.370
For Lewis, Aristotle’s solution to the problem of acquisitiveness is the middle way 
between “dependency on property as a necessary means” and “the courage to turn 
away, through one's own volition, from further acquisition that could apparently 
maximize the security of one's livelihood.”371 Hence, his reading acknowledges the 
possibility of agents managing their desires away from excessive acquisition although 
he does not clarify whether Aristotle thinks this would be possible in a market-
oriented economy. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, a notable Aristotelian critic of the market system, draws on 
Aristotle’s theory of virtue in order to construct his ethical critique of the market 
system. MacIntyre seeks to establish that the profit-motive ultimately crowds out the 
virtues and corrupts productive practices. Since he has not offered a close reading of 
Aristotle’s text on chrematistics, I will not discuss his work in detail. Yet, we should 
368 Lewis (1978:78).




keep in mind that Macintyre’s distinction between goods internal and goods external 
to professional practices is an ingenious way to reconstruct and interpret Aristotle’s 
passage about the commercialization of professions (Pol. 1258a7-14). MacIntyre 
shows that it is impossible to obtain the internal goods by cheating, whereas the 
external goods, like money, can be obtained by both moral and immoral means. 
MacIntyre explains that the pursuit of unlimited wealth is so antithetical to virtue that 
“possession of the virtues may perfectly well hinder us in achieving external 
goods.”372 In my view, Aristotle’s passage about the commercialization of professions, 
especially the noble ones like medicine and generalship, can be explained by 
Macintyre’s idea that commercial economies crowd out the motives that move agents 
to achieve goods internal to these practices through excellent and ethical performance; 
cheating along the way would not help obtain these goods. Macintyre’s 
Aristotelianism concludes my outline of the structuralist approach.
6.1.3 The Agential Reading
The competing interpretation is that business is not the cause of greed; rather, greed is 
a failing of human psychology and business is a neutral instrument that greedy 
persons misuse in order to satisfy their pre-existing excessive desires for gain and 
physical gratification.
i. William Kern & Ryan Balot
William Kern reads Aristotle in non-structuralist terms. He starts from Aristotle’s 
conception of a natural, household-based economy that was embedded in social and 
cultural reality. In this respect, Kern’s reading adopts Polanyi’s and Lowry’s 
historical understanding of ancient economy.373 On that score, the individual and 
collective economic ends characteristic of market economies—such as profit 
372MacIntyre’s (1984:196) analysis of professions illuminates how the commercialization of 
professions crowds out the virtues. This account can be usefully applied to Aristotle’s remark about 
professions in Pol. 1258a7-14. MacIntyre argues that the aim of business is the acquisition of external 
goods, not the achievement of internal goods, e.g. expert knowledge, pride of achievement, and the 
moral virtues required for excellent practice. The pursuit of external goods may crowd out the virtues 
attached to professional practices. 
373 Their approach is part of the so-called ‘substantivist’ approach to the economic history of pre-
capitalist economies. This is opposed to the ‘formalist’ approach which holds that the economy of 
Aristotle’s time was a primitive economy which differed only in scale, not in principle, from modern 
market economies.  
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maximization, efficiency and economic growth—were not driving the economic and 
socio-political life of ancient city-states. This is an important step in Kern’s 
interpretation. He holds that instead of maximizing the efficient use of scarce 
resources in pursuit of profit-maximization and utility-maximization, Aristotle held 
that agents should regulate their unlimited or acquisitive wants in accord with his 
hierarchy of ends, where economic pursuits are subsumed under the non-economic, 
higher end of happiness.374 For Kern, Aristotle’s solution to the economizing problem 
of societies is exemplified by his agent-focused solution to the problem of property 
distribution in Pol. II.7. Aristotle says:
 
So, while equalizing the property of citizens is among the things that helps 
prevent faction, it is certainly no big thing, so to speak. For cultivated people 
would get dissatisfied, on the grounds that they do not merit equality. That is 
why they are often seen to engage in sedition and start faction. Besides, human 
greed is an insatiable thing. Thus two obols is enough at first, but once that has 
become traditional, they go on always asking for more, until they go beyond 
all limit. For there is no natural limit to desires, and satisfying them is what the 
many spend their lives trying to do. The starting point in such matters, 
therefore, rather than leveling property, is to arrange that naturally decent 
people are disposed not to want to be acquisitive, and that base ones cannot be 
(and this is the case if they are weaker and are not treated unjustly. (Pol. 
1267a37-1267b9) 
Aristotle here argues that since there is no natural limit in the desire for physical 
gratification, the solution is to educate the desires of those who are more amenable to 
reason and to, somehow, arrange (or perhaps regulate) the economic activity of 
those—the ignoble ones—who are less disposed to virtue. Kern’s reading links this 
passage with Pol. 1257b40-1258a7 where Aristotle shows that the desire for physical 
gratification is insatiable in those who misconceive the good life with the life of 
physical gratification.375 For Kern, the Aristotelian solution to the problem of greed 
suggests a non-structuralist explanation: greed is a natural predisposition; hence, it 
arises independently from the practices of commercial economies. If Aristotle thought 
that economic institutions foster greed, he would have argued that problems of 
economic justice should be solved by regulation—e.g. by equalizing property. As 
374 Kern (1983) here appeals to Aristotle’s analysis of happiness in NE I; viz. happiness does not consist 
in wealth accumulation but in virtue, practical and intellectual.
375 Kern (1983:507) correctly refers back to Pol. 1267a40 because here Aristotle argues that the desire 
for wealth required for the satisfaction of bodily desires is insatiable.
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Kern suggests, Aristotle was not in favor of a wholesale rejection of the market 
solution to the economizing problem of societies because he thought that market 
exchanges are necessary and that greed is a natural predisposition that can be 
counteracted by the virtues, without modifying the institutions of a market economy. 
He agrees with Lowry that, for Aristotle, there is no inherent natural limit in human 
desires for excessive wealth. Hence, for Kern, Aristotle explains greed in agential 
terms since his interpretation places human reason in the driver’s seat of economic 
behavior: reason can ultimately set the upper limit on the desire for excessive wealth, 
setting the proper economic ends.376  
Ryan Balot, too, claims that the passage of Pol. 1257b40-1258a14 clearly supports an 
agential explanation of greed.377 Although he recognizes that business and money 
may intensify or even incite the desire for excessive wealth, Balot’s Aristotle holds 
that greed arises independently from such institutions.378 That is why, says Balot, 
“Aristotle laments that as a matter of fact all wealth getters, even householders, try to 
increase their holdings without limit”;379 their natural tendency to seek pleasure 
disposes agents to confuse the end of natural chrematistics with the end of unnatural 
chrematistics as the passage suggests. Balot also offers a very useful discussion of 
greed and argues that it differs from acquisitiveness which is the subject of the 
passage. In general, commentators, especially structuralists, assume that the desire for 
excessive wealth that motivates unlimited acquisition is the same vice with greed. 
However, greed is the state which motivates particular injustice. Also, the subject 
matter of Pol. 1257b40-1258a14 is not greed. Aristotle’s explanation of greed is based 
mainly in NE V.1-2 and X.7. I examine greed in section 6.2.  
In sum, the structure of commercial economies is supposed to explain the deleterious 
effects of market economies on virtue. The structuralist interpretation does not make a 
close reading of Aristotle’s analysis of how the vices of injustice and illiberality arise. 
Do they arise from repeated profit-maximizing behavior or from an inborn tendency 
376 This idea is based on Aristotle’s solution to the economizing problem. See Gordon (2005): “For 
Aristotle economics is predominantly concerned with the question of selecting the end or aim to be 





to physical gratification? In the latter case, the vice of injustice may arise in all kinds 
of economy, market and pre-market ones. On the other hand, the agential reading 
holds that business does not necessitate vices, like injustice. However, in the next 
section I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of self-love (φιλαυτία) in NE IX.8 suggests 
that commercial injustice arises with selfishness. Since business prioritizes the selfish 
pursuit of unlimited wealth, it is inimical to virtue. The next section is an attempt to 
understand the structure of economic vices.
6.2 Economic Vices and Commercial Economies
Aristotle censures commerce and money-lending because they operate on the 
principle of profit-maximization (Pol. 1257b3-5; 1258a9-14) and the pursuit of 
unlimited wealth (Pol. 1257b23-34). In NE V.1-2 he links profit-seeking with greed 
(πλεονεξία; the state that prompts injustice),380 καπηλική with acquisitiveness (Pol. 
1257b40-1258a7), and avarice with illiberality (NE IV.2). We need to read closely 
Aristotle’s analysis of greed, avarice, illiberality and injustice and examine how he 
thinks that these vices arise.
6.2.1 Greed, Illiberality and Particular Injustice
Some commentators argue that there is no single characteristic desire or emotion 
which is specific to particular justice. For example, Bernard Williams points out that 
there are acts of injustice which are not motivated by greed (πλεονεξία); injustices 
like grabbing the property of others or refusing to repay a debt could be motivated by 
malice or revenge.381 Aristotle does not state the connection between greed and 
commercial injustice in NE V.5 but there is a recognizable connection between profit-
seeking behavior and commercial injustice in the NE V.2 (NE 1129b1). The vice of 
injustice belongs to the class of particular vices, like cowardice and self-indulgence 
(NE 1130b15-16): 
Evidently, therefore, there is apart from injustice in the wide sense another, 
‘particular’, injustice which...is concerned with honour or money or safety—or 
380 In his analysis of justice as a virtue, Aristotle says that the predicate ‘just’ characterizes the person 
that is not grasping, whereas ‘unjust’ refers to the person that acts from graspingness (NE 1129b1).
381 Williams (1980).
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that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it—and its motive is 
the pleasure that arises from gain. (NE 1130a31-b3) 
The sphere of application of particular justice is the sphere of exchange and the sphere 
of distribution of benefits and burdens—in particular, the distribution of the contested 
goods, viz. wealth, honor and safety (NE 1130b1-3). ‘Gain’ here should have the 
sense of unfair gain because greedy agents are disposed to getting more of the goods 
or less of the ills of fortune than they ought (NE 1129b6-10).382 Moreover, acts of 
particular injustice—e.g. profiteering or refusing to repay a debt—differ from acts of 
general injustice—e.g. committing adultery or deserting one’s comrades during battle. 
The former, says Aristotle, are motivated by greed, while the latter are motivated by 
such vices as intemperance and cowardice respectively (NE 1129b19-24). In 
particular: 
There is, then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide 
sense, and a use of the word ‘unjust’ which answers to a part of what is unjust 
in the wide sense of ‘contrary to the law’. Again, if one man commits adultery 
for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the 
bidding of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter 
would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is 
unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his 
making gain by his act. Again, all other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to 
some particular kind of wickedness, e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the 
desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but 
if a man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but 
injustice. Evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his 
act. (NE 1130a22-33)
Adultery for the sake of gain is not gain from a commercial exchange but Aristotle’s 
point here seems to be that acting unjustly for the sake of gain (i.e. from greed) 
separates particular from general justice, too.383 Those who act from greed violate 
particular justice; those who act from some other motive (e.g. adultery due to 
intemperance) commit a general injustice. This is the connection between greed and 
particular injustice in the Nicomachean Ethics V.1-5: the greedy person is someone 
who gets an undue gain in an exchange or acts unjustly for the sake of gain. 
382 Particular justice as a virtue is fairness in sharing (NE 1129a32-35). Aristotle says that the just is 
also fair (ἴσον; i.e. the fair or equal-minded; hence, τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον). In 
contrast, injustice refers to the unfair (τὸ ἄνισον). 
383 The adulterous act is unjust in the particular sense, perhaps, because the adulterer he/she fakes love 
in order to deceive his/her lover and, hence, does not reciprocate the love he/she receives. 
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Particular injustice and illiberality are supposed to be separate vices. According to 
Aristotle, illiberality is “the deficiency in giving and the excess in getting” (τῇ τ᾽ 
ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως; NE 1121b18-19):384
Others again exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any 
source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people, and those 
who lend small sums and at high rates. For all of these take more than they 
ought and from wrong sources. What is common to them is evidently sordid 
love of gain; they all put up with a bad name for the sake of gain, and little 
gain at that. For those who make great gains but from wrong sources, and not 
the right gains, e.g. despots when they sack cities and spoil temples, we do not 
call mean but rather wicked, impious, and unjust. (NE 1121b33-1122a6)
 
In this respect, illiberality in taking resembles to injustice because they both involve 
the love of gain and excessive taking—viz. taking more than one ought to take. The 
obvious difference between them is that illiberality is based on sordid sources of gain 
(αἰσχροκερδής), whereas injustice is based on cheating in an exchange. Their 
psychological difference is not obvious. A number of commentators suggest further 
that the πλεονέκτης desires to gain because he/she feels pleased that others lose.385 
But this is not the pleasure of a fair win, like in a game of chess. According to this 
interpretation, the greedy person derives pleasure from unfair gain, e.g. by cheating 
others, hence, by stripping others from their due. Let us see these glosses in more 
detail.
Richard Kraut explicates the desire to deprive others from their holdings as 
ἐπιχαιρεκακία, i.e. feeling pleasure at another’s undeserved losses.386 According to his 
analysis, νέμεσις is the disposition to feel pain when someone does well undeservedly 
and lies between envy, viz. feeling pain at one’s deserved good fortune and 
ἐπιχαιρεκακία. Kraut identifies πλεονεξία with ἐπιχαιρεκακία: what pleases the 
384 According to Aristotle, the virtue of liberality lies in a mean between the vices of illiberality and 
prodigality: “With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the 
defect prodigality and meanness.” He defines the liberal person as someone who “will both give and 
spend the right amounts and on the right objects, alike in small things and in great, and that with 
pleasure; he will also take the right amounts and from the right sources. (NE 1120b26-31)”. The 
important point about acquisition here is that the liberal agent takes the right amount from the right 
sources.
385 Curzer (1995:215).
386 Kraut (2002:139). See pp. 136-141 for Kraut’s interpretation.  
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πλεονέκτης is that others will suffer from the undeserved loss, when evil befalls 
others. So, causing suffering to others is part of the motive of greed. 
In a similar vein, Curzer suggests that πλεονεξία is the desire for a larger share of 
goods “qua more than one’s share out of a desire to cheat others of what they 
deserve”; gain for the πλεονέκτης agent is gain at the expense of others.387 The agent 
wants more only in a way that violates fairness. Its opposite is μειονεξία (meionexia), 
a masochistic desire for a smaller amount of goods than one’s due which brings the 
agent at a disadvantageous position in relation to others.388 In Curzer’s analysis, 
particular justice is the virtue that lies between the extremes of πλεονεξία and 
μειονεξία. For Curzer, while particular injustice and illiberality share the desire to 
acquire an excessive amount of goods, they differ in what appeals to the unjust who is 
πλεονέκτης and to the illiberal who is αἰσχροκερδής: the first derives pleasure from 
undeserved gain while the second derives pleasure from the excessive amount of 
goods. 
But Kraut’s and Curzer’s readings make πλεονεξία a rarer vice than is fit for 
Aristotle’s analysis of commercial justice which is concerned with a very ordinary 
practice among ordinary people (NE V.5). According to this reading, those who would 
fail to reciprocate in exchanges due to greed (πλεονεξία) should be regarded as 
desiring undue gains intrinsically which is rather unusual and rare. 
Others suggest that greed is excessive competitiveness.389 By increasing his/her 
property, the greedy person gains a competitive advantage over others. This reading is 
based on the idea that external goods are contested because they are scarce and, hence, 
that commercial exchange is a zero-sum game. Therefore, the greedy can only 
387 Curzer (1995:215).
388 Ibid. 220.
389 Williams (1980). Irwin (1988:426) stresses that greed involves the desire for a competitive 
advantage. This reading of πλεονεξία agrees with the dictionary definition of Liddell and Scott who 
render it as “greediness with a view to one’s own advantage” since it stresses the comparative function 
of the term ‘advantage’ and the competitive context of allocations; greed is about goods that are objects 
of competition (NE 1168b15-23). Hence, if competitiveness is the mark of πλεονεξία, the πλεονέκτης 
person is someone who is moved to acquire an undeserved gain because he/she desires to have more 
than others. Yet, the desire to have more than others is not clearly about gaining for the sake of gain; it 
might be for the sake of assuaging one’s excessive sensual desires.
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increase their property by getting a larger share of the contested goods than they ought. 
On that score, the unjust person would be someone who seeks to gain because he/she 
desires to have more than others for the sake of superiority; the unjust is not someone 
who desires excessive wealth in order to satisfy his/her insatiable desires (ἀπληστία; 
Pol. 1267b1-5). In this respect, greed and injustice could be explained by excessive 
competitiveness. 
However, there is evidence that the psychology of greed resembles to that of avarice 
which is marked by the desire for excessive wealth in order to gratify the insatiable 
desire for physical gratification:
And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay 
enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want 
more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire to be unlimited, 
and most men live only for the gratification of it. (Pol. 1267b1-5)390
Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love [i.e. φιλαυτία] to 
people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and 
bodily pleasures; for these are what most people desire, and busy themselves 
about as though they were the best of all things, which is the reason, too, why 
they become objects of competition. So those who are grasping [i.e. 
πλεονέκται] with regard to these things [i.e. wealth, honours, and bodily 
pleasures] gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and the irrational 
element of the soul; and most men are of this nature (NE 1168b15-21) 391
In these passages, there is an obvious connection between greed and the urge to 
satisfy one’s insatiable desires for the sake of physical gratification.392 Greed, the 
desire for more possessions than one already has (ἀεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείονος), here is 
explained by the insatiability and unlimitedness of human desire (ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς 
390 Translated by Jowett who renders ἄπληστον as avarice and connects it with πλεονεξία (πλείονος and 
πλεονεκτεῖν): ἔτι δ’ ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν διωβελία μόνον, 
ὅταν δ’ ἤδη τοῦτ’ ᾖ πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἄπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς 
ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἧς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς 
οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι 
πλεονεκτεῖν (Pol. 1267b1-5). 
391 Δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον 
ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι 
περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς 
ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς·
392 Also, greed might be based on the love of money (φιλοχρηματία). About φιλοχρηματία see Pol. 
1263a40-b5 and Pol. 1271a16-17. See also about φιλοχρηματία and injustice: “Yet pretty well the 
majority of deliberate acts of injustice are caused among men by ambition and love of money” (Pol. 
1275a15-17). However, Aristotle does not explain whether he refers to particular or general justice.
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ἐπιθυμίας φύσις). Also, Aristotle says that the greedy person (πλεονέκτης) is selfish 
(φίλαυτος); he/she pursues a greater share of wealth for the sake of gratifying the 
irrational element of their soul, their appetites. Here Aristotle seems to connect the 
desire for gain with selfishness which may issue in injustice. I will come back to this 
point shortly.
So far, we know that the illiberal person has a sordid love of gain (αἰσχροκερδής), viz. 
he/she or takes more than one ought to take from the wrong sources, and the greedy 
person gets more than one ought in exchanges and distributions of contested goods. 
Yet, the psychological difference that underlies particular injustice and illiberality in 
taking is not clear since both the unjust and the illiberal persons are also avaricious; 
they seek more than they ought to because of their insatiable desire for physical 
gratification. 
For Aristotle, greed motivates particular injustice (e.g. NE 1130a22-33) and 
illiberality motivates general injustice. Is there a clear psychological difference apart 
from the difference in spheres of application—viz. the distribution of contested goods 
vs. the source of goods/wealth? We need to understand their psychological structure 
in order to understand how they arise. Charles Young argues that greed consists “in 
the absence of a certain restraint on the desire for gain.”393 Hence, the unjust person 
lacks restraint in regards to the desire for excessive and undue gain, whereas the “just 
person does not want gain when it involves taking what belongs to another.”394 For 
Young, both the greedy and the illiberal persons desire excessive gain but they differ 
in that the former lacks the inhibition on that desire. Hence, while the illiberal desire 
to gain, too, they are not greedy because they can curb their appetite for gain. Yet, 
Aristotle says that there are several kinds of illiberal persons; some of them may put 
up with the disgrace of sordid gain: they often take more than they ought to from the 
wrong sources, especially for small gains (e.g. they lend small sums at high rates; NE 
1121b32-1122a13). Young’s reading assumes that the illiberal agents can curb their 
desire for gain. However, as NE 1122a1-13 shows, some of the illiberal in taking lack 




Also, Young’s reading implies that particular justice is essentially the ability to inhibit 
the desire for unfair gain. Yet, Aristotle individuates justice as the wish for what is 
just (NE 1129a7-10).395 In other words, the just person is disposed to act virtuously 
and do the right thing (general justice) or to get due shares (particular justice). 
Trivially, particular justice is the disposition to take a due share of goods, not merely 
the disposition to inhibit greed. A way to amend Young’s reading is to show that there 
is a positive psychological state which underlies particular justice. I propose that this 
state is proper self-love (φιλαυτία). According to Aristotle, the proper kind of self-
love motivates agents to seek the noble:
In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to 
assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense, then, as has 
been said, a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men 
are so, he ought not. (NE 1169a35-b2)
The good person is someone who gratifies and obeys the rational element of his/her 
soul; loving one’s intellect (nous),396 the best part of oneself, is the noble way of 
loving oneself (NE 1168b29-1169a11). Aristotle considers self-love as a constant—
“he [i.e. man] is his own best friend” (NE 1168b10). However, the proper kind of self-
love is not selfishness; the good person channels their self-love into noble things, 
including the good of their friends and their community (NE 1169a19-31).
It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends 
and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both 
wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, 
gaining for himself nobility…[H]e is therefore assigning the greater good to 
himself. The same too is true of honour and office; all these things he will 
sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for himself. (NE 1169a19-
31)
395 The virtues are intermediate states between extremes with regard to characteristic actions, desires or 
emotions. Aristotle’s account of justice follows the principle of disjoint spheres, viz. “each moral virtue 
has some characteristic motivation for a characteristic object which distinguishes it from the other 
moral virtues so that no moral virtues overlap”; Drefcinski (2000:113-114). Apart from characteristic 
motivations, his account is concerned with characteristic spheres of action—e.g. particular justice is 
concerned with justice in exchange while liberality in taking is concerned with taking the right amount 
from the right sources. In various places Aristotle argues that character traits concern both actions and 
affective states (NE 1106b6-7; 1108a18-9; 1109a23 and 1009b10). 
396 The noble self-lovers love their intellect because this is the sovereign part of the self and deserves 
their affection and respect. That is why the good life needs friendship; by loving one’s friends (a 
person’s other self) agents become virtuous and just.
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By acting for the sake of the noble—hence, securing the greatest good, i.e. virtue—, 
the good person exemplifies proper self-love since he/she benefits oneself and others 
at the same time.397 Aristotle does not state the connection between particular justice 
and self-love here but we expect that the proper kind of self-love involves the 
disposition to seek one’s due in exchanges. The connection between self-love and 
particular justice seems to be the following.398 Since justice is an other-regarding 
virtue (pros heteron; NE 1130a32b1) that issues in reciprocity, the proper self-lover 
acts justly because associations for exchange are a species of utility friendship which 
are reciprocal relationships based on good will.399 In addition, the proper self-lovers 
are not interested in maximizing their share of the contested goods because they seek 
the “greater share in what is noble”. In sum, the just person should be someone who is 
disposed to reciprocal exchanges since he/she extends his/her self-love to others and 
seeks the noble instead of a larger share of the contested goods. On the other hand, 
greed is a state of selfishness: 400 
Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who 
assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily 
pleasures; for these are what most people desire, and busy themselves about as 
though they were the best of all things, which is the reason, too, why they 
become objects of competition. So those who are grasping with regard to these 
things gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and the irrational 
element of the soul; and most men are of this nature. (NE 1168b15-21)
Here Aristotle says that the pursuit of excessive and undue shares is based on 
selfishness, i.e. the improper kind of self-love. The selfish persons assign to 
themselves the greater share of the contested goods because they live as passion 
dictates and can only secure the means to satisfy their excessive appetite for pleasure 
by taking the due shares of others. In other words, the greedy seek to gain undue 
shares because they are not disposed to reciprocity; their self-love is excessive.
397 If friendship is an extension of proper self-love—self-love is the standard of friendship since the 
friend is another self—, then improper self-love does not allow friendship. 
398 Pakaluk (2008:276-82). Given that the good person loves oneself properly and that one’s friends are 
one’s other self, the good person feels love for one’s friends and good will towards one’s fellow 
citizens (εὔνοια; good will; for Aristotle, friendship is reciprocal good will; see NE 1156a4-5). In 
particular, the good person wishes others well. Hence, friendship is an extension of self-love.
399 Irwin (1988:625n11).
400 Aristotle says that, strictly speaking, the selfish person does not love oneself properly since he/she 
lives the life of pleasure which does not benefit oneself really.
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In sum, there is no obvious psychological difference between the unjust person and 
the illiberal in taking. Τheir obvious difference lies in the sphere of application: the 
illiberal seek to gain from sordid sources, while the unjust seek to gain from 
exchanges. Aristotle does not mention the characteristic motive of illiberality in 
taking. Most possibly, illiberality in taking is characteristically motivated by avarice. 
But the greedy/unjust seek to gratify their appetites, too. Young argues that, unlike the 
illiberal, the greedy are those who cannot inhibit their desire for gain. But Aristotle 
does not say that the greedy are intemperate with regard to gain, as Young’s reading 
implies. I propose that their love of undue gain is based on their excessive self-love. 
Hence, their main psychological difference is that the greedy/unjust lack the 
disposition to reciprocate because they are selfish, whereas the illiberal are not 
characteristically motivated from selfishness. In the next section, I examine which of 
the two readings is more compatible with Aristotle’s moral psychology and analysis 
of ‘economic’ vices in order to reconstruct his answer to the Master Question (2.b).
6.3 Critical Discussion
In my view, Aristotle’s moral psychology and social thought—his thinking about 
social institutions—support both structuralist and agential explanations of economic 
vices. On the one hand, habituation is a social process that shapes human character. 
Part of this explanation is institutional; it stresses the role of social institutions in 
character formation. On the other hand, Aristotle’s naturalistic history of socio-
economic formations and institutions is agential: the institutions of market exchange 
and money are explained by human nature, including the natural ends of humans. 
Also, his emphasis on rational choice and responsibility in character formation 
suggests that agents can resist the social influences on their character. I argue that 
Aristotle employs both explanations at various places but the agential explanation is 
primary. The difficulty of the agential explanation is that it cannot account for the fact 
that the cities which prioritize wealth over virtue are inimical to virtue. 
6.2.1 The Structuralist Interpretation
200
In Politics I.9 avarice appears to originate with the institutions of money and 
exchange since these gave rise to καπηλική which usually aims at unlimited wealth. 
The invention of coined money (Pol. 1257b3-6) and commerce created the belief that 
wealth consists in “a large quantity of coin” and is unlimited (Pol. 1257a41-b10; 
1256b40). In particular, the κάπηλος creates wealth from the exchange itself by 
finding the most profitable exchanges.401 In Pol. 1257b32-40 Aristotle explains that 
people mistake the two kinds of exchange (μεταβλητική), namely, necessary 
exchange and business, because both kinds use money as a medium of exchange. 
However, this double use obscures the difference in their purpose: necessary 
exchange aims at true wealth, whereas καπηλική aims at spurious wealth through the 
maximization of profit. People fail to notice this difference and think that all exchange 
should aim at unlimited wealth. In this respect, the institutions of money and business 
incite the desire for profit and unlimited wealth. Hence, Aristotle‘s account of the 
desire for spurious wealth in Pol. 1257b32-41 seems to be primarily structuralist. 
If particular injustice is motivated by selfishness, then it may arise from living in a 
city-state that prioritizes material self-interest and unlimited wealth above all, as 
MacIntyre shows. That is, agents do not have to practice unjust acts repeatedly in 
order to become unjust. Commercial economies tend to crowd-out virtue in favor of 
wealth. For example, they undermine proper self-love and friendship which are chief 
components of the virtue of particular justice. In this sense, the structuralist reading 
has wide scope. Even if the propensity towards greed is somewhat natural—due to the 
insatiability of sensual desires, as Aristotle says in Pol. 1267b1-5—commercial 
economies seem to bring out the propensity towards unlimited acquisition. As Lewis 
explains, commercial economies may even necessitate the pursuit of unlimited 
acquisition because of competition and anxiety. The problem with Lewis’ 
interpretation is that it lacks textual support. 
Meikle’s reading is partly based on Aristotle’s text. In Pol. 1258a710-14, Aristotle’s 
worry appears to be that commercial economies—economies of exchange value as 
Meikle coins them—promote unlimited acquisition and profit-seeking. He explains 
401 Καπηλική is productive (ποιητική; poiêtikê) of wealth and money; it creates wealth by making profit 
from the exchange itself (Pol. 1258b31). 
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that profit-seeking corrupts professions and turns them into money machines. Hence, 
for Meikle, Aristotle is worried that economies of exchange value eventually lead to 
vice. On the other hand, Meikle fails to convince that the M-C-M cycle as such 
nurtures greed and injustice because he wrongly assumes that all commerce is an 
unfair zero-sum game and concludes that all forms of M-C-M necessitate greed. In 
my view, Meikle’s reading is not correct because Aristotle approves of foreign trade 
although it is an instance of the M-C-M cycle; hence, the practice of M-C-M, as such, 
does not necessitate greed and injustice. 
Also, Meikle’s and Pack’s interpretation misreads Aristotle’s analysis of greed: 
maximizing economies may force acquisitive behavior but they do not necessarily 
inculcate greed in agents. We saw that greed is peculiar to particular injustice since it 
primarily pertains to undue profit in distributions and exchanges of the contested 
goods. But Aristotle’s objection to unnatural chrematistics in Pol. I.9 is primarily 
concerned with the pursuit of spurious wealth—which is his main argument against 
unnatural chrematistics; this objection pertains to avarice, not to greed/particular 
injustice. The formation of injustice in Aristotle’s psychology presupposes the 
repetition of unjust acts. However, one who seeks to increase one’s wealth may do so 
by investing on profitable stocks or ventures, or by maximizing one’s accounting 
profit justly (e.g. by effective cost-cutting). One does not become unjust necessarily 
by seeking to increase one’s wealth, although one may become increasingly 
acquisitive or φιλοχρήματος (lover of money) by doing so. Structuralist interpreters 
wrongly assume that exchange-based economies invariably nurture greed/injustice in 
and of themselves. Also, the strong claim that greed arises from the institutions of 
money and business necessarily cannot be correct because greed is based on the 
nature of desire (Pol. 1267b1-5) and, second, it is based on selfishness, i.e. excessive 
self-love (NE IX.8). Selfishness arises from one’s attachment to the appetitive part of 
one’s soul. Such an attachment does not presuppose a specific economic arrangement 
in Aristotle’s writings. 
On the other hand, a weak structuralist reading is more defensible. As we saw above 
in this section, commercial economies do not necessitate vice but crowd out virtue 
because they prioritize wealth and self-interest above everything. Also, they reinforce 
202
selfishness which may issue in acts of particular injustice. In virtue-theoretic terms, 
the problem of avarice and greed is that they may permeate all forms of exchange-
based chrematistics, natural and non-natural ones. As we saw in Pol. 1258a10-14 
Aristotle launches a critique of the profit-motive, not of the M-C-M cycle in particular. 
As Barker says “there is no more need for every dealer to make wealth his sole object 
of life, than there is for every doctor.”402 While greed/injustice may arise 
independently from the mode of acquisition, commercial economies, where 
everything is commoditized, promote the pursuit of unlimited wealth.403 
In general, commercial economies are regulated by competition and put self-interest 
over intrinsic goods, civic friendship and co-operative practices for the sake of utility-
maximization. As Lewis notes, when profit-maximization is the only strategy of 
survival, economic agents (businesses and households) feel anxious and adopt 
maximizing behavior; anxiety may crowd out the moral motives of agents. It is no 
surprise that Aristotle warns that the profit-motive should not overcome non-
economic or intrinsic motives because, as MacIntyre shows, the goods external to 
noble vocations can often be had by use of immoral behavior. The ‘advantageous’ 
tends to invade non-economic spheres where intrinsic goods have their home—e.g. 
the sphere of noble occupations or intrinsic goods—and, hence, crowds out all 
intrinsic motivation. In a more general way, as Irwin notes, the commercial ethos of a 
city, viz. a city where market institutions require a certain set of character traits, may 
nurture maximizing behavior (e.g. Pol. 1337a11-27):
Moreover, habits and responses will be weak and confused if they are 
encouraged only by, say, parents, but discouraged by the attitudes prevailing 
in social life. If parents encourage a child to regard wealth and honour as 
comparatively unimportant, but she grows up in a state that values these goods 
to excess, she will find it hard to form any stable character, let alone the right 
one. If Aristotle is right about the nature of the virtues and the training they 
require, and right also about the influence of the state on the habits and 
characters of its citizens, he has made a strong prima facie case for public 
moral education. [Irwin (1988:418)]
402 Barker (1906:384).
403 Hence, I agree with Balot (2001:38) who argues that Aristotle does not say that “money creates or 
awakens that desire”; acquisitiveness stems from a non-rational attachment to the bodily enjoyment (pp. 
35-44). The most we can infer is that money facilitates unlimited acquisition. 
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Irwin’s point rightly highlights the power of structures and institutions in character 
formation. Actually, Aristotle argues that the lawmakers should so design the 
institutions of property acquisition and distribution as to limit injustice since sensual 
desires are insatiable and the non-rational part of most people’s soul is not sufficiently 
amenable to reason (Pol. 1267a5-12 and 1267b5-7; also, Pol. 1321b12-17 about 
supervision of market operation). However, the prospect of moral education, a 
distinctively Aristotelian notion, gives primacy to the agential reading. While 
structures co-create character, Aristotle’s moral psychology suggests that free agency, 
not structures, is the primary explanans of human character and action.
6.3.2 The Agential Reading
In Pol. 1257b40-1258a7 Aristotle offers an agential explanation of the desire for 
spurious wealth. He attributes the emergence of καπηλική primarily to the natural 
propensity for unlimited wealth, and, secondarily, to the institutions of money and 
market exchange. The pursuit of spurious wealth is based on the common 
misconception that the good life is the life of pleasure; agents tend to confuse the two 
kinds of chrematistics because they are disposed to the kind of chrematistics which 
serves the life of pleasure through excessive wealth. In other words, the excessive 
desire for gratification explains the desire for excessive wealth and the use of 
καπηλική as a means to acquiring it. Hence, in this respect, Aristotle does not blame 
καπηλική as such and, more generally, the institutions of commercial economies for 
the pursuit of spurious wealth. As we saw, he considers avarice and the love of money 
as nearly universal propensities (e.g. Pol. 1263b4-5). 
Aristotle’s theories of moral character and moral responsibility suggest that agents 
have the capacity for decision and voluntary action. Hence, these support the primacy 
of the agential reading. Aristotle explicitly claimed that agents are responsible for 
their characters and voluntary acts. According to his definition of voluntariness:
(V) A does X = act voluntarily if and only if (a) the moving principle of X is in A, 
and (b) A has knowledge of facts about X.  
He considers a number of excusing and exempting conditions for responsibility. We 
already saw that force is an excusing condition: an act done under force or ignorance 
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(NE 1110a1) is involuntary. Then he discusses compulsion or duress. Acts done under 
compulsion are mixed (μεικτές; NE 1110a12): a sea-captain who in the midst of a 
storm throws away cargo to save the ship and the crew, acts voluntarily in the causal 
sense but involuntarily because “no one would choose anything of this sort [i.e. the 
intentional object of a mixed act] for itself” (NE 1110a19-20).404 Aristotle then 
considers ignorance and intoxication: causing harm in ignorance—e.g. under 
intoxication or drunkenness—is not an excuse. On the other hand, acting because of 
factual ignorance is an excusing condition. Third, ignorance of norms—e.g. stealing is 
wrong—is not an excusing condition—everyone should know such universals (NE 
1110a35). 
The most controversial part of Aristotle’s account of responsibility is his claim that 
our virtues and vices are up to us (NE 1113b6-7).405 For Aristotle, acting under the 
guise of the good is not an excusing condition.406 To do so, Aristotle appeals to his 
thesis that moral character is the product of habituation: qualities of character result 
from doing like acts (NE 1103b22-3). And this process is up to us: 
But we are ourselves responsible for having become this sort of person, by 
living slackly, and for being unjust or self-indulgent, in the first case by treating 
people badly, in the second by passing our time in drinking and that sort of 
thing; for it is the sort of activity we display in each kind of thing that gives us 
the corresponding character (NE 1114a5-9).
What if one is not aware that qualities of character result from doing like acts? 
Aristotle argues, rather unpersuasively, that to ignore this is a sign of a thoroughly 
senseless person (NE 1114a9). Unfortunately, he does not provide support for this 
claim although this is a crucial step in his argument. In any case, Aristotle points out 
that one’s character is not determined by the structures and conditions of a society. To 
be sure, his view of responsibility highlights his belief in free agency. Hence, 
although habituation is a social process, Aristotle wants to reconcile it with free 
agency. Otherwise his theory of moral responsibility would not be compatible with 
404 But, Aristotle says, there is a limit: there is no such thing as being forced to slay one’s mother, like 
Euripides’ Alkmaeon did; Alkmaeon should have faced death instead (NE 1110a28).
405 Aristotle’s main claim in NE III.5 is that it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious.
406 The good appears in accord with one’s character—and we are responsible for our characters (NE 
1114a31-114b26). With this move Aristotle tries to reject the Socratic claim that vicious acts are 
involuntary (Protagoras 352a-c; Gorgias 468b; Meno 77e-78b).
205
his theory of habituation: moral character is formed by habituation and natural 
propensities but agents are not automata—they elect the conditions that shape their 
character. Rational choice or decision is the leeway from the determinism of 
habituation. Aristotle argues that the object of decision (προαίρεσις) is the same with 
the object of deliberation; they are both about things that are up to us (NE 1111b30). 
For example, we do neither deliberate about nor choose to find “a cache of treasure” 
(NE 1112a28) although we may wish we found one. Furthermore, Aristotle defines 
virtue as “disposition that issues in decisions” (NE 1106b36), that is, our dispositions 
are reason-responsive. 
In sum, the following are the barebones of Aristotle’s theory of free agency. First, he 
gives a condition for liability, that is, voluntariness. Second, character traits are 
acquired voluntarily; they issue in decisions and, ipso facto, their exercise is 
concerned with things that are up to us. Third, the capacity for decision is necessary 
for responsible agency. Lacking this capacity is an exempting condition from moral 
agency. We are responsible to the extent that our dispositions are reason-responsive. 
Insane agents are not capable of moral agency since they lack rational control of their 
behaviour. But the pressure of social structures on agents is not an exempting 
condition for Aristotle. We are ultimately responsible for our voluntary actions and 
characters because we are capable of free agency.407 Aristotle does not clarify whether 
those with settled good dispositions could become greedy by repeating their profit-
seeking behavior. We only know that he views moral development as a relatively 
ongoing process. He also thinks that, up to a certain point, bad dispositions are 
revisable because agents’ dispositions and acquisitive desires are 
reason-responsive.408 A possible objection to the agential reading could be that 
407 Some commentators, ancient and contemporary, have tried to trace Aristotle’s assumptions about 
freedom and determinism. For example, Hughes (2001:137-142) and Broadie (1991:149-159) attribute 
to Aristotle some form of libertarianism, whereas Meyer (1998) thinks that Aristotle would subscribe to 
Stoic compatibilism. In any case, determinism is not a cogent rendering of Aristotle’s views about 
agency.
408 Aristotle does not preclude character reform. He only says that those who have done irreversible 
damage to their characters can no longer restore their moral health—this is like trying to restore a stone 
which we have just let go (NE 1114a15-20). For the gloss that reason can deliberate on, and evaluate, 
ends see Sorabji, R. (1980) and Wiggins (1980). Aristotle’s psychology allows character reform 
because when reason discovers some good, wish (βούλησις) follows up and motivates the agent 
automatically; see (DA 433a22-5) and Cooper (1999). Hence, we can start acting contrary to vicious 
desires and generate better dispositions.
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character traits do not arise by nature. However, this reading is only concerned with 
the origin of propensities, not of virtues. Aristotle recognizes that humans are born 
with certain propensities and nature provides the material to be shaped by moral 
education; virtues result from moral education.  
Apart from his moral psychology, which prioritizes free agency over social 
determinism, Aristotle’s view of redistributive policy bolsters the primacy of agency, 
too. Aristotle rejects Socrates’ and Phaleas’ proposals that put forth a form of 
communism about property as the arrangement that would minimize conflict and 
faction in a city (Pol. 1261b34). He recommends that societies focus primarily on the 
education and equalization of desires instead of redistributive policy aimed at 
preventing avarice.409 In this respect, the structuralist reading cannot be correct 
because Aristotle thinks here that the problem of avarice lies in the psychology of 
individuals rather than in the institution of private property. His comparative 
discussion of existing regimes—Sparta, Crete and Carthage—evinces his confidence 
in the superiority of Carthage partly because of its economic arrangements. Aristotle 
was aware that wealth was highly esteemed in Carthage and its rulers should be both 
virtuous and wealthy because wealth provided a toil-free life, hence, the leisure to 
engage in politics fully.410 In this discussion, Aristotle does not praise the mercantile 
life as such nor does he say whether citizens should engage in such a life, but he 
considers trade to be essential for the prosperity of a city.411 Yet, since this was his 
idea of the proper economic structure of the best practicable city we may infer that, 
for Aristotle, a commercial economy is no ethical threat in and of itself especially 
when the middle-class is the dominant class; citizens of the middle-class tend to 
pursue moderate amounts of wealth and, hence, guard against the acquisitiveness 
facilitated by commercial economies (Pol. IV.11-12). 
409 Aristotle suggests that property should be privately owned and shared on a voluntary basis (Pol. 
1263a30-40).
410 Carthaginian regime combined oligarchic with democratic institutions. A special committee elected 
the rulers, the Senate and the Council on the basis of desert. On the other hand, the democratic aspect 
of the Carthaginian regime included a powerful, popular assembly that referred its concerns to the ruler 
and the fact that the rulers governed for the people—they should comply with the wishes of the people 
(Pol. 1316b5-6). 
411 In Carthage, the lower economic class—the poorer citizens—carried out the necessary functions. 
Some of the wealthy Carthaginians were businessmen—e.g. έμποροι and ναύκληροι—who had access 
to high office. The leisure class most likely relied on rents since the mercantile life was a barrier to 
leisure and political participation.
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While the structuralist interpretation fails to establish that vice has primarily 
institutional origins, we should not ignore that Aristotle recognizes the mutual 
dependence of institutions and characters (NE X.9). In my view, his main worry was 
that a commercial economy is more fertile for the development of injustice, greed, 
cut-throat competition and selfishness than is a natural economy—an economy that is 
in line with his Principle of Teleology. For Aristotle, commercial economies have no 
natural limit and, hence, they need to be managed by individuals and institutions. If 
greed is partly a natural propensity, then a commercial economy is more conducive to 
its growth. Every economy goes hand-in-hand with a set of institutions, a set of values 
and ethos, as well as a system of moral education. This is an important limitation on 
the agential reading. The teleological priority of the city—the ‘perfective’ sense of 
priority—implies that agents depend on the city for the exercise of the function in 
virtue of which they can progress to full existence and happiness. Hence, the city is 
teleologically prior because it enables the fulfillment of the natural end of its parts, i.e. 
the flourishing of humans. Any individual on one’s own could ever hardly enable the 
fulfillment of the city’s end on his/her own. However, agents depend upon the 
specific end of the city in which they live. If the city aims at wealth above virtue it is 
somehow inimical to virtue and undermines the pursuit of happiness as specified by 
Aristotle, i.e. the life of practical and intellectual virtue. Hence, it is quite likely that, 
for Aristotle, commercial economies undermine the project of virtue because they 
rouse the natural propensities to selfishness, greed and avarice. 
6.4 Conclusion and Summary
Aristotle’s answer to the Master Question (2.b) should be that commercial economies 
do not necessitate greed and particular injustice. For Aristotle, virtues and vices arise 
from habituation but it is largely a matter of choice whether the disposition to greed 
and avarice become the settled traits of injustice and illiberality in taking. On the 
other hand, he thinks that such economies are inimical to virtue because they 
exacerbate the natural propensity to greed and selfishness. His argument for the 
teleological priority of the city suggests that agents are functionally dependent on the 
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end of the city. While greed and insatiable desires arise independently from the socio-
economic structures of a city, some structures are more conducive to greed than others. 
Hence, a city that prioritizes material self-interest and wealth above virtue triggers the 
growth of pre-existing propensities to selfishness, greed and avarice.
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EPILOGUE
Let me recapitulate Aristotle’s answer to the components of the Master Question:
The Master Question 
Is the art of wealth-acquisition identical with the art of household-management?
Chrematistics and household-management are not identical. 
Question 1:
What are the aims of the two economic arts? And how are the two arts related to one 
another? For example, is chrematistics a part or auxiliary to household-
management?
The first is the art of supply. It is concerned with the acquisition of wealth, i.e. a 
supply of goods, required for household-management. The art of household-
management is concerned with the management and use of wealth. Chrematistics is a 
productive art while household-management is a practical art. The tasks of 
chrematistics which require the householder’s engagement are part of household-
management, whereas the tasks that can be delegated are auxiliary to it.
Question 2:
When is chrematistics a proper part of household-management and, hence, natural? 
Chrematistics is natural and, hence, part of household-management when it conforms 
to any of the following conditions: first, the source of goods must be nature itself or 
production; second, chrematistics must aim at the natural self-sufficiency of the 
household, i.e. true wealth; third, in exchange-based acquisition the exchange value of 
goods must be based on their use value, it must aim at true wealth, and must be based 
on production. The standard that separates natural from unnatural chrematistics is the 
Natural Standard. 
Question 3: 
When is a commercial exchange just?
Aristotle’s formula of just price (i.e. proportionate equality) is the following: ‘as 
builder is to shoemaker, so many shoes to a house or food’ (NE 1133a22-23; δεῖ 
τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν). 
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The standard of value that determines, for example, the number of shoes or beds that 
should equal one house is the need (or utility) of the producers-exchangers. The just 
price is the price at which the market price of goods approximates their natural price. 
However, the natural price of a good is not formed on the basis of the subjective 
utility of exchangers but on the total utility of a good in the long-run.  
Question (1.a):
Which tasks of chrematistics are proper for the householder and the statesman? To 
what extent should householders pursue wealth?
The householders’ duty depends on which tasks the householder could delegate to 
others in order to secure leisure. The householder should use the knowledge of experts 
in order to manage the tasks of chrematistics. In addition, the householder should 
delegate the tasks related to the practice of chrematistics, e.g. farming, to others. Also, 
the householder should know the essential of commercial chrematistics in order to be 
able to manage the sales of surpluses, to recognize and invest profitable opportunities. 
However, the householder should not be a businessman; business is not part of 
household-management although it could be used as an auxiliary. Natural self-
sufficiency delimits the scope of wealth required for household-management.
Question (2.a):
Which modes of chrematistics are suitable for the good city and the good person / 
citizen?
The ethical status of a mode of chrematistics depends on the constitutional 
arrangement at hand, on its effects on the character of individuals, and on whether it is 
a necessary or noble occupation. Wage labor, business, money-lending, farming and 
the crafts are not noble occupations and, hence, they are unsuitable for the good 
person and citizen of the best city. These forms of wealth-acquisition should be 
delegated to/and practiced by slaves and foreign residents of the city works. Wage 
labor and the crafts are servile occupations and unsuitable for the free person and 
citizen. They also deprive citizens of the leisure required for political participation. 
However, these occupations could be practiced by citizens of non-ideal regimes, like 
the polity. Business is not necessarily an unjust mode of acquisition. Aristotle’s 
analysis of just price and economic value allows for moderate business profit within 
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the bounds of the natural price of goods, such as commercial agriculture, logging and 
mining, commercial manufacture, foreign trade, and in general trade based on the use 
of factors of production. However, business is unsuitable for the good person and 
citizen of the best city. Local and foreign trade should be practiced by foreign 
residents under the supervision of the state. Business is also suitable for the landless 
citizens of non-ideal regimes.  
Question (2.b):  
Does greed arise as a result of the practice of business and more broadly, the 
institutions of money and market exchange? Or is business a neutral device that 
serves to satisfy the natural predisposition of agents for excessive acquisition?
Greed and acquisitiveness are natural propensities that business and commercial 
economies intensify. Business is a neutral device. It depends on agents whether they 
use or misuse it, whether they act justly or unjustly in their economic dealings. 
However, business is inimical to virtue and unsuitable for the good person/citizen and 
the best city because it prioritizes self-interest and profit-seeking above everything 
and, hence, tends to crowd out the virtues. Even if such city-states do not necessitate 
greed/injustice they do not contribute to the realization of the human function, i.e. 
εύδαιμονία. Citizens depend on the end of the city for their ethical growth. 
212
REFERENCES
1. Ackrill, J. (1980). ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’. In: A. Rorty (ed.), Essays in 
Aristotle’s Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2. Andrews, D. (2014). ‘Adam Smith’s Natural Prices, the Gravitation Metaphor, 
and the Purposes of Nature’. Economic Thought (1) 42.
3. Annas, J. (1993). The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Balot, R. (2001). Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
5. Barker, E. (1906). The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. London: Methuen. 
6. –— (1948). The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
7. Barnes, J. (ed.). The Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton (NJ): Princeton 
University Press, 1991.
8. Bielskis, A. & Knight, K. (2015). Virtue and Economy: Essays on Morality and 
Markets. London: Ashgate.
9. Broadie, S. & Rowe, C. (2002). Nicomachean ethics. Translation, Introduction, 
and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Broadie, S. (1991). Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. —— (2006). ‘Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics’. In: R. Kraut (ed.). The 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
12. Burnet, J. (1900). The Ethics of Aristotle. London: Methuen. 
13. Burnyeat, M. (1980). ‘Aristotle on Learning to be Good’. In: A. Rorty (ed.), 
Essays in Aristotle’s Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
14. Capaldi, N. (2013). ‘Pro-Market Versus Anti-Market Approaches to Business 
Ethics’ in C. Luetge (ed.) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business 
Ethics. New York. Springer. 
15. Chan, M. (2006). Aristotle and Hamilton: On Commerce and Statesmanship. 
Columbia (MO): University of Missouri Press.
16. Charles, D. (1988). ‘Perfectionism in Aristotle's Political Theory: Reply to Martha 
Nussbaum’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume (1): 
185-206.
213
17. Child, J. (1998). ‘Profit: The Concept and its Moral Features’. Social Philosophy 
& Policy Foundation.
18. Cooper, J. (1985). ‘Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune’. The Philosophical Review, 
2:173-196.
19. Cooper, J. & Hutchinson, D.S. (eds. 1997). Plato: Complete works. Indianapolis: 
Hackett.
20. —— (1999). ‘Contemplation and Happiness’. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on 
Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
21. Cowan, R. and Rizzo, M. (1995). Profits and Morality. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.
22. Crespo, R. (2014). A Re-assessment of Aristotle’s Economic thought. New 
York: Routledge.
23. Curzer, H. (1995). ‘Aristotle’s Account of the Virtue of Justice’.  Apeiron 28:207-
38.
24. Danzig, G. (2000). ‘The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity’. Classical 
Philology, 95 (4): 399-424.
25. Dobbs, D. (1994). ‘Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle's Defense of 
Slavery’. The Journal of Politics, 56, (1): 69-94. 
26. Drefcinski, S. (2000). ‘Aristotle and the Characteristic Desire of Justice’. Apeiron 
33: 109-123.
27. Ekelund, R. & Hebert, R. (1997). A History of Economic Theory and Method. 
New York: McGraw Hill.
28. Engen, D. (2008) http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economy-of-ancient-greece/
29. Finley, M. (1970). ‘Aristotle and Economic Analysis’. Past and Present, 47: 3-25.
30. Fortenbaugh, W. (1964). ‘Aristotle's Conception of Moral Virtue and Its 
Perceptive Role.’ Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association 95: 77-87.
31. Gordon, B. (1964). Aristotle and the Development of Value Theory. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78 (1): 115-128.
32. —— (1993). ‘Aristotelian Economic Analysis and the Medieval Schoolmen’. 
History of Economics Review, 20 (1): 1-12. 
214
33. —— (2005). ‘Aristotle and Hesiod: The Economic Problem in Greek Thought’. 
Review of Social Economy, 63 (3): 395-404. 
34. Gottlieb, P. (2009). The Virtues of Aristotle’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
35. Graafland, J. (2007). Economics, Ethics and the Market. London: Routledge.
36. Hardie, W.  (1968). Aristotle’s Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
37. Hasebroek, J. (1965). Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece.  Translated by L. M. 
Fraser and D. C. Macgregor. London: Bell.
38. Hausman, D. & McPherson, M. (2006). Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy 
and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Heilbronner, R. (2012). The Making of Economic Society. Upper Saddle River 
(NJ): Pearson. 
40. Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P.H. Nidditch, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
41. Hughes, G. (2001). Aristotle on Ethics. London: Routledge.
42. Irwin, T. (1975). ‘Aristotle on Reason, Desire and Virtue.’ Journal of Philosophy 
(72) 17: 567-578. 
43. —— (1988). Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
44. —— (2007). The Development of Ethics: From Socrates to the Reformation, Vol. 
1. Oxford: Clarendon Press
45. Johnson, V. (1939). ‘Aristotle’s Theory of Value’. The American Journal of 
Philology, 60 (4): 445-451.
46. Jowett, B. (1885). The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
47. Judson, L. (1997). ‘Aristotle on Fair Exchange’. Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 15: 147–75.
48. Karasmanis, V. (1997). ‘The Economic Man in Plato’s Republic’. In K. Boudouris 
(ed.) Plato’s Political Philosophy and Contemporary Democratic Theory, (1): 83-
91.
49. Kay, J. (2003). The Truth About Markets: Their Genius, Their Limits, Their 
Follies. London: Penguin.
50. Kern, W. (1983). ‘Returning to the Aristotelian Paradigm: Daly and Schumacher’. 
History of Political Economy, 15: 501-12.
215
51. Keyt, D. (1991). ‘Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice’. In D. Keyt & F. 
Miller (eds.) A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
52. Kraut, R. (1991). Aristotle on the Human Good.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
53. —— (2002). Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
54. Langholm, O. (1985). Wealth and Money in the Aristotelian Tradition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
55. Lewis, T. (1978). ‘Acquisition and Anxiety: Aristotle’s Case against the Market’. 
Canadian Journal of Economics 11: 69-90.
56. Lowry, T. (1974). ‘Aristotle's 'Natural Limit' and the Economics of Price 
Regulation’. Roman and Byzantine Studies, 15: 57-63.
57. —— (1979). ‘Recent Literature on Ancient Greek Economic Thought’. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 17 (1): 65-86.
58. —— (1987). ‘The Greek Heritage in Economic Thought’ in Pre-Classical 
Economic Thought (Vol. 10 of the series Recent Economic Thought Series);
59. MacIntyre, A. (1984). After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
60. McConnell, C. (2009). Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
61. Marx, K. (1995[1867]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Volume I). 
In Marx/Engels Internet Archive available online.
62. Meikle, S. (1991a). ‘Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange’. Journal of 
Hellenic Studies 111: 193-196.
63. ——(1991b). ‘Aristotle and Exchange Value’. In: D. Keyt & F. Miller (eds.), A 
Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. London: Blackwell. 
64. —— (1995). Aristotle’s Economic Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
65. —— (1996). ‘Aristotle on Business’. The Classical Quarterly 46 (1):138 -151.
66. Meyer, S. (2006). ‘Aristotle on the Voluntary’. In: R. Kraut (ed.). The Blackwell 
Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
67. Miller, F. and Paul, J. (1990). ‘Communitarian and Liberal Theories of the Good’.  
Review of Metaphysics, 43: 803-830.
68. Miller, F. (1995). Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
69. —— (1998). ‘Was Aristotle the First Economist?’ Apeiron 31 (4): 387-398.
216
70. —— (2017). ‘Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?’ In: E. Heath & B. Kaldis 
(eds.) Wealth, Commerce, and Philosophy: Foundational Thinkers and Business 
Ethics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
71. Millet, P. (1991). Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
72. Modrak, D. (2009) ‘Sensation and Desire’. In: G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A 
Companion to Aristotle. Malden (MA) and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
73. Moss, J. (2011). ‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right: Virtue and Phronesis in Aristotle’s 
Ethics’. Phronesis 56 (3): 204-261.
74. Mulgan, R. (1987). Aristotle’s Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of 
Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
75. Newman, W. (1887). The Politics of Aristotle I. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
76. Nussbaum, M. (1986). The Fragility of Goodness. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
77. —— (1988). ‘Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political 
Distribution’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume ( l): 
145-154.
78. —— (1988). ‘Reply to David Charles’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
Supplementary Volume (1): 207-214.
79. Ober, J. (1998). Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of 
Popular Rule. Princeton. Princeton University Press.
80. O’ Neil, J. (1998). The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics. London: 
Routledge.
81. Owens, J. (1981). ‘Aristotle on Leisure’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4): 
713-723
82. Pack, S. (1985). ‘Aristotle and the Problem of Insatiable Desires: A Comment on 
Kern’s Interpretation of Aristotle, with a Reply by William S. Kern. History of 
Political Economy, 17: 391-94.
83. –— (2010). Aristotle, Adam Smith and Karl Marx: On Some Fundamental Issues 
in 21st Century Political Economy. Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar.
84. Pakaluk, M. (2008). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
217
85. Polanyi, K. (1957). ‘Aristotle Discovers the Economy’. In: K. Polanyi, C. 
Arensberg & H. Pearson (eds.). Trade and Market in the Early Empires: 
Economies in History and Theory. Glencoe (IL): The Free Press.
86. Politis, V. (1999). ‘Review: Aristotle’s Economic Thought by Scott Meikle’. The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (195): 279-281.
87. Reeve, C. D. C. (1998). Aristotle: Politics. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company.
88. —— (2006). ‘Aristotle on the Virtues of Thought.’ In: R. Kraut (ed.), The 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 198-217. Oxford: Blackwell.
89. Roberts, J. (2009). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics. 
London: Routledge.
90. Robbins, L. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. 
London: MacMillan.
91. Roche, T. (2014). ‘Happiness and the External Goods’. In: R. Polansky (ed.) The 
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
92. Ross, W. D. (1915[1954]) The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1 (editor). London: Oxford 
University Press. (Available online)
93. —— (1925). The Nicomachean Ethics. In The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 9. Edited 
and Revised by Lesley Brown (ed. 2009). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
94. —— (2005). Aristotle. London: Routledge. 
95. Rousseau, J. J. (1997 [1750]). The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings. 
V. Gourevitch (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
96. Sandelin, B. (2014). A Short History of Economic Thought. London: Routledge.
97. Samaras, T. (2007).  ‘Aristotle’s Politics: The City of Book Seven and the 
Question of Ideology’. Classical Quarterly 57:77–89.
98. Sandel, M. (2012). What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New 
York: Farrar Straus Giroux.
99. Saunders, T. (1992). Aristotle: The Politics. London: Penguin.
100. —— (2002). Aristotle: Politics. Books I and II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
101. Scaltsas, T. (1993). The Golden Age of Virtue: Aristotle's Ethics. Athens: 
Alexandria Press.
218
102. —— (1995). ‘Reciprocal Justice in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’. Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (3):248-262.
103. —— (1996). ‘Good, Reason and Objectivity in Aristotle’. In: T. Scaltsas (ed.) 
The Aristotelian Ethics and its Influence. Athens: Εταιρεία Αριστοτελικών 
Μελετών.
104. Schumpeter, J. (1954a). History of Economic Analysis. Taylor & Francis e-
library. Routledge.
105. —— (1954b). Economic Doctrine and Method. Translated from the German 
(1912). New York: Oxford University Press.
106. Shields, C. (2007). Aristotle. London: Routledge
107. Shulsky (1991). ‘The Infrastructure of Aristotle’s Politics: Aristotle on 
Economics and Politics’. C. Lord & D. O'Connor (eds.), Essays on the 
Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
108. Simpson, P. (1998). A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
109. Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations.
110. Solmsen, F. (1964). ‘Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State’. Rheinisches 
Museum 107: 193–220.
111. Solomon, R. (1992) ‘Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian 
Approach to Business Ethics’. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2 (3): 317-339.
112. Sorabji, R. (1980). ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’. In: A. Rorty 
(ed.), Essays in Aristotle’s Ethics, 201-19. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
113. Soudek, J. (1952). ‘Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: An Inquiry into the Origin 
of Economic Analysis’. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
96:45-75.
114. Urmson, J. (1980). ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’. In: A. Rorty (ed.), Essays 
in Aristotle’s Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
115. Wiggins, D. (1980). ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason.’ In: A. Rorty (ed.), 
Essays in Aristotle’s Ethics, 221-240. Berkeley: University of California Press.
219
116. Wilson, C. (1896). ‘Aristotle's Classification of the Arts of Acquisition’. The 
Classical Review, 10 (4): 184-189.
117. Wilson, G. (1975). ‘The Economics of the Just Price’. History of Political 
Economy, 7 (1): 56-74.
118. Williams, B. (1980). ‘Justice as a Virtue’. In: A. Rorty (ed.), Essays in 
Aristotle’s Ethics, 157-170. Berkeley: University of California Press.
119. Young, C. (2006). ‘Aristotle’s Justice’. In: R. Kraut (ed.). The Blackwell Guide 
to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
